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P R E F A C E 
P R E F A C E 
By the turn of the l a s t century the eyes 
of the world conanunity were f ixed on a new power 
which had emerged on the fr inge of Asia, By her 
own e f f o r t s Japan had succeeded by 1899 i n removing 
the stigma of i n e q u a l i t y she carr i ed ever s ince the 
forced entry of f o r e i g n e r s i n t o Japan and her f i r s t 
t r e a t i e s were concluded with the western powers in 
1858, The world was astonished i n 1892 when Anglo-
Japanese Tfceaty came i n t o force which was the f i r s t 
b i l a t e r a l t rea ty between a western power and an 
o r i e n t a l n a t i o n . More than t h i s the m i l i t a r y de fea t 
Of Russia by Japan i n 1904-5 stunned the e n t i r e world 
and gave a new s p i r i t and confidence to the Asian 
nat ions i n t h e i r freedom s t r u g g l e s against European 
imperial ism. Japan became one of the major powers 
Of the world by the end of world War- Z* But world W«" 
II brought u t t e r d e v a s t a t i o n , t o t a l d e f e a t , and 
fore ign occtipation for the f i r s t time in her g l o r i o u s 
h i s t o r y . Cruel ac t s and a t r o c i t i e s committed by the 
i i 
Japanese agains t the Asian people during the war had 
generated tremendous hatred and b i t t e r n e s s towards 
Japan throughout Asia. J apan ' s postwar recons t ruc t ion 
and economic growth required access to raw mate r i a l s 
and markets in Asia. She had perforce to adopt a new 
approach towards postwar Asia. In t h i s t h e s i s I have 
t r i e d t o study the evolut ion of Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s 
from 1977 to 199 3 with a view to finding out the chara-
c t e r i s t i c t rends and tendencies during the period and 
the prospects of Indo-Japanese cooperation during the 
1990's . 
The miracle of economic growth has transformed 
Japan from a land of begging bowl in to one of the most 
prosperous na t ions within a span of j u s t 48 yea r s . 
The Japanese economic miracle i s awe-inspir ing, has 
become a cause of envy for the developed coun t r i e s and 
a g rea t source of hope . and i n s p i r a t i o n for the deve-
loping c o u n t r i e s . 
The supreme p r i o r i t y of Japan since the second 
world War has been the r e s t o r a t i o n of her i n d u s t r i a l 
p o t e n t i a l and economic competit ion with the west. As 
l i l 
and when the western powers decide to c u r t a i l the 
wings of Japan, a. r ad i ca l r e o r i e n t a t i o n of Japanese 
foreign economic policy wi l l be in order . Hence a 
r a d i c a l sh i f t in Japanese foreign pol icy towards 
India i s most probable because of the tremendous 
changes in the global scenar io in the post-Cold war 
e ra . Since India has already e s t ab l i shed i t s r epu t -
a t ion as a superpower of South Asia whose cooperation 
i s e s s e n t i a l l y requi red for maintaining peace and 
s t a b i l i t y in the Asian cont inent / Japan i s bound 
to c u l t i v a t e c lose r e l a t i o n s with India . Japan i s 
now a l l se t t o play a bigger ro le a t the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
l eve l through her economic might. Thus, the global 
economic g ian t has already a t t r a c t e d the a t t en t i on of 
the world and has become an important subject of 
academic research . Although Japan ' s r e l a t i o n s with 
her foremost a l l y , the U.S.A. and with other western 
coun t r i e s are s t i l l c l o se , growing s t r a i n s in t h e i r 
t rade r e l a t i o n s cannot be overlooked. The e rec t ion 
of a wall of protect ionism agains t Japanese expo^^ts 
by the western na t ions and the naming of Japan 
under the so-ca l led "Super-301" by the U.£,A. are sane 
of the ins tances of desperate e f f o r t s made by these 
i v 
coun t r i e s to browbeat Japan economically. In the 
l i g h t of these pecu l i a r i n t e r n a t i o n a l developments, 
the Japanese publ ic opinion has turned strongly 
against the U.S.A. and the western world and pressed 
the Japanese government to pursue an independent 
foreign pol icy and play a more meaningful ro le in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . 
Japan i s no longer the poorest member of 
z 
the r i c h m^*s club or even an underdeveloped 
country but li&s, become one of the r i c h e s t members of 
the r lchmen's c lub . Under the present circumstances 
the Third world i s the arena where Japan must seek 
newer prospects of t rade and future <deplbyine<nt- of 
i t s c a p i t a l and technology. Japan may use the foreign 
aid lever as a diplomatic Instrument t o spread i t s 
influence throughout the Third World. 
This has given r i s e to speculat ion t h a t , 
Japan, which i s undoubtedly an economic super-power, 
i s gradual ly preparing t o e s t a b l i s h her p o l i t i c a l 
l eadersh ip in Asia. To r e a l i z e t h i s ambition japan 
i s bound t o make f u l l e s t u t i l i z a t i o n of her economic 
p o t e n t i a l towards maintenance of s t a b i l i t y and peace 
in Asia* 
On the other hancL India which possesses 
abundant n a t u r a l resources and has the second l a r g e s t 
populat ion in the world also has tremendous po t en t i a -
l i t i e s . By v i r t u e of these mentioned f a c t o r s , India 
has emerged as the :. superpower of South Asia but s t i l l 
i t possesses tremendous p o t e n t i a l which i s not ye t 
^^^apped due to shortage of money and lack of techno-
log ica l development. Therefore, India urgent ly needs 
economic and technological ass i s tance for i t s socio-
economic development. Japan, en economic g ian t of the 
world, and an emerging leader of Asia, may play a 
major ro le in I n d i a ' s overa l l development. At the 
same time, japan a lso needs a new market for her 
goods because Japanese r e l a t i o n s with the wastern 
coun t r i e s are in doldrums. Despite the fac t t h a t 
India i s offer ing a vas t market for Japanese goods 
i t a lso possesses cheap labour which i s scarce in 
Japan, Hence, promotion of c lose t i e s between India 
v l 
and Japan can be expected to contribute s igni f i -
cantly to the attainment of the aims of japan 's 
Asian diplomacy; par t icular ly the long-term 
s tabi l iza t ion and strengthening of Jaipan's re la t ions 
with the Asian countries. Japan, should, of course, 
also str ive to further deepen her re la t ions with 
India not only in the economic field but also other 
areas as wellj^ Mutual dependence of Japan and India 
ca l l s for closer po l i t i c a l cooperation and economic 
collaboration. 
No doubt, Jsypan's post-war re la t ions with 
India have been largely economic having no po l i t i ca l 
overtones. Even economic re la t ions of Japan with 
the nations of South Asia remain modest as„ compared 
with the South-east Asian countries./Of c6u^se> Japan 
has increased rapidly her di rect investment abroad in 
the post-world war I I period^Japanese investment in 
South Asia has been sluggish and negligible and 
the region has yet to real ize, Itishigh hopes for 
increased Japanese investment and assistance. 
v i i 
The world has been undergoing many changes. 
The process of democratizat ion in eas t e rn Europe, 
the growing interdependence of na t iona l economies 
and above a l l , the co l lapse of the Soviet union as 
the Second super power of the world, have ended the 
cold war and given a new shape and d i r ec t ion to 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . The post-Cold war period 
has c e r t a i n l y reduced the t r a d i t i o n a l l y important 
ro le of the mi l i t a ry and the r o l e of economic might 
has become increas ingly important. Given such recent 
changes, Japan i s t ry ing to use i t s economic ass is tance 
as a tool to spread i t s influence in the Third world 
and, t o a large ex ten t , the appears to have been 
successful in her manipulations p a r t i c u l a r l y in 
Asia, India i s a lso grapppling with the new r e a l t i e s 
both within and outside Asia. Therefore, Japan and 
India are inc l ined t o improve t h e i r over a l l r e l a t i o n s 
cons tan t ly . India and Japan have long been fr iendly 
towards each other and p a r t i c u l a r l y India holds Japan ' s 
economic and technological s t rength in high regard. 
Since I n d i a ' s c o n s t r a i n t s of foreign exchange reserves 
and the debt servic ing have become major d i f f i c u l t i e s 
v i l l 
In the process of I n d i a ' s economic development, 
India I s compelled to expand the value and volume 
of her exports and exp lo i t her resources to gain 
maximum bene f i t . To achieve the above-mentioned 
ob jec t ives India can get much help from Japan. India, 
too, cannot be ignored by Japan due t o the former 's 
undisputed supremacy in the region of south Asia in 
terms of area, populat ion, na tu ra l resources and above 
a l l i t s p r e s t i ge and standing in world a f f a i r s . 
The study of Indo-japanese r e l a t i o n s i s not 
only a t ou t i ne matter but i s of v i t a l s t r a t e g i c , economic 
and p o l i t i c a l importance. Since Japan has already 
increased i t s ro le in the world a f f a i r s and become 
an economic force to be reckoned with, any study 
on Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s must be object ive as well 
as pene t r a t ing . The subject has been studied in an 
independent, inypartlal and unbiased way free from any 
b iases and p r o c l i v i t i e s . I have given equal respect 
and equal treatment to the respec t ive approaches, 
viewpoints and p o l i c i e s of both India and Japan. 
In the prepara t ion of t h i s study I have 
r e l i e d pr imar i ly on o f f i c i a l documents and s t a t i s t i c a l 
ix 
data published by the Japanese Government as well as 
on the abundant secondary sources avai lable in the 
country, some of which have been included in the 
select^ bibliography given at the end of t h i s 
study. I have p a r t i c u l a r l y drawn my s t a t i s t i c s from 
the following sources i 
(a) Financial s t a t i s t i c s and Direct ion of Trade 
S t a t i s t i c s of the In te rna t iona l Monetary fund 
(IMF). 
(b) Governmental and semi-governmental pub l ica t ions 
of Japan and India such as numerous white 
papers on In t e rna t iona l t r ade , JfepOrts of JETRO 
Japan .and , repor t s of the Indo-Japan Business 
Committee of India . 
I have a lso been for tunate in ge t t i ng in 
touch with the very few scholars in India who are 
ac t ive in the f i e l d of Japanese s t u d i e s . Their 
views and i n s i g h t s have g rea t ly benefi ted me in 
assessing Japanese r e l a t i o n s with India, 
In Chapter I , I have made an e f fo r t to 
analyze the var ious f ac to r s responsible for shaping 
Japan's foreign policy. Since world war I I I have 
highlighted the factors and forces behind the 
economic miracle of japan which made her an inde-
pendent po l i t i ca l actor pursuing an increasingly 
^assertive role in Asia. 
In chapter I I , I have t r ied to examine 
various factors which played a v i t a l role in shaping 
out India 's foreign policy since her independence in 
1947. An effort has been made to evaluate the causes 
which compelled India to adopt a policy of non-
alignment at her independents. I t has been shown 
that India has already become a superpower in south 
Asia and she i s str iving to improve her re la t ions 
with a l l the countries of Asian continent. 
Chapter I I I , deals with Indo-Japanese re la t ions 
during the period 1947-1976. An effort i s also made 
to look at the h is tor ica l t i e s between the two coun-
t r i e s br ief ly . In th i s chapter, various factors are 
discussed which led both Japan and India to have 
divergent paths on many international po l i t i ca l issues. 
x l 
I t s c e n t r a l point i s t h a t Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s 
are confined to commercial and economic spheres 
without any p o l i t i c a l moorings. 
In Chapter iv , which i s the s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t 
of t h i s study* I have evaluated Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s 
from 1977 t o 199B. In t h i s chapter an attempt i s made 
to examine the important events which have taken place 
and have had subs t en t i a l and l a s t i n g e f fec t on Indo-
Japanese r&Lat±anv, An-effort has been made to evaluate 
the f ac to r s which have led t o dramatic changes in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s which have r e su l t ed in ending 
the eold war and heralding a new e ra dominated by 
peaceful cooperat ion and coordina t ion . I t i s a lso 
displayed t h a t economics i s playing a very important 
role in the changing global context . India and japan 
have widened t h e i r con tac t s amidst the changing milieu 
of vvorld p o l i t i c s . 
In Chapter V# I have analyzed the prospects of 
Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s during the 1990*s and beyond, 
since Japanese economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t in Asia 
x l l 
i s increas ing day by day,the future holds b e t t e r 
prospects for Indo-Japanese Cooperation, I n d i a ' s 
dependence on Japan for c r e d i t s and t r ans f e r of 
technology and Japan ' s need t o acquire faw ma te r i a l s 
from and a big market for i t s products in India, 
have made both coun t r i e s in terdependent . Both s ides 
need each o ther . In t h i s fact l i e s the key to the 
growth of Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s in the years t o 
come. 
F ina l ly , the conclusion sums up the main 
f indings of the study. In the rap id ly changing 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , maintenance of regional 
peace and b i l a t e r a l and m u l t i l a t e r a l cooperat ion 
among na t ions have acquired added urgency, I have 
evaluated o p t i m i s t i c a l l y the prospects of improve-
ment in Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s and es tabl ishment 
of durable peace, s t a b i l i t y and prosper i ty in the 
Asia -Pac i f i c region through i n t e r n a t i o n a l coopera-
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C H A P T E R - I 
J a p a n ' s Fore ign P o l i c y Towards Fos t -war Asia 
C H A P T E R 
JAPAN'S FOREIGK POLICY TOWARDS POST-WAR ASIJ^  
The J ^ a n e s e archipe lago , l y ing o f f the eas tern 
coas t of the Asian cont inent s t r e t c h e s i n a narrow area 
3,800 k i lometres long . I t s t o t a l area of 3 ,77 ,815 square 
k i lometres i s s l i g h t l y larger than the United Kingdom 
but only about one n inth the s i z e of India and one twenty 
f i f t h tha t of the United S t a t e s , The Japanese archepelago 
was f i r s t inhabi ted more than 1 ,00 ,000 years ago when i t 
s t i l l comprised par t of the c o n t i n e n t a l Asian land mass. 
Agr icul ture , pr imari ly r i c e p l a n t i n g and metal working 
were introduced from the Asian cont inent around 300 B*C« 
Gradually, the small s t a t e s were un i t ed and by the fourth 
century p o l i t i c a l authori ty was c e n t r a l i z e d when Yanato 
ru led the n a t i o n . The per iod from the fourth century on-
wards saw the introduct ion of the Chinese c u l t u r e inc luding 
Confucianism and Buddhism!Buddhism was introduced in 538 
B. C. from India . 
Japan comprises a curved chain of more than 
3,000 i s l a n d s . Four l a r g e and main i s l a n d s , named (from 
North to South) Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, 
account for about ninety-eight percent of the land area. 
A resource-poor country, Japan has very l imited arable 
area not exceeding seventeen percent. Her Physical i s o l -
ation the Asian mainland has enabled her to develop her 
own culture and without being completely overshadowed 
and engulfed by the Chinese c i v i l i z a t i o n and her insula* 
r i ty also provided her security against external threats . 
The abundance of mountains and the lack of intercourse 
with outsideriB have made the Japanese people clannish and 
s t r i c t l y in ward looking. Japan's swift streams have proved 
of immense benefit to her industry, while her agricultural 
poverty and the dearth of >^'*^  ore have been v i t a l factors 
in shaping her foreign pol icy . 
To understand Japan's foreign policy in the 
perspective of post-war Asia, i t i s necessary f i r s t to 
have a look at her turbulent past and the impact i t has 
had on the Japanese soc iety . Three se ts of events, in 
part icular, appear to have exerted decis ive influence* 
(1) The self-inq?osed policy of i so la t ion 
(2) The developments leading to the Meiji Restoration and 
emergence of Japan as a modern power and 
(3) the defeat of Japan in the second World War and her 
occupation by the U.S. Armed Forces. 
The f i r s t event occured in 1637 when the 
Tokugawa shogun, l yeyasu , c l o s e d J ^ a n to fore ign 
i n t e r - c o u r s e and began an era which was not t o end 
u n t i l the "hermit** n a t i o n ' s doors were f o r c i b l y opened 
i n 1853-54 by CXdininodore perry* Japan managed to pursue 
a se l f - imposed p o l i c y of i s o l a t i o n for more than two 
hundred y e a r s , a l lowing only the Dutch and the Chinese 
to carry on trade at l^agasaki whi le forbidding her own 
n a t i o n a l s to s e t foo t on fore ign s o i l . This i s o l a t i o n i s m 
was motivated by the fear of fore ign c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e s 
and European aggress ion . 
The i s o l a t i o n i t s p o l i c y of the Tokugawa regime 
was, no doubt/ r e spons ib l e for the nat ion lagging behind. 
But on the other s i d e t h i s regime gave the Japanese people 
a sense of d i s c i p l i n e , a sense of unity and, above a l l , a 
strong f e e l i n g of nat ional ism which proved an a s s e t at 
the time of t r a n s i t i o n t o the Meiji per iod (1868-1912) .As 
Sir G. Sanson remarks, "Tokugawa s o c i e t y was a matxire 
and s t a t i c feudalism i n which the v i r t u e s of obedience 
and l o y a l t y were p r i z e d beyond a l l o thers" . U l t imate ly , 
1, B.R. C h a t t e r j i . Modern Japan (Meeruts Meenaks^Publishers, 
1 9 6 6 ) , p . 5 . 
t h i s pol icy of national i so la t ion led to p o l i t i c a l , 
economic and social exclusivlsm and stagnation. 
In the middle of the 19th century ••powerful, 
well-organized and ruthless western nations* armed with 
too ls and we^ons forged in the industrial revolution 
were engaged ei ther in iinposing their wi l l on the 
weeker lands of Asia and Africa or in reducing them 
outright to colonies and dependencies'*, japan also 
f e l t the b i t e of Western arms when American warships 
under the command of commodore perry steamed into Yedo 
(TOKYO) in 1853-54 and conqpelled her to open i t s doors 
to foreign trade. I t was yet another s igni f icant event 
which led to c i v i l war for a few years culminating in 
the downfall of the Tokugawa regime and Meiji Restor-
ation which in turn was destined to change the course of 
Japanese foreign pol icy . 
2. Klichl Aichl, "japan's Legacy and Destiny of change.". 
Foreign Affairs , Vol. 48, No. 1 (Oct. 1969), p. 22. 
Thus in Japanese history a new era began early 
in January 1868, when the young enqperor officially 
assumed direct control of the state which event came 
to be known as the "Meiji Restoration". The Meiji 
Restoration is regarded as the starting point of modern-
ization of Japan. The circumstances in which japan's 
modernization had its beginning were to have major influ-
ence not only on Japanese society, economy and the psycho-
logical makeup of her people but also on Japanes foreign 
policy. The new regime had been deeply impressed by the 
helplessness of the earlier Tokugawa regime in the face 
of western military powers, and the humiliation they had to 
suffer because of their military weakness. Obviously, they 
were eager to create a Japan capable of holding her own 
in the modern world. Outrightly they thought firstly in 
terms of military might, but soon realized the heart of 
problem that ito. achieve military might J^an essentially 
required an econcmic, social and intellectual renovation. 
The Restoration government therefore adopted a series of 
vigrous policies aimed at achieving rapid modernization, 
comprised of measures whose goal was epitomized by such 
slogans as "Rich country, strong army" and "Increase 
production, promote industry" . Keeping in mind the past 
3. Koichi Kishimoto, Polit^ ics in Mo<^ ern japan (Tokyo; Echo 
Inc. Publishers, l977)p. 12. 
Images of humiliation caused by military and economic 
weakness of the Tokugawa regime the Melji government 
made concerted efforts to make Japan a powerful modern 
state capable of meeting any challenge in the future. 
Thus, J^an emerged not only as the first Asian country 
which banished illiteracy from the nation entirely but 
also became an industrial and military giant of the 
modern world by the end of the nineteenth century, 
"japan astonished the world by increasing her exports 
in midst of the depression and the future looked bright 
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for the J^anese". Sir G. Sansom points out, "The main 
causes of Japan's spectacular economic advance were her 
disciplined and deligent man power, their simple stan-
dard of living and the attention paid by the government 
to the development of industry and trade in the natio-
nal interest." 
The (emergence of the first world war in 
Europe gave a golden opportunity for the expension of 
Japanese economic and political empire in Asia which 
4. Robert A. Scalapino, The Foreign Policv of Modem 
Japan, (university of California press, 1977),p.213, 
5. Chatterji, op.cit.^p» 25. 
brought her a s t a t u s of major power in the modern world. 
Japan p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the peace conference he ld at Versa-
i l l e s i n 1919 as one of the m i l i t a r y and i n d u s t r i a l g i a n t 
of the modern world and acquired recogn i t i on as one of the 
"Big Five" of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l order. This speedy emergence 
of Japan as modern economic and m i l i t a r y might gave a 
boost t o her i m p e r i a l i s t i c ambition t o become a l eader of 
Asia« u l t i m a t e l y culm^joat^d i n a heavy attack on the 
American naval base at Jp^arl Harbqr on 7th December* 1941« 
>n of wat without a p r i o r dec lara t ion f t that invo lved both japan 
and America in the Second world war which had already 
s t a r t e d in 1939. But t h i s Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour 
proved as a bane for her might because i t i n v i t e d a strong 
American Army, Navy and a i r f o r c e aga ins t her which ruined 
Japanese power by dropping two atom bombs on August 6 and 9, 
wiping out the Japanese c i t i e s HTroshima and Nagasaki. The 
ers twhi le powerful empire s a w ' i t s abysmal cataclysm and had 
no way except to surrender uncondi t iona l ly before A l l i e d i 
powers on 14th August* 1945* The Emperor himself anounced 
the news of j a p a n ' s surrender on the radio on 15th August* 
1945 as "Let one e n t i r e nat ion continue as one family from 
generat ion to gnerat ion mindful of the long road before i t . 
Unite your t o t a l s t rength t o be devoted to the cons truct ion 
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of the futxire. Thus the second world war came to an end 
with the defeat of an economically and p o l i t i c a l l y powerful 
eirpire which brought Japan for the f i r s t time in her long 
history under foreign occupation or a l l i e d occupation which 
was the l a s t s igni f icant event, altered the entire course 
of Japan's foreign policy in the post war Asia. 
Post war japan came under the administration of 
the Al l ied Powers (v irtual ly , the U.S.A.) and on 6th 
September, 1945, General Doughlas IBacActber received his 
o f f i c i a l designation as the Supreme Commander for the All ied 
Powers. I t was the f i r s t Japanese defeat which l e f t her 
under American occupation, which wrote a remarkable chapter 
in the history of Japan by introducing so many reforms with 
cooperation of the Enperor on her s o i l . General Macrther 
took various steps to promote d«nocratizatlon and disbanded 
iiT^erial armed forces and tr ied to mitigate militarism. 
The Japanese extended their fu l l cooperation to these refor-
mative steps of Macrther by real iz ing r ight ly that i t was 
almost impossible to Japan to reemerge as a major military 
power in the modern nuclear world with i t s geographical 
l imitat ions . At the same time, the very survival of japan 
6. Ibid, p.85. 
was at stake due to abysmal economic fiasco gifted by 
war and there was no other way before her except to 
believe in the principle of interdependence, mutual 
trust, cooperation and peace. The world saw for the 
first time a unique type of relationships between the 
victor and the vanquished when America beared all pain 
to make the economic recovery of Japan while Japanese 
responded with surprizing cooperation to Americans in 
spite of the fact that America was mainly responsible 
for their calamity. "Under the guidance of the Emperor, 
Japan accepted her defeat in such a way that she earned 
7 
the title of the "World's worst winner; Best Loser". 
The changing trends in the global situation at 
the time of Japanese recovery, of course, gave a new 
shape to Japan's future. As soon as the war ended the 
entire gamut of the international relations was engulfed 
by a new kind of war termed as 'Cold War'. The Union of 
Soviet socialist Republic emerged as another super power 
of the world after the America in the end of the second 
world war. The Cold war virtually divided almost the 
whole world into two camps known as western canp under 
7. Ibid.,p. 102. 
10 
the l eadersh ip of America and comnunlst capip under 
the l eadersh ip of Sovie t Union. The ©mergence of china 
in Asia as a cornnunlst State In 1949 under the leader* 
ship of Mao alarmed Western Powers aibout the Increas ing 
s trength of communism and t h i s development s h i f t e d the 
thea tre of co ld war from Europe t o Asia, Jus t a f t e r a 
year North-Korea backed up by communist regime of Soviet 
Union and P e o p l e ' s Republic of China attafclMfl on South 
Korea popularly known as pro-Western country. This was 
the most Important event which had i t s v i t a l impact in 
shaping Japan's f ore ign p o l i c y in l a t e r y e a r s . Though, 
Japanese, a f t er the war began t o hate war and had deep 
longing for peace at any c o s t (showed by t h e i r acceptance 
of renouncing war a r t i c l e IX) got themselves q u i t e f a i l e d 
t o forget the growing threat of 'red expenslonisro" or 
comiraanism due t o her geographical l o c a t i o n near U.S.S.R. 
and China. This fear of Japan u l t i m a t e l y culminated i n t o 
a t reaty of mutual peace and s e c u r i t y with the United 
S t a t e s , which provided an American commitment for Japanese 
p r o t e c t i o n from the o u t s i d e threat and the continuance of 
American bases i n Japan. In fac t , America under the pressure 
of g lobal c ircumstances wanted to c u l t i v a t e japan as a 
counter weight of conuminlst powers so red expansionism could 
be curbed and coped up with f u l l might. 
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Thus Americans r e v o l u t i o n i z e d the s t eps of Japanese 
recovery and Japanese with f u l l enthusiaent* drudgery and 
ded icat ion t r a n s l a t e d these s t e p s i n the g l o r i o u s s u c c e s s . 
I t was at t h i s time on September 8, 1951, in san Francisco , 
49 c o u n t r i e s s igned a peace t r e a t y with J ^ a n , The Japan 
and U.S. s ecur i ty t rea ty was s igned on the same day but 
both t r e a t i e s took e f f e c t on April 28, 1952. Japan, thus 
regained i t s independence and made progress i n economic 
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Though American occupation aided and played 
an important ro l e in the transformation of japan but, no 
doubt, Japanese themselves deserve most of the c r e d i t for 
what they have gained in p o s t war years . 
After (Independence i n 1952 Japanese government gave 
p r i o r i t i e s for her recovery from the l o s s e s of world war II 
and for the bui ld ing of an economic s trength with a c t i v e 
cooperat ion of United S t a t e s . In order t o nurture Japan, a 
s t a b l e and a prospering democracy U.S.A. provided opportu-
n i t y to japan region access t o world market and raw materials^ 
japan has achieved a remarkable record of recovery r i s i n g 
from the ashes of defeat in 1945 and has emerged an economic 
power in the world community. 
This surpr is ing economic growth of Japan have had 
i t s deep Impact on japan ' s fore ign p o l i c y . Now Japan's 
12 
economic inf luence i s not only confined t o Asia r a the r i t 
has alarmed almost e n t i r e vwrld. The japan an economic 
g ian t of the modern world may use i t s economic might as 
the diplomatic too l to maintain her inf luence and hegemony 
in i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . 
In February 1989 Prime Minister cha t icha i choonhavan 
of Thailand sa id "The world economic war i s over, Japan has 
won.\ 
Thus, this historic economic resurgence of Japan 
which has made her one of the roost powerful economic giant 
of the modern world, will have its own paramount role in 
shaping the future of the Asia in particular and the world 
in general, 
Japan, the place of rising sun, is a country of 
several .islands grouped together. At one end it touches 
the Russian territory on the West and American borders on 
the East. This geographical situation of japan has given 
her a strategic significance due to the fact of which 
Japan has played an effective role in the Asian affairs. 
S.Bruce Koppel and Michael Plummer, "japan Ascandancy As 
A Foreign-Aid Power", Asian Survey. Vol. XXIX, No,11, 
1989. 
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As soon as Japan emerged a major power In the beginning 
of the twentieth century, she began to give utmost impor-
tance to th i s region. The catchy slogans l ike "Asia for 
Asians" and "Greater East Asian coprosperity zone" aired 
by Japanese leadership in the beginning when they recog-
nised Japan as an •Asian roof* which wi l l protect them 
against the Western ' imperial i s t rain». In other words 
Asian people meekly considered Japan as their 'guard' 
against foreign threat. But soon they rea l i sed that over 
ambitious japan wanted to cu l t iva te herself as their 
•Master' rather than their 'Guard'. Despite the fact 
that th is over ambitious and imperial is t design of Japan 
was largely responsible in breaking down the shackles of 
Western colonialism in almost entire Asia, even, after 
t h i s , public opinion in t h i s continent turned severely 
against her, due to their unprecedented devastation 
caused by Japan during the Second World War. Of course, 
the strong sense of nationalism, rec ia l equality and 
confidence among Asian was the by product of Japanese 
victory over European powers, such as J^anese forces 
defeated Russia in 1904-5. "We may say that i t was japan 
which started the revolution in 19 41-42 which swept over 
Asia and has changed today the very nature of world 
14 
p o l i t i c s , with the war cry 'Asia for Asians* Japanese 
forces over-ran French Indo-china, B r i t i s h M a l ^ a and 
Burma and Dutch Indones ia , The t i d e of J ^ a n e s e advance 
r o l l e d t o the eas tern gate of India , The surrender of 
B r i t i s h army at Singapore d e a l t a staggening blow t o the 
European hodl on Asia and the p o s i t i o n could not be 
r e t r i e v e d . Whatever might have been the mistakes committed 
by the Japanese m i l i t a r i s t in the c o u n t r i e s they ' l i b e r a t e d ' , 
the viatnamese, the Indonesians and the Burmese would not 
accept again t h e i r former European masters . 'The propaganda 
of 'Asia for the A s i a t i c s ' was not s i l e n c e d by Japan's 
defeat i n war.what Japan did so s u c c e s s f u l l y was to destroy 
9 
the 19th century s tructure of c o l o n i a l empire i n Asia", 
But the second world war ended i n Japanese defeat which 
brought her under the fore ign r u l e . Japan's pre-war deeds 
have had deep impact on the j a p a n ' s fore ign p o l i c y p a r t i -
cu lar ly in the context of Asia. 
After the Second World War, a number of new and 
independent nat ions emerged i n the Asian cont inent due to 
the c o l l a p s e of Western i m p e r i a l i s t might in t h i s reg ion . 
But soon these na t ions were involved in t h ^ c o l d war 
s tructure and v i r t u a l l y d iv ided i n t o twb p l o c k s known as 
\ / 
9. Chat ter j i , 2k» c i t . . p .102 
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communist and non-coitinunist bnel Japan, which was already 
under the American occupation could a l so rega in her 
independence i n 1952 and became an important a l l y of the 
U.S.A. The San Francisco Peace Treaty brought an end of 
A l l i e d occupation and opened a new age i n japan ' s approach 
to the external world. But the unprecendented catastrophy 
of the Second World war had l e f t deep wounds in the minds 
of the people who kept on harbouring doubts about the 
Japan's honesty and d e c i l i t y . "New Zealand and Austra l ia 
shared the f ears of other p a c i f i c s t a t e s that Japan might, 
even without v i o l a t i n g the t r e a t y terms, rearm and become 
a meance again i n the Far East . I t was seen at the time 
when the Japanese Premier Yoshida attempted to c l e a r these 
doxjbts before peace t r e a t y by saying that the "Japan of 
today i s no longer t h e Japan of Yesterday, we w i l l not 
f a i l your expec ta t ions of us as a new nat ion . 
Since the emergence of Japan as a modern p o l i t y , 
Japanese l eadersh ip has showp^ore i n t e r e s t i n East and 
Southest Asia due to an immenc^ importance of the these 
reg ions to Japan. In comparison to these reg ion , japan 
was l e a s t concerned with r e s t of the Asian par t s in the 
^ 
10. / Tech andlwehrle. I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s in East Asia 
/v(New YorKr Praeger Pub l i shers , 1975), p . 156. 
11. I b i d » , p . l 5 7 ; 
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pre-war as well as in the Post-war period. This over-
Interest of japan In the East and South East Asia 
s t irred her for an unprecedented and widespread ruin 
of these regions which suffered most in Asia during the 
second world war. I t was the main reason that East Asian 
and southest Asian countries with their sense of insecurity 
reacted in a very of All ied occupation in 1952. Even the 
San Franslsco Peace Treaty (concluded by 48 nations with 
japan on September 8,1951) was fa i l ed in mitigating the 
sense of fear and insecurity of East Asian and sougheast 
Asian nations. 
Consistent e f forts were made by the Japanese 
leadership in the post-war years to promote Japan's good 
re lat ions with East Asian countries particularly with Korea 
and China which are very important to Japan from thelr \ 
geographical point of view. 
As in the pre-weu: period, the Japanese leadership 
always advocated that Tokyo must capture the Korean peninsula 
in order to protect Japanese in tegr i ty and her economic and 
p o l i t i c a l empire in the Asian continent because th i s 
peninsula was the most clear and suitable route for foreign 
aggression on the Japanese is lands. In post-war years when 
the Korean peninsula was divided into South Korea and North 
17 
Korean, japan recognized south korea and renewed its efforts 
to improve her ties with South Korea and had no official 
devlings with north Korea. But relations between the south 
Korea and Japan remain strained because of the colonial 
experience left a legacy of deep doubts between the two 
countries. "Memory of the Past governed personal and official 
attitudes on both sides, and the legacy colonialism got in 
12 the way of rapid settlement of difficulties. The doubts,in 
the minds of the Korean people that japan may try again to 
maintain her hegemony in thetr country, were later strengthened 
by President of South Korea Syngman Rhee for his own political 
interests and remained as the wall between the two nations 
good relations. "In 1957 the London Times guestioned whether 
Rhee could accept the possibility of a fair settlement with 
japan, whose people* he had persistently denounced as untrus-
13 tworthy and incorrigibly aggressive". "In December 1955, 
the well known Jaqpanese Christian leader, Toyohiko Kagawa, 
made an eloquent appeal in an open letter to President Rhee, 
which was printed widely in the Japanese press Kagawa wrotej 
12. /olsonlLawre^^, Japan In Post-war Asia (New Yrok t 
PraegeFTuBlTshers, 1970),p. 102. 
13. i b i ^ pp. 109-110. 
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"As Saul tried to kill David, the Japanese 
toctured Your Excellency and oppressed your 
people. In the name of Christ I apoligize 
to your Excellency/ and appealing to your 
Christian conscience« beg for your forgiveness. 
Forgive like the Lord who for gave this enemies 
on the cross and bring permanent peace 
between Great Korea and japan". 
pressing his appeal, Kagawa drew examples from American 
history : 
"There was a time when the United S ta te s was a 
colony of Great B r i t a i n . Angered by B r i t a i n ' s 
oppress ion of the c o l o n i e s , George Washington 
stoodup and fought against England to achieve 
today ' s independence. However, at present o ld 
hatreds are f o r g o t t e n . . . . I wish the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between Great Korea and japan would be l i k e 
t h i s . ^ * 
In s p i t e of U.S. r o l e as a mediator the r e l a t i o n s h i p of 
South Korea and J ^ a n Kept on r o l l i n g i n oldfeirums u n t i l 
14. I b i d . , p . 110. 
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Rhee had fallen from power in 1950. Rhee's departure opened 
a new era of healthy relations between the two countries 
when they signed a treaty on June 22, 1965 that settled the 
reparation question which was a major dispute between the 
two. In this treaty, »Japan pledged to extend $ 500 million 
in government aid. Of this, $ 300 million was in outright 
grants and $ 200 million in twenty years loans at 3.5 per 
cent interest, with a seven years moratorium on repayment. 
The loans were to be extended through the new oversees 
Economic cooperation Fund. In addition the Japanese govern-
ment aggreed to facilitate private credits of another $ 
300 million to South Koreans. All this compensation was made 
in a form that stressed economic cooperation, not reparations, 
a word already distasteful enough to the Japanese public 
15 
and impossible to stomach where Korea was concerned. 
By the end of the decade, economic relations between the 
two countries could improve to a pleasant point. "The cumul-
ative total of investments in South Korea, which was only 
about $ 15 M, by the end of 1969 fiscal year, had already 
reached $ 47 M. by July 1970 and $ 650 million by March 
15. Ibid, p. 113. 
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1973, with the Japanese Investment Inflow at nearly $ 1 0 3 
m i l l i o n i n the f i r s t quarter of 1973 alone". Though 
South Korea has been one of the important r e c i p i e n t of 
japan' s economic assistaxv:;e but t h e i r r e l a t i o n s were not 
free from the Chi l l as w e l l . But Japan, infact« could come 
c l o s e r to South Korea under the l eadership of former Japanese 
prime Minister Nakasone who always kept japan ' s g lobal r o l e 
i n h i s mind and inqproved r e l a t i o n s with south Korea at 
f a s t e r pace by convincing p r e s i d e n t Chun. "When Nakasone 
become Prime Minis ter , he soon e s t a b l i s h e d a personal r e l a -
t ionsh ip with Pres ident Chun and a compromise se t t l ement of 
the aid quest ion was reached. Japan agreed to provide 
$ 1.85 b i l l i o n in yen c r e d i t s over a seven year per iod as 
17 
wel l as $ 2.15 b i l l i o n i n non-concess ional c r e d i t s . Mow 
the maturity of t h e i r card ia l r e l a t i o n s can be e a s i l y seen 
in t h e i r f a s t iir^roving trade r e l a t i o n s . "Two way trade 
between japan and Korea reached $ 27 b i l l i o n in 1988, a 
fourty f o l d i n c r e a s e over the l a s t two decades that made 
Korea ja pan ' s second most important trading partner a f t er 
the United States".^® 
16. ft.P. Sinha, "Japanese Foreign Investment", The worl^ 
Today, Vol . 31 , No.4 (April 1975) ,pp. 144. 
17. William L. Brooks and Robert M. Orr. , j apan ' s Foreign 
Economic Ass i s tance 
18. saburo Okita, "Japan's Qui^te Strength", Foreign P o l i c v , 
No.75 (Summer 1989) , p . 1^6. 
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China, another important country to Jaqpan in East 
Asia, emerged a communist country in post-war years y ie lded 
so many diplomatic de l i cac i e s because of being an a l ly of 
U«S.A. Japan, i n the pre-war per iod spent l a rge amounts in 
Manchuria and t r i e d to con t ro l the commerce of China and 
even des i red to have good commercial r e l a t i o n s with China 
due to her r i chness in resources and vas t market. But due 
to the emergence of cold war and v e r t u a l l y under the pressure 
of America, Japan recognized N a t i o n a l i s t China ( under 
Chiang Kai Shek ) as l eg i t ima te en t i ty and concluded a 
separa te peace t r e a t y with Taiwan in April 1952 which 
caused envy to Cuina. ••premier Yoshida in a l e t t e r to secr -
etary of Sta te Dulles i n s i s t e d tha t japan wished u l t ima te ly 
to recognize Peking and to have normal r e l a t i o n s with tha t 
regime. Yoshida meant to leave the future open; but the 
t r e a ty had the ef fec t of acknowledging the legit imacy of 
the Chinese Na t iona l i s t regime as the government of china 
19 and made a peace t r e a t y with Peking impossible" . Though, 
t h e i r unof f i c ia l t r ade was continued due t o t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l 
and c u l t u r a l a f f i n i t y but o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s between the two 
count r ies could not be resumed for almost two decades, the 
revolut ionary economic progress of Japan in 1960s and the 
19. Lawrence, 2E« c i t . , pp. 74-75. 
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attractions of the vast market of China, renewed Japan's 
enthusaism and eagerness to give a new thrust to their 
re lat ions , on the other hand China was also interested in 
getting economic and technological assistance from japan 
in order to modernize i t s e l f . In the meantime, the cold war 
between America and China came to end due to the shrewd 
diplomacy of Henery Kissinger, Secretary of State. The process 
of 'Detente' between America and China soon saw the v i s i t of 
U.S. president Nixon to Peking in 1972. Thus, Japan, for 
the f i r s t time in the post-war years could get an opportunity 
to revive her re lat ions with China by recognizing I t in 1972 
which was the major conf l ic t ing i ssue between the two nations. 
Since the pcocess of normalization started in 197 2, both 
countries have shown fast growing pace of their economic 
re lat ions and f inal ly Japan and the People's Republic of 
China concluded a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. 
Since then both countries have displayed their over-enthusia-
s t i c interes t in improving their diplomatic and eccaiomic 
t i e s . Now China has taken a very s ignif icant place in Japanese 
foreign economic pol icy s imilarly, Japan looms large in 
Chinese foreign economic po l i cy . "Trade l eve l s now range 
between $ 9 and $ lO b i l l i o n annually, japan i s committed 
through private and o f f i c i a l means to ass i s t ing china in i t s 
modernization e f for t s , japan provides China with much needed 
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c e ^ i t a l and technology/ while china supp l i e s Japan o i l , 
coal and other m a t e r i a l s . Since 1979 Tokyo has des ignated 
China as a p r i o t i t y a id -rec ipent and has a l l o c a t e d about $ 
3.5 b i l l i o n i n yen c r e d i t s mainly for r a i l road and port 
cons truc t ion p r o j e c t s . Loans were a l s o made for a petrochem-
i c a l p r o j e c t at Daging and an i r o n m i l l at Baoshan In addi-
t i o n , Tokyo has funded by g r a n t - a i d a thousand bed h o s p i t a l 
in Be i j ing as a symbol of Sino-Japanese fr iendship and i s 
invo lved i n a major a g r i c u l t u r a l t e chn ica l a s s i s t a n c e pro jec t 
in Northeast China, i n 1982 China became the top r e c e i p i e n t 
20 
of j apan ' s b i l a t e r a l ODA.* 
r 
In l a s t years* the U.S.S.R. under the leadership 
Of Gorbachev had a l s o adopted a s o f t a t t i t u d e towards japan. 
Gorbachev in h i s Vladivostok speech on 28 July 1986 recogni -
zed japan "as a Power of paramount Importance" and in Be i j ing 
on 17 May 1989, he expressed Soviet Union's "Keen i n t e r e s t " 
21 
in developing close relations with j^an . This development 
had further encouraged China to develop stronger ties with 
Jaqpan. China seems to be keener to come close to ja^an. Keeping 
in mind Russians overtures of wooing it even under the lead-
ership of BMS Yelsin Li Peng Prime Minister of China visited 
20. Brooks and Orr, 2E« £ii,««)PP« 331-2. 
21. Indian Express , August 17, 1989, p . 8 . 
24 
Japan and received warm welcome there, japan has now 
become a big source of technology to China, and the 
latter has emerged as the largest trading partner of 
22 
Japan a f ter Hong Kong, * In August 1988 Takeshita Pledged 
a package of s o f t loans and other a s s i s t a n c e for 1990 
through 1995 t o t a l i n g 810 b i l l i o n yen ( $ 6 .3 b i l l i o n in 
23 1988 d o l l a r s ) . Now Sino->Japanese r e l a t i o n s are not only 
stronger i n economic f i e l d but o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s are f a s t 
g e t t i n g matured. In 1987, 418.00 Japanese v i s i t e d China 
and 73,000 Chinese v i s i t e d Ja^jan f i g u r e s that are 18 t imes 
higher than 10 years ago. In comparision, 315, 000 Americans 
v i s i t e d china i n 1987.^* 
Japan's r e l a t i o n s with Taiwan during post-war 
years remain very c l o s e . The most important factor in 
t h e i r good r e l a t i o n s was j a p a n ' s recogn i t i on of Taiwan 
regime as the l e g i t i m a t e government of china. Only in 1972» 
Taiwan threatened tu severe diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with japan 
when Japan recognized P e o p l e ' s Republic of China but soon 
agreed to a new s i t u a t i o n in which Japan and Taiwan exchanged 
"unof f i c ia l" miss ions and continued t h e i r trade . Both the 
22. Ib id , p . 4 . 
23. Ckita, 0£. c i t . o p . 135. 
24. I b i d . , p . 1 3 5 . 
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countr ie s are i n cxose contact with each Other and further 
strengthening t h e i r t i e s . 
The economic miracle hasi urged japan to play a 
more important r o l e i n Bast Asia, japan has already s t a r t e d 
to spread i t s in f luence in t h i s region by using economic aid 
as a diplomatic t o o l which i s c l e a r l y seen i n i t s approach to 
i t s neighbours i n East Asia. Though japan ' s r e l a t i o n s with 
i t s East Asian neighbours are d i sp lay ing good progress^ 
susp ic ion and b i t t e r n e s s towards japan has been a major 
legacy of World War I I , A c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s was seen 
i n September 1984 South Korean Pres ident Chun DOO Hwan's 
f i r s t v i s i t t o Tokyo. En^eror Hirohi to had t o g ive a c a r e f u l l y 
25 
ru l er of Korea i n the decades before the Second World war. 
In 1986 j a p a n ' s newly appointed Education Minis ter , Mosayuki 
Fuj io , was forced t o r e s i g n because of Chinese and Korean 
p r o t e s t s over h i s support for r e v i s i o n i s t school h i s tory 
t e x t books and h i s i l l - c o n s i d e r e d remarks implying Korean 
compl ic i ty in japan ' s 1910 annexation of the country, prime 
Minister Nakasone p u b l i c i t y apologized for the i n c i d e n t . 
More recent ly i n May 1988, another r ight-wing Minis ter , 
Sisuke Okuno, was forced to re s ign for remarks that sought 
25. Barry Bujan, "Japan's Futurei Old History versus new 
r o l e s " In ternat iona l A f f a i r s , v o l . 6 4 . No.4(Autumn 1988) , 
p . 558. 
26 
to whitewash japan ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the outbreak of 
war with china in 1937,^^ Though 45 years have e lapsed 
s ince World war I I but South Korea s t i l l forbids the 
27 
showing of Japanese f i lms i n the country. 
The Southeast Asian region i s the most inpor-
tant region to japan ' s economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s 
i n Asia. Keeping i n mind the v i t a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s 
region to i t s o b j e c t i v e s the Japanese l eadership has t r i e d 
to keep p o l i t i c a l , economic and c u l t u r a l hegemony of Japan 
over t h i s region in the prewar per iod as we l l as in the 
post-war per iod . As po in ted out by Wanaudi, t h i s i s true 
f i r s t , because more than 80% of j apan ' s energy and 60% of 
i t s raw materia l requirements pass through southeast Asia. 
Second, Southeast Asia i t s e l f i s important to japan as a 
market, a source of raw mater ia l s and food s t u f f s , and as 
28 
a f i e l d of investments . The Japanese l eadersh ip in i t s 
fore ign p o l i c y always gave p r i o r i t y for maintaining good 
r e l a t i o n s with southeast Asian nat ions and p a r t i c u l a r l y 
s ince 1952 the Japanese diplomats have shown renewed i n t e -
r e s t in t h i s reg ion as a trading partner , a source of raw 
mater ia l s and a p l a c e for p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e . Thus, r i g h t 
from i t s independence, japan has been making overtures to 
26. I b i d , , p . 558. 
27. "Japan and The Third world". The Economist, June 17, 
1989, p . 1 7 . 
28rOjusuf Wanandi, " P o l i t i c o - s e c u r i t y Dimensions of South-
eas t Asia", Asian Survey Vol . xx. No.7, (July 1980) 
t) .779. 
27 
woo south-eas t Asian c o u n t r i e s which s t i l l abhor Japan's 
a troc ious r o l e dxiring the second world war which had l e f t 
deep scars and susp ic ions in Southeast Asia, I t was the 
reason t h a t c o u n t r i e s of Southeast A s i a . l i k e P h i l i p p i n e s , 
Indones ia . Vietnam and Burma s trong ly opposed the San 
Fransisco Peace Treaty. These c o u n t r i e s manifested t h e i r 
r e a c t i o n s in t h e i r demand for reparet ions and t e r r i t o r i a l 
s e c u r i t y . The P h i l i p p i n e s and Indonesia i n i t i a l l e d the 
t rea ty but refused t o r a t i t y i t u n t i l reparat ions agreements 
29 
s a t i s f y i n g t h e i r c la ims were reached. Though Japan s t a r t e d 
t a l k s with these c o u n t r i e s on the quest ion of reparat ions 
as early as i n 1951 but without p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s because of 
the s t i f f stand of both P a r t i e s . U l t imate ly Japan could 
reach to a po int of s o l u t i o n on the ques t ion of reparat ions , 
with Burma i n 1954 which a l s o l e d t o agre«nents with P h i l i -
ppines (1956) . Indones ia (1956) and Vietnam(l959) . A Burmese 
de legat ion arr ived in Tokyo i n the Summer of 1954 and within 
three months s igned a reparat ions agreement tha t was r a t i f i e d 
by both c o u n t r i e s in the spring of 1955. Repretion agree-
ment for P h i l i p p i n e came on April 27, 1956, was r e t i f i e d 
by the Diet on June 4 and by the Ph i l ipp ine Senate on July lO, 
29. Lawrence, 2£» S i i» • P« ^^• 
30. Ibid .« p . 22. 
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29 
I t went Into e f f e c t on July 23# and diplomatic r e l a t i o n s 
31 
were r e s t o r e d . Reparations for Indonesia were not 
s e t t l e d u n t i l 19i8« when the amount was s e t at $ 223 
m i l l i o n over twelve years , p l u s $ 400 m i l l i o n i n p r i v a t e 
loans and inves tments . In add i t ion , a trade debt to Japan 
of $ 117 m i l l i o n which had been d e l i b e r a t e l y unpaid for 
y e a r s , was c a n c e l l e d . F ina l ly i n May 1959, a small repara-
t i o n s agreement was s igned with south Vietnam, to be used 
ulmost e n t i r e l y for cons truc t ion of a h y d r o e l e c t r i c p r o j e c t 
on the Da Ninh River. Other agreements in l i e u of repara-
32 t i o n s were l a t e r made with Laos and Combodia. 
The reparat ions payments which japan had agreed 
33 to make t o the four claimant c o u n t r i e s are as f o l l o w . 
31. I b i d . , p . 25. 
32. I b i d . , p . 26. 
33. I tagaki Yo ich i , "Reparations and Southeast Asia". 
Japan QuarterIv, 1959, p . 441. 
30 
After g e t t i n g r i d of the major i s s u e of 
reparat ions , Japan s t a r t e d expanding i t s economic t i e s 
and trade r e l a t i o n s i n southeast Asia, p a r t i c u l a r l y with 
ASEAN countr i e s (The P h i l i p p i n e s , Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Indones ia ) , japan emerged soon as the pree -
minent partner of the south e a s t Asian nat ions p a r t i c u -
l a r l y the ASEAN s t a t e s because her economic miracle had 
made Japan t h e i r main trading partner and t h e i r b i g g e s t 
source of t h e economic and t e c h n o l o g i c a l a s s i s t a n c e . None-
t h e l e s s , approximately 83% of Japan's development aid 
was d i rec ted to the developing Asian region and about 
67% to Southeast Asia i n 1969.^* In a very short span 
of time japan emerged as one of the most powerful trading 
partner in the southeast Asian reg ion . By the l a t e 1960s, 
Japan was the leading i n v e s t o r , aid-donor and trading 
partner of Southeast Asia and h i s preeminent p o s i t i o n 
35 
was further strengthened during the decade of the 19708. 
34. Akira Onishi , "Japanese I n t e r e s t s in Southeast Asia. 
A Japanese view", Asian Survev Vol . XI, No.4(Apri l 
1981) p .415 . 
35. Donald C. Hellmann, "japan and Southeast Asia: 
c o n t i n u i t y Amidst change", Asian Survev. Vol. XIX, 
No.12 (December 1979) , p . 1193. 
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TABLE » I I 
Japan Southeast Asian Trade 1978 (Mi l l ions of U»S. g) 
Exports Imports Total 
Rank of japan 
Trade i n Other 
Balance Nations Total 
Trade 
Brunei 
Burma 
Hong Kong 
I n d o n e s i a 
Malaysia 
P h i l i p p i n e s 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Thai land 
Vietnam 
T o t a l 
51 
232 
3112 
2114 
1168 
1559 
2345 
3615 
1541 
218 
15,737 
1403 
51 
501 
5284 
1911 
1066 
878 
1764 
849 
51 
13,758 
SourceI I n t e r n a t i o n a l Monetary 
YeariJaQQk 1979. 
1454 
283 
3613 
7398 
3079 
2625 
3223 
4379 
2390 
269 
29,495 
-1352 1 
181 1 
2611 2 
-3170 1 
- 743 1 
493 1 
1467 1 
1851 2 
682 1 
169 1 
+1,979 
Fund, D i r e c t i o n of Trade 
The formation of many reg ional organ iza t ions and 
t h e i r wide scope of a c t i v i t i e s further made Japan's r e l a -
t i o n s with southeast Asian c o u n t r i e s s tronger cord ia l and 
tver growing, such organ iza t ions are the Asian p r o d u c t i v i t y 
organ iza t ion , the Asian Development Bank e t c . The impor-
tance of Japan and the Southeast Asian nat ions t o each 
32 
Other was r e c e n t l y menlfested with ASEAN where the member 
countr i e s are now p lac ing great hope on the r o l e japan can 
p lay to Increase cooperation between ASEAN, the In ternat lon -
al world, and other reg ional organ iza t ion . 
The end of the Vietnam war in April 1975 brought 
so many changes in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s of southeast 
Asia, japan badly r e a l i z e d t o play more s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e 
in t h i s region which u l t i m a t e l y culminated in the •'Fxikuda 
Doctorine" of 1977 which showed* i n the opinion of p o l i t i c a l 
a n a l y s i s , a s ign of japan ' s d e s i r e t o p lay an increased r o l e 
i n g lobal a f f a i r s , Asian a f f a i r s and p a r t i c u l a r l y economic 
and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s of Southeast Asia, i n August 1977, 
Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda attended a Summit meeting of 
ASFAN, v i s i t e d the f i v e member s t a t e s p lus Burma, and s e t 
forth a s e t of g o a l s of j a p a n ' s p o l i c y towards Southeast 
Asia, what has come t o be c a l l e d the Fukuda Doctrine had 
four major p o i n t s i ( 1 ) Japan w i l l not become a m i l i t a r y 
Power; (2) Japan w i l l promote " heart to heart" understan-
ding v.ith ASEAN Nations i n a l l f i e l d s ; (3) Japan w i l l 
cooperate with ASEAN as an "equal partner" while working 
for s tab le r e l a t i o n s with the Indochinese n a t i o n s ; ( 4 ) 
36, wanaudi, o p . c l t » , p . 779. 
33 
Japan w i l l double a id in f i v e y e a r s , while increas ing 
i i tports from and investment in Southeast Asian n a t i o n s , " 
Thus, by the dec larat ion of t h i s doctr ine i t was q u i t e 
that Japan was intended and i n t e r e s t e d i n expanding i t s 
scope of a c t i v i t i e s p a r t i c u l a r l y , economic one, i n t h i s 
reg ion . The c o u n t r i e s of t h i s region whole heartedly 
accepted for t h i s new increased and more e f f e c t i v e r o l e 
of japan. Since the end of t h e Vietnam war and with the 
growing presence of the Sovie t Union in Vietnam the 
Japanese r o l e of mediator between ASEAN and vietname has 
become i n c r e a s i n g l y accepted. ASfiAi'J countr i e s are beginn-
ing to see japan as a supplementary source of m i l i t a r y 
aid as w e l l ; some southeast Asian l eaders even want japan 
36 
to send thatj arms. 
In the mid of 1980s, s ign of detente between the 
two super powers and the growing economic aid t echno log ica l 
might of Japan, have further strengthened the roo t s of 
Japanese t i e s i n the Southeast Asia , japan, now has assumed 
ro le as a reg ional leader in Asia but p a r t i c u l a r l y i t i s 
concentrat ing in Southeast Asia which has got p r i o r i t y in 
37. Hellmann, Q p . c i t . * pp. 1195-6. 
38. Shin'chi Ischimura, "japan and Southeast Asia", Asian 
Survey, Vol. XX, No. 7, (July 1990) p . 761. 
34 
the Japanese fore ign p o l i c y . Former Japanese Prime Minister 
Takeshita went t o Manila In mid-December 1987 t o a t t e n d , the 
Assoc iat ion of Southeast Asian na t ions (ASEAN) summit meet-
ing where he announced the establ ishment of a new $ 2 b i l l i o n 
39 ASEAN-japan Development Fund, Japan has been c o n s i s t e n t l y 
depending i t s economic I n t e r e s t i n Southeast Asia mainly 
the members of the ASEAN. About two t h i r d of Japanese 
fore ign aid i s d i r e c t e d t o Asia i n which major share i s 
sucked up by Six ASEAN c o u n t r i e s . I t i s p e r h ^ s Japanese 
i n c l i n a t i o n t o spread i t s hegemonial wings over t h i s reg ion . 
Start ing from reparat ions and continuing through 
t echno log i ca l and economic a s s i s t a n c e Japan's r e l a t i o n s i n 
post-war years with Southeast Asian nat ions have been 
considerably c o r d i a l , in s p i t e of Japanese undoubted 
economic hegemony and increased r o l e i n t h i s region, japan 
has been unable t o m i t i g a t e the memories of her /henlous y 
and /natredVole p layed by her during the Second world War, 
Therefore, ^wspiclous^(and s i g n s of fear are s t i l l p e r s i s t i n g 
i n t h i s reg ion . When the e r s t w h i l e Prime Minis ter Kakuei 
Tanaka v i s i t e d the ASEAN c o u n t r i e s in January 1974, he 
encountered v l r u l en t ant i -Japanese demonstrations v l r u -
40 t a l l y wherever he went. Raul Manglapus, Foreign Minister 
39. Haruhiro Fukui, "Japan i n 1988", Asian Survey,. Vol . 
XXIX, No. l (January 1989) , p . 3. 
40, Okita, 0£. c i t , , pp. 136-7 , 
35 
of the Phi l ip ines , who spent two years fighting against 
the Japanese during the war, repl ied bluntly when asked 
how much influence Japan has in his countryi ••Thus far, 
41 
none Although anti-Japanese feel ing seems to be dec l i -
ning somewhat with one passage of time and with the growing 
real izat ion that the ir interdependence i s indispensable 
for their betterment stronger and closer economic re lat ions 
between Japan and Southeast Asia are contributing much to 
their mutual well being. 
west Asia could not attract japan during the 
pre-war period as well as in post-war period because 
japan's foreign pol icy could not concentrate on th i s 
region probably because of i t s distance from Japan. But 
i t was the o i l ' c r i s i s of 1973 which ushered Japanese 
diplomacy in t h i s region, ^ '^^ ©"^umulative impact of a 
ser ies of internation^iYciri^^n the 1980s that began 
with the Arab o i l embargor^n 1973 had profound e f f ec t s 
42 
on Japanese foreign po l icy . Japan played her cards 
shrewdly during Iraq-iran war and succeeded in maintaining 
diplomatic re lat ions with both the countries. Japan also 
showed keen interes t in gett ing a peaceful solution of 
41."Japan and the Third world". The Economiet, June 17,1989, 
pp. 16-17. 
42. Brooks and Robert, 0£« e i t . , p . 326. 
36 
Iraq-Iran through v i s i t s by the Japanese foreign 
Minister and other o f f i c i a l s , japan tr ied to bring 
the two sides together In peace. On the i ssue of 
Arab I srae l i confl ict* japan took a clear posit ion 
by supporting the United Nations security Council 
Resolution 242 and demanded I srae l i withdrawal from 
the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s but upheld I s r a e l ' s right 
to ex i s t as a nation s ta te . Infact Japan's o i l depen-
dency largely in th i s region, has urged Japan for not 
being align to any side strongly rather concentrated 
on a peaceful solution. 
Thus* ja^an which was not attaching even 
meager Importance to West Asia began to show increasing 
Interest in th i s region since the o i l c r i s i s because of 
i t s own o i l needs and so Japanese re lat ions with West 
Asian countries Improved in la ter years through the 
Japanese import of o i l and her economic and technological 
assistance to these countries, japan provided economic 
aid to Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan for the purpose of 
rebuilding their war shattered economies. Stiching to 
the long-cherished ideal of i t s foreign pol icy in the 
post-war period, l . e , maintenance of of peace in general 
37 
particularly In Asia, japan had been making a l l i t s 
e f forts to r e a l i s e i t japan provided economic assistance 
to U.N. sponsored American Army, against Iraq in order 
to maintain peace in th i s region. 
Though japan could air slogans l ike ••Asia for 
the Asians*^, or ••a new order for Asia", during the pre-war 
period but v i r tua l ly , for the Japanese leadership and 
diplomats the meaning of these slogans did not extend 
beyond East Asia and South-East Asia because of their 
immediate economic and p o l i t i c a l in teres t s in these regions, 
Even in the post-war period when japan re-emerged as an 
independent nation in 1952 after seven years of All ied 
occupation, her attention remained l imited to the tradi-
t ional zones of Japanese in teres t , namely East and South-
east Asia. Though South Asia was not completely neglected 
by the Japanese leadership during the prewar period and 
since 1952, Japanese foreign pol icy was l eas t concerned 
withthis region. But after becoming the economic super-
power of Asia Japanese economic interes t and a c t i v i t i e s 
which were tradi t ional ly l imited to East and Southeast 
Asia have increasingly shifted towards South Asia, japan 
has now become the leading individual donor of development 
for t h i s region, "^  In recent years , the changing trends 
43. Okita , 2£, c i t . , pp. 
38 
of global politics due to growing detent between the two 
superpowers have had their deep inpact on the political 
and economic perceptions and priorities of japan. Being 
a warId economic power, Japan is bound to engulf the 
entire Asia with her increased activities. Thus, South 
Asia has now become significantly an important region 
to the Japanese economic and political interests. In 
spite of the above mentioned situation that atracted 
japan, there are certain other factors which have enhanced 
Japanese interest in the region of South Asia. 
Since japan imports large quantities of its 
oil from the countries of the Middle East, more than 70% 
of which coming by Sea through the Indian Ocean. The 
stability and peace of the South Asian region, which 
includes the Indian ocean of that sea route. Thus, J^an 
\ — — 
i s keener to expand her a c t i v i t i e s i n t h i s region of the 
g lobe , by providing economic a s s i s t a n c e so that peace 
and s t a b i l i t y may be maintained. As the Japanese former 
Prime Minis ter TOshiki Kalfu in h i s v i s i t to South Asian 
countr i e s remarked, "Peace and S t a b i l i t y in Asia i s a 
44 matter of great concern t o japan". 
44. po l i cy speech by Prime Minister Toshiki Kai fu 's 
Speech on Japan and South Asia) In pursu i t of 
Diologue and cooperat ion for peace and prosper i ty" 
d e l i v e r e d at t h e Parliament House, New Delhi , on 
; ^ r i l 30,1990, p , 9 . 
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Secondly, seven of the countries in the 
region of South Asia (India) Bangladesh, Pakistan, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldiives ) are categoriesed 
as l e s s developed countries . Of these, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal are indeed, l eas t l e s s 
developed countries* ja^an i s expected to play a 
major role in economic and technological aid to the 
countries of t h i s region. As Mr. Kaifu cleared th i s 
point by saying "As a country in Asia that has endeav-
oured to modernise i t s e l f , we bel ieve that japan has a 
unique role to p l ^ for the promotion of development 
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assistance. 
Thirdly, the to ta l population of t h i s region 
numbers approximately one b i l l i o n people, almost one 
f i f t h of a l l mankind. Hence, promotion of c lose t i e s 
between japan and the countries of the South Asian 
region can be expected to contribute s igni f icant ly to 
the attainment of the aims of Japan's Asian diplomacy, 
particularly to long term s tab i l i za t ion and strength-
ening of japan's re lat ions with the Asian countries. 
As Kaifu stated* "the development of t h i s region which 
45. Ibid.? p. 11 
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is inhabited by oxie b i l l i o n people, or one f i f t h of 
a l l mankind, i s in i t s e l f one of the major interes t 
of the whole world as we move c loser to the twenty 
46 f i r s t century". Undoubtedly one b i l l i o n population 
of th i s region i s considered to have great potential 
in the long term. 
Fourthly, the South Asian countries are having 
abundant natural resources* while Japan i s a poor resource 
country, thereby, Japan and the south Asian region are 
interdependent. If combined, the abundant natural and 
human resources of the South Asia and japan's very 
advanced technology may bring economic prosperity to the 
region and in turn, japan's economic interes t wi l l also 
f lourish. 
Fi f th ly , the South Asian region i s one of the 
cradles of world c i v i l i z a t i o n . Japan desires to expand 
cultural exchanges i n various f i e l d s , such as the arts 
and sport, with the countries of th i s region, which i s 
one of the sources of Japan's culture. Former prime 
Minister Toshiki Kaifu stated as "South Asia i s a 
treasu re trove of cultural and his tor ica l monuments. 
46. Ib id . , p .9 . 
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which a re a l s o common h e r i t a g e of mankind. I should 
a l so l i k e t o pu r sue ways i n which j a p a n w i l l be 
a b l e t o c o n t r i b u t e i t s s h a r e i n e f f o r t s to p r e s e r v e 
t h i s h e r i t a g e . * ^ 
No doubt , j a p a n has i n c r e a s e d her a c t i v i t i e s 
i n t h e South Asia r e g i o n in t h e r e c e n t y e a r s bu t she 
has no I n t e n t i o n of i n t e r v e n i n g in t h e problems of t h e 
r e g i o n , j a p a n does , however, have a p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e 
t o supi^orting movements among t h e c o u n t r i e s of t h e 
r e g i o n fo r t h e improvement and s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e i r 
c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a t i o n s , such as South Asian Regional 
c o o p e r a t i o n . As Former Prime M i n i s t e r Toshik i Kaifu 
s a i d , **! should l i k e to pay r e s p e c t t o t h e South Asian 
c o u n t r i e s which a re bound by t i e s of h i s t o r y and c u l t u r e , 
for having produced c e r t a i n r e s u l t s i n t h e i r j o i n t 
e f f o r t s t o achieve the pu rpose s of SAARC such as the 
promot ion of the we l fa re of t h e p e o p l e s , s o c i a l p r o g r e s s 
and c u l t u r a l development , while s t r i c t l y adher ing t o 
t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e Uni ted Na t ions c h a r t e r , i . e . 
Sovere ign e q u a l i t y , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , n a t i o n a l 
independence , non-use of f o r c e , a l l n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e 
48 i n t h e i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of o t h e r s t a t e s " . 
47. I l ^ i d . , p . 19. 
48. I b i d . , D P . 13-14. 
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After seeing the above-mentioned view i t 
may be concluded that expanding economic re la t ions 
between Japan and the South Asian countries have an 
important role to play in broadening and deepening 
japan 's overall re la t ions with the countries of the 
Asian continent* For t h i s purpose, i t i s necessary to 
do everything possible to increase Japan's trade with 
the South Asian countries which are looking forward 
to Japanese technological and economic assistance. 
To understand the Japanese foreign policy in post-war 
period towards South Asia, i t i s essential to look at 
her b i l a t e ra l re la t ions with major countries of th i s 
region. 
The changing trends in global po l i t i c s due 
to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. as a superpower and 
the revolutionary growth of Japan's economic might 
have further widened the scope of Japanese ac t i v i t i e s 
in Asia. 
To conclude, "for h is tor ica l geographical, 
economic and p o l i t i c a l reasons, japan naturally has 
favoured Asian countries in i t s allocation of aid. At 
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one time almost a l l of j a p a n ' s b i l a t e r a l ODA 
went to Asia, but the r a t i o now f l u c t u a t e s at 
49 
around 70%. Future prospec t s of japan in Asia 
are br ighter and Asia w i l l hope f u l l y remain the 
region of high p r i o r i t y in Japanese fore ign p o l i c y . 
49« Brooks and Robert, 0£ . c i t . , p . 328. 
C H A P T E R_XI 
India and Post~war Aslai Foreign Policy Qrlentatlons and 
Emerging Role 
C H A .p. T .fi R I I 
INDIA AND POST-WAR ASIAt FOREIGM POLIQf ORIENTATIONS AMD 
EMEROINQ ROLE 
Geographical l o c a t i o n of a country i s invar iab ly 
an important determinant of i t s fore ign p o l i c y . Indian 
fore ign p o l i c y too has a deep imprint of the g e o s t r a t e g i c 
f a c t o r s . 
I n d i a ' s v a s t s i z e i s so i o ^ r e s s i v e that i t i s 
o f t e n descr ibed as a subcontinent with an area of 
32/87,263 5q. km. Ind ia i s world^s seventh l a r g e s t country 
a f t er the USA, Canada, China, Braz i l and Aus tra l ia in tha t 
order. Her populat ion i s b i g g e s t i n the world a f t er China. 
India extends between 8*^ 4* and 37°6' north l a t i t u d e s and 
68^7* and 97°25' e a s t l ong i tudes and thus l i e s wholly 
wi th in the northern and eas tern hemispheres. I t s maximum 
s t r e t c h measures 3#214 km. from north to south and 2,933 km. 
from e a s t to west . 
The globe shows the Indian subcontinent as the 
southward ex tent ion of the great landmass of As ia . The 
Indian pen insu la tapers towards the Indian Ocean, d iv id ing 
the oceanic realm i n t o the two f lanking expenses of water. 
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known as the Arabean sea and the Bay of Bengal. These 
two seas have played an important role in determining 
the nature of interaction of the Indian people with 
those of the surrounding regions in Africa, South-west 
and South-East Asia. At times, they have provided eas i ly 
negotiable maritime communication l inks between India and 
the peninsulas and the archipelagos of South-east Asia and 
the l i t t o r a l countries of West-Asia and East-Asia. The 
link role of these water-bodies i s seen in the cultural 
influences of India gett ing diffused in to the distant 
lands to the west and the eas t . I t i s also ref lected in 
the assimilation of new cultural elements coming from i t s 
maritime neighbours into Indian Society, adding a new 
flavour and richness to i t . On the other hand these expen-
ses of the seas have promoted a certain degree of i so lat ion 
and have fostered a unique homogeniety in the Indian c i v i l -
izat ion. 
India also occupies a pre-eminent pos i t ion in 
the Indian ocean. No other country has such a large 
coast l ine on th i s ocean as ours. The Deccan peninsula 
projects i t s e l f in to the Indian ocean, thus making i t 
possible for India to look bothways towards South-east 
Asia and the Far east from i t s eastern, other countries 
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except Srllanka (Sri Lanka) bound the Indian ocean . 
India i s in i t . 
Being located at a very strategic pos i t ion , at 
the cross-roads of world's major routes and her richness 
in natural resources together exerted tremendous impact 
on India's foreign pol icy . The above mentioned favourable 
forces of geography make India an important and independent 
factor in international re lat ions in her own right . I t 
would not be proper for India, therefore, to play a role 
in inteimational re lat ions l ike a small nation, jawaharlal 
Nehru was fundamentally right when he said# "I can under-
stand some of the smaller countries of Europe or some of 
the smaller countries of Asia being forced by circumstances 
to bow down before some of the greater powers, because they 
can not help i t* the power opposed to them i s so great and 
they have nowhere to turn to . But I do not think that cons-
ideration applies to India. India i s too big a country 
herself to be bound down to any country, however big i t 
may be. India i s going to be and i s bound to be a big 
country that counts in world affairs". 
1. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policv (Delhi, 1961) 
p. 32. 
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After a tough and long b a t t l e , India could free 
herse l f from the shackles of imperialism and colonial ism 
on 15th August, 1947, I n d i a ' s independence from B r i t i s h 
ru le demanded for shading out her foreign pol icy t h a t 
s u i t s to Indian t a s t e and to her people , A far s ighted 
foreign po l i cy was badly needed because of I n d i a ' s survival 
was a t s take due t o gross e x p l o i t a t i o n of her by B r i t i s h 
r u l e . At the same time, with the growth of science and 
technology, world has become a much smaller p l a c e . I n t e r -
dependence between na t ions has grown and the need for 
mutual exchange in the f i e l d s of knowledge, science and 
technology, c u l t u r e , t r ade and commerce have become more 
urgent than even before . One may say t h a t not only progress 
and p rospe r i ty but the very surviva l of mankind i s depen-
dent upon t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n . No doubt, i t i s foreign po l icy 
of a country which v i r t u a l l y provides the grounds to 
ma te r i a l i ze the above mentioned goa l s . " I t i s the ad jus t -
ment of the ac t ions of s t a t e s in favour of ones own s t a t e 
which George Modelski c a l l s " the purpose of foreign pol icy" . 
India which got herse l f in an unprecendented 
s i t u a t i o n a t the time of her independence due to the 
d iv is ion of the world i n t o two an tagon is t i c mi l i t a ry b loc* 
2. George Modelski,A Theory of Foreign Policy (London, 
I962j ;p . 3. 
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i «e , the western bloc led by United States of America 
(U.S.A.) and the Soc ia l i s t bloc led by Union of Soviet 
Soc ia l i s t Republic (U.S.S.R.) just after the second 
world war. Thus India had to choose her foreign policy 
under the clouds of cold war. 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the f i r s t Prime Minister 
of India who i s also known as a architect of India's 
foreign policy* adopted certain general principles to 
deal with international re la t ions . These general pr inc i -
p le s , l a ter , became the fundamental key to the India's 
foreign pol icy . To understand India's foreign pol icy in 
post-war Asia a brief discussion of these fundamental 
principles of India's foreign pol icy i s desirable. 
In an age of atomic and hydrogen bombs, b a l l i -
s t i c miss i l e s and vas t ly destructive weapons, world 
peace i s not a mere fervent hope but an urgent necessity 
When India got independence her leaders were convinced 
that persuit of world peace must be one of the cardinal 
principles of India's Foreign Pol icy. In a broadcast 
from London on 12 January 1951, Nehru said, "What we 
need i s a passion for peace and for c i v i l i z e d behaviour 
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in international affairs. It is the temper of peace and 
not the temper of war that we want, even though peace is 
sometimes casually mentioned.... If we desire peace, we 
must develop the temper of peace and try to win even those 
who may be suspicious of us or who think they are against 
us. we have to try to understand others. Just as we expect 
them to understand us. We can not seek peace in the language 
3 
Of war or of threats". Moreover, when India became free, 
one of ourr main problems was economic development. Economic 
development requires peace, when the British government 
handed over power to India, the economy of the country was 
totally shattered. The World war II which ended a mere couple 
of years earlier had made the economic condition still worse. 
During war all resources of a country are diverted towards 
war* thereby trade and commerce are affected. Having won 
independence at a time when the world had not yet been 
able to overcome the horrors of world War II, Indian leaders 
made the achievement of world peace as the basic tenet of 
her foreign policy. 
Non>alignment i s another Important element 
of I n d i a ' s foreign po l i cy . The Second a*wpid war ended 
3* A* Appadwrai and M.S. Raj an, I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy 
and Rela t ions (Delhi t south Asian Pub. , 1985), p .44 . 
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with two blocs. One bloc was l^d by the Soviet Union amd 
the other was led by the U.S.A. There were also in exis-
tence Military Alliances and Pacts such as NATO, SEATO, 
CENTO and WARSAW, This kind of mutually opposed blocs 
and pacts created in the world an atmosphere tf tension, 
distrust and suspicion which came to know as the cold war. 
India considered these blocs as injurious to world peace. 
She did not Join any alliances or military pacts. Thus 
the essence of India's foreign policy has been to keep 
out of the blocs and not to join any pacts and to express 
our views on world events independently, Nehru defined, 
"Nonalignment means not tying yourself with military blocs 
of nations, or with a nation. It means tirying to view 
things, as far as possible, not from the military point 
of view, though that has to come in sometimes, but in-
dependently and trying to maintain friendly relations with 
4 
a l l countries". 
I t has been India's pol icy that, as far as 
poss ible , international disputes should be s e t t l ed by 
peaceful means and not by force. Indian constitution 
also directs the government to work for peace and to 
4. I b i d . , p . 39 . 
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attempt the set t lement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i spu tes through 
a r b i t r a t i o n . 
India has c o n s i s t e n t l y opposed rac ia l i sm and 
r a c i a l d i sc r imina t ion . Ind ia vehemently opposed the r a c i a l 
pol icy of the Government of South Africa, 
Besides t h i s , India expressed genuine sympathy 
with the sentiments of the co lon ia l people to be f ree . 
Ind ia opposed French imperial ism in Indo-China and the 
U.S. war in Vietnam. She has r a i s ed her voice in favour 
of freedom struggle of such Portugese colonies as Angola. 
Thus, Ind ia has always supported those na t ions which oppose 
imperialism and s t rugg le for t h e i r independence. 
Perhaps one of the most important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
of I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy has been explained through the 
"Panchsheel". The f ive p r i n c i p l e s of peace or the 'Panchsheel ' 
was f i r s t promulgated on 29 Apri l , 19 54 in the Sino-Indian 
agreement. 
Following are the f ive p r i n c i p l e s of Panchsheel j -
1. Mutual respec t 45or each o t h e r ' s t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y 
and sovereignty; 
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2. Mutual non-agression; 
3. Mutual non-interference in each o ther ' s internal 
af fa i rs . 
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and 
5. Peaceful co-existence. 
These principles have formed the basis of 
the foreign policy of our country. While India respects 
the t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty and sovereignty of other 
countries, she considers the defence and maintenance 
of our t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty equally important. Peace 
and co-existence do not mean that India should not 
defend herself against invasion by any other country. 
In the context of above mentioned general 
pr inciples , Ind ia ' s foreign policy was formulated to 
deal with global affa i rs , India maintained her relat ions 
with the international community in the l ight of these 
fundamental parameters. Since we are concerned here 
with the foreign policy of India towards postwar Aisa, 
thereby i t i s not desirable to discuss India ' s t i e s with 
the world community. However, Ind ia ' s re la t ions with the 
nations of Asian continent are discussed below : -
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•'Every nat ion-state l ike every individual has 
d i s t inc t personality of i t s own. No two nat ion-states 
are quite al ike, jus t as no two individuals are. The 
personality of an individual i s shaped by a combination 
of factors-inheri ted t r a i t s , habits acquired from 
interact ion with environment, and habits consciously 
acquired through sel f -disc ipl ine and sustained attempts. 
A personality thus moulded, contributes to society of 
which i t becomes a member, although in exceptional cases 
he may choose to opt out of his social environment and 
re t rea t into solitude as a resu l t of gonscious dict ion. 
Nation-states; too, are moulded f i r s t of a l l by the i r 
h is tor ica l evolution-the process through which such 
s ta tes find themselves in current s ta tes of socio-pol i t ical 
existence. In addi t ion, their personality i s developed 
through interaction with the i r geographical ( and po l i t i ca l ) 
environment as well as through decisions taken consciously 
or through compulsions. However, unlike individuals, 
nat ion-states do not have the luxury of opting out of the 
"world environment"and, therefore, have to make continuous 
adjustment to the i r personality as expressed through thei r 
pol ic ies in dealing with the outside world. 
5. world FOCUS,"India' s Foreign Policy," Nov-Dec.-199;, 
p . 27. 
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Asian continent which was dominated by foreign 
imperial and colonial masters gave a sense of Asianism to 
Indian people. The Indian renaissance, which cultivated 
patriotic feeling among Indians, was integrated with a 
sense that the entire Asian continent is passing through 
inperialistic suppression and racial discrimination in one 
form or another. Therefore, all nations of Asia have got 
a same kind of destiny. No doubt, Indians ancient culture 
that had its widespread impact on various countries of 
Asia also contributed a lot in the growing spirit of 
Asianism in India, The freedom movements in different 
countries, particularly, emergence of Japan as a strong 
challenge to the colonial countries after the Meiji 
Restoration and her victory over a powerful European 
country i.e. Russia in 1905, further accentuated the 
sense of Asianism. "prom the end of the first world war 
the Indian National congress talked, year after year, 
almost without interrruption, of the need for an "Asiatic 
Federation". In 1928 the Congress resolved that "India 
should develop contacts with other countries and peoples 
who also suffer under Imperialism and desire to combat it" 
and directed its working comnittees to covene "The first 
session of a pan-Asiatic Federation in 1930 in India". . 
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In the following year jawaharlal Nehru, as President 
of the congress^ spoke eloquently of the past g lor ies 
of a l l Asian nations, now in a s tate of humiliation 
and subjection under Western nations, not only in the 
realm of thought but a lso in military and p o l i t i c a l 
spheres, "We have forgotten", he said "that far millemia 
the legions of Asia overran Europe and modern Europe 
i t s e l f largely cons i s t s of the descendants of these 
invadera from Asia" India's leadership of freedom 
struggle was quite conscious that Western imperial ist 
and colonial masters can be compelled to grant indepen-
dence to India or other country of Asia only in a 
s i tuation when there i s a whole- Asian continental 
challenge threw to them. Therefore, combined fight from 
a l l Asian nations was the only way to get rid of the 
colonial shackles of slavery. Thus, the victory of a 
country i s a sign of victory to a l l nations. In 1942 
congress resolved that "the freedom of India must be 
a symbol of and prelude to the freedom of a l l other 
Asiatic nations under foreign domination. Burma, Malaya, 
Indo-China, the Dutch Indias, Iran and Iraq must also 
6. J. Bandopadhyaya, The Making of India's Foreign 
Policy (Delhi, All ied Pub. 1979) p, 75-6, 
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attain their complete freedom". Thus when jawaharial 
Nehru convened the f i r s t Asian Relations Conference in 
New Delhi in March 1947 and observed in his inaugural 
address that "in order to have one world« we must also 
in Asia, think of the countries of Asia co-operating 
together for that larger ideal .he was merely giving con-
crete expression to a long- fe l t i d e a l i s t i c aspiration 
7 
of the Indian national movement", when Indian leaders 
shaped out India's foreign policy after her independence, 
India made i t clear to the world that Asia wi l l remain a 
priori ty region. But in Asia i t s e l f there are different 
regions l ike South Asia, west Asia, South-east Asia and 
East Asia which received India's attention di f ferent ly 
according to geographical importance. 
South Asia i s encompassing seven countries of Asia 
and India i s one of them. This region becomes utmost 
important and very v i t a l to India because India resides 
in th i s region. India shares many h i s tor i ca l , cultural , 
soc ia l , economic and p o l i t i c a l bonds with these countries 
of South Asia. Since independence India's main purpose 
had been to maintain cordial re lat ions with a l l the 
countries, part icularly with neighbours. Indian leader-
ship was well convinced that good re lat ions with neighbours 
7. Ib id . , p. 76. 
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Is of v i t a l s ignificance for her progress and prosperity. 
That i s why South Asian region got pr ior i ty in the 
foreign policy of India, As pandlt jawaharlal Nehru said, 
••The neighbouring countries had the f i r s t place in our 
minds". As he put i t , "the second place went to the other 
countries of Asia with whom India was intimately connec-
ted. "^  
Despite the fact that India kept on making laborious 
ventures to have most cordial re lat ions with a l l nations 
of South-Asian region there has been a sign of very 
pessimestic response from a l l the countries particularly 
Pakistan. The year of 1947 i s a landmark in the history 
of South Asia because India was partit ioned. Pakistan 
came into existence but the Princely s ta tes in had to 
take their own decision about acceding to e i ther of the 
two s ta tes . The jamnu and Kashmir got acceded into India 
but Pakistan refused to accept t h i s accession. This 
stubborn att i tude of Pakistan has not only given a 
severe Jolt to their b i l a t era l re lat ions but also impeding 
any meaningful mult i lateral cooperation in t h i s region. 
Pakistan has already gone to war with India thrice- in 
1947-48, 1965 and 1971 b u t t h e r e i s no sign of change 
8. jawaharlal Nehru's ^eacfh delivered at the Indian 
council of world Affla±r^# New Delhi, 22 March, 1949. 
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in i t / attitude and actions. Pakistan has not only tried 
to have t i e s with those nations which are regarded as 
anti-Indian but at the same time i t i s constantly making 
a l l e f forts to destablize Indian Society. Pakistan has 
aided and encouraged terror i s t s in Punjab and Kashmir. 
Though, India has pleaded Pakistan plenty of; times to stop 
such destructive acts and must st ick to the persuit of 
peace but a l l these prayers have fa l len on deaf ears. So 
many proofs have been co l lec ted by Indian Governnent which 
show an active involvement of Pakistan in spreading and 
aiding terrorism in India. No doubt, Pakistan i s s t i l l 
posing a threat to our unity and integr i ty . Therefore, 
Indian Government i s bound to protect i t s integri ty . Even, 
U.S.A. has warned Pakistan to declare her a terrorism 
sponsored state* Thus, Pakistan's unhelping and uncompro-
mising attitude has certainly compelled Indian foreign 
policy makers to doubt about the honesty and integr i ty 
of Pakistan which has led two countries re lat ions in 
doldrums. S t i l l , India's e f forts are going on to improve 
her re lat ions with Pakistan. 
India's re lat ions with the Himalayan Kingdom 
of Nepal remained very good right from India's independence 
because of India's commitment to have peaceful and cordial 
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re lat ions with a l l her neighbours. Due to some undesired 
steps of Nepal, re lat ions between the two countries got 
strained in recent years but could be resolved successful ly. 
"The re lat ions with the Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal which 
had deteriorated s igni f icant ly during 1989 as a resul t of 
India's hardened stand over the questions of extending the 
Indo-Nepal Trade and Transit agreement as a reaction to 
Nepal's decis ion to Import weapons from china (and thereby 
upset India's security in teres t in the region) and to impose 
res tr i c t ions on the entry of Indian nationals into the 
Himalayan Kingdom by imposing work pearmits on Indian workers, 
were resolved peacefully in June 1990 when the two countries 
signed an accord to restore the status quo ante. As a resul t 
of the accord Nepal agreed to withdraw the system of work 
permits to Indian workers and c a l l off i t s purchase of arms 
from China in appreciation of India's security s e n s i b i l i t i e s . 
The Indian side responded by agreeing to reopen i t s transi t 
point on the border, resume supplies of o i l and coal and 
thus re l ieve the ordinary c i t i z e n of Nepal from hardship and 
increase stand by credit f a c i l i t y by te. 10 crores. Not only 
was the status quo ante restored but also the ear l i er 
cordia l i ty and warmth in the b i l a t era l re lat ions between 
9 the two nations. 
9. The Indian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science. Vol.52, No.2 
April-June, 1991, p.191. 
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Indo-Srl Lankan r e l a t i o n s which rece ived a j o l t 
due to the fatnil problem in Sr i Lanka, are now f a s t impro-
v ing . I n d i a ' s stand to send IPKF to Sri Lanka under Rajiv-
jayawardene accord was misunderstood by prwmdasa Government 
as an Indian in ter ference in Sr i Lanka. India withdraw IPKF 
and proved her £a i th in peace fu l c o - e x i s t e n c e and non-
in ter ference p o l i c y . "Indo-Sri Lankan r e l a t i o n s a l s o showed 
cons iderable improvement in the l a s t two years fo l lowing 
I n d i a ' s d e c i s i o n t o not only withdraw IPKP from the Srilanka 
but a l s o , more importantly, pursue a p o l i c y of non-interferenc« 
in the i s l a n d ' s e thnic problem". 
India played a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in the l i b e r a t i o n 
of Bangladesh in 1971.Since Bangladesh i s the poorest 
country of the reg ion , her domestic/ompulsions do not demand 
that BAngladesh leadership adopt a p o l i c y of confrontat ion 
T 
with India. India is equally sincere about the (pitiable^ 
plight of Bangladesh. Therefore, India has always been too 
eager to have good neighbourly relations with Bengladesh. 
By and large both the countries are honest towards each 
other. 
As far as Bhutan and Maldive are concerned, 
India enjoys extremely satisfactory ties with these two 
10. Ibid., p. 191. 
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t iny c o u n t r i e s . India , the most powerful nat ion of south 
Asia never t r i e d to spread her hegemonic wings on her 
small neighbouring c o u n t r i e s . Ins tead, India stood with 
these small na t i ons a t the time of c r i s i s , Maldive's 
Government headed by Mamoon AbduIc.Gayoom was helped 
by Indian Government when he was dethroned by some 
powerful mercenaries . Thus# I n d i a ' s coiranitment to her 
fundamental p r i n c i p l e s of foreign po l icy , by and l a rge , 
c u l t i v a t e d an im^ge of India as a peace loving fXAtioo.in 
Sbuth Asian-region. 
Recent global changes have fur ther widened the 
gamut of Indian r e s p o n s i b i l i t y because India i s the only 
nat ion which can be considered as a super power of South-
Asia. Therefore, India must make a l l her e f f o r t s to ensure 
peace and p rosper i ty in t h i s reg ion . For t h i s , SAARG forum 
wi l l be a safe ground to nur ture above dreams. "India 
should in the years to come tiry to use the SAARC forum 
to not only s t rengthen i t s b d l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s with 
i t s Sough Asian neighbours but a lso s t rengthen regional 
cooperat ion in such v i t a l sec to r s as t r ade , industry and 
f inance. I t i s noteworthy t h a t a t the Maldives Summit 
the SAARC leaders agreed to bring t rade r e l a t e d i s sues 
in to t h e i r regional cooperat ion a c t i v i t i e s . The pos t -cold 
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war s i t u a t i o n r e s u l t i n g in the withdrawal of the super 
powers from fue l l ing Indo-PaX tens ions should be a 
favourable input in s t rengthening cooperation in south 
Asia". ^^ 
West Asian region has a l so exer ted tremendous 
impact on I n d i a ' s foreign po l i cy . India and West Asian 
region had t h e i r con tac t s since ancient t imes. Arab people 
used to come in India as t r a d e r s who sometime s e t t l e d on 
Indian s o i l . These t rade r e l a t i o n s even led t o diffusion 
of cu l tu re between Indian and Arabian c u l t u r e . " India and 
West Asia have had extensive con tac t s since the dawn of 
the c i v i l i z a t i o n . The Ni le Delta c i v i l i z a t i o n in Egypt, 
the Euphrates River c i v i l i z a t i o n in Mesopotamia and the 
Indus Valley c i v i l i z a t i o n in India were not only contemp-
oraneous, but were a lso in contact with one another-each 
con t r ibu t ing in i t s own way t o the enrichment of human l i f e 
and c u l t u r e . History i s strewn with the evidence of mutually 
advantageous r e l a t i o n s between the two reg ions , for example, 
i t was the Indian muslim which the Egyptians used t o wrap 
the mummies. S imi lar ly , i t was the Arab craftsmanship 
which i s bel ieved t o have produced f igur ines for the 
Indian temples and homes. The extensive t rade con tac t s 
between India and the Arabs gradual ly led to the semi-
permanent Arab se t t lements on the western and southern 
11. I b i d . , p . 192. 
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coas t s of Ind ia , and of the Indian communities along the 
Gulf as well as in the c i t y of Alexandria in Egypt. After 
the advent of Islam, the Arab Indian contac ts were fur ther 
12 
strangthened, " 
Apart /from /) good r e l a t i o n s between India and 
West Asian world. West Asia has become v i r t u a l l y important 
to India in post-war period-due t o following reasons-
(1)- The area produces 80% of the world o i l , 
(2 ) - I t i s a major source of monetary and 
mi l i t a ry support to Pakis tan, 
Since India i s always in need of o i l import from 
West Asia, I t has the re fore , always made ser ious ventures 
to improve her r e l a t i o n s with a l l Arab coun t r i e s . India 
always stood behind Pa l e s t i ne in i t s problem with I s r a e l . 
India has always condemned I s r a e l for i t s hegemonistic 
and i m p e r i a l i s t i c ac t ions agains t p a l e s t i n e people . India 
fee ls t ha t P a l e s t i n e i s a sovereign and independent s t a t e 
and i t s sovereignty must berespected. In pursuance of 
t h i s pr inciple , , India vehemently c r i t i c i s e d Iraq when i t 
captured Kuwait and extended her support t o All ied forces 
12. Appadjirai and Rajan, op .c l t* $ p . 373. 
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in Gulf war by providing fuel to All ied War p lans . But 
recent changes in i n t e r n a t i o n a l c a l c u l a t i o n s have brought 
a change in Indian foreign pol icy towards West Asia, NOW 
India has resumed her diplomatic t i e s with I s r a e l . " I t 
may be r eca l l ed t h a t New Delhi accorded recogni t ion to 
I s r a e l in September 1950, and was contemplating on e s t a b l i -
shment of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s on the eve of the n a t i o n ' s 
f i r s t general e l e c t i o n . Had i t then been accomplished the 
event would have been as a l og i ca l follow up of the decision 
on recogni t ion , Btit t ha t was not to be. The consumation of 
t ha t p rocess now a f t e r a lapse of more than forty years 
acquires spec ia l s igni f icance for two nat ionsi f i r s t l y , 
because in the intervening period New Delhi had been p r o j -
ec t ing absence of f u l l diplomatic t i e s as proof of i t 
( i t s ) support for the Pa l e s t i n i an cause, and secondly, 
because the decis ion came c lose on the heels of I n d i a ' s 
support in the United Nations General Assembly for revoking 
13 i t s e a r l i e r r e so lu t ion equating Zionism with recism. •' 
The far reaching changes t ha t the global community has 
withnessed in recen t years have led t o a l i t t l e change 
in I n d i a ' s foreign po l i cy , but West Asia s t i l l occupies 
13. world Focus, OP. C i t . P P . 55-6. 
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utmost importance on Indian Agenda. India i s making fu l l 
blooded at tempts to improve her b i l a t e r a l t i e s with a l l 
the na t ions of West Asia. 
In order to have a conspicuous p i c t u r e about(of) 
I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with Asian pac i f i c region, i t i s essen-
t i a l l y requi red tha t I n d i a ' s t i e s with ears twhi le Soviet 
Union and China f i r s t l y and b r i e f l y . I t i s because these 
two coun t r i e s played a key r o l e in shaping out the I n d i a ' s 
foreign pol icy in t h i s region. 
India was favourably disposed towards Soviet 
Union before independence. Pandit jawahar Lai Nehru 
was a strong supporter of the Russian revolu t ion and 
grea t ly admired the support extended by Soviet Union t o 
the Indian freedom movement. Russ i a ' s open c a s t i g a t i o n 
against Imperialism a l so made India to have a sympathetic 
a t t i t u d e towards Soviet Union. That i s why jawahar Lai 
Nehru showed too much i n t e r e s t towards sovie t Union and 
never doubted I t s i n t e g r i t y which was a i red by western 
powers. 
This aspect can be summed up bes t in jawahar L a i ' s 
words wr i t ten i n 1929» "We have grown up in t r a d i t i o n . 
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carefully nurtured by England of hostility to Russia, For 
long years past the bogey of a Russian invasion has been 
held up to us and has been made the excuse of vast expen-
diture on our armaments. In the days of the Tsar we were 
told the imperialism of Russia was for ever driving South, 
coveting an outlet to the Sea, or may be India itself. The 
Tsar has gone but the rivalry between England and Russia 
continues and we are now told that India is threatened by 
Soviet Govternment, It is inconceivable that Russia, in 
her present condition at least, and for a long time to 
come, will threaten India, The two countries today are 
A 
too similar to be exploited by each other* but there can 
be no economic motive for Russia to covet India 
0»rdinarily Russia and India should live as the best of 
neighbours with the fewest points of friction. The cont-
inued friction that we see today is between England and 
Russia, not between India and Russia. If we face the 
facts , we can only come to one conclusion and that is 
that India has nothing to fear from Russia. And having 
come to this conclusion we must make it clear that we 
shall not peirmit ourselves to be used as pawns in England's 
imperial game, to be moved hither and thither for her 
benefit*'.^* 
14. V.P, Dutt, 0£, cit, ,p. 132. 
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Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was deeply Ijnpressed by 
the dramatic and stunning progress and p rospe r i ty t)f 
sovie t union in a very shor t span of per iod . Nehru used to 
be l ieve t h a t communism can not be adopted by us because 
i t i s not in the conformity with Indian t a s t e . But the 
purpose of communism t o c rea te an e g a l i t a r i a n soc ie ty 
c e r t a i n l y In jec ted ever l a s t i n g impression on Nehru's 
psyche. 
Indeed* even before Independence, Nehru had 
appreciated th r p o t e n t i a l power of the Soviet Union and 
showed an eagerness t o befr iend i t . I t s main a t t r a c t i o n 
had been t h a t i t did not have an " impe r i a l i s t " stigma 
but was ••the g r e a t e s t opponent of imperial ism". Moreover, 
while Nehru expressed some r e se rva t ions about communism, 
spec ia l ly i t s s u i t a b i l i t y to Indian cond i t ions , he p ro -
fessed to be l ieve i n communism as "an i d e a l of soc ie ty" 
in so far as i t represented socialism in essence. He, 
the re fo re , saw no reason why Independent India should 
i n h e r i t B r i t a i n ' s suspicions of Russia", However, when 
India became an independent na t ion in August 1947, the 
global scenar io was qu i t e unprecedented and alarming one. 
15, A, Appadiirai & M, S, Rajan, 0£. c i t . . p . 259. 
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Since the world had already / ^ e e n / ^ divided i n to two 
blocs t h a t i s western and the Eastern one, Ind ia kept 
i t s e l f aloof from both and adopted non-aligned p u r s u i t . 
Due to t h i s , I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s wlfch Soviet Union could 
not develop along c o r d i a l l i n e s and c e r t a i n tens ions 
began t o appear. I n d i a ' s membership of commonwealth, 
opposi t ion to the Communist Revolution in Malaya, 
support t o Greece and above a l l the decis ion t o adopt 
the pol icy of non-alignment was i n t e r p r e t e d by the Soviet 
Union as pro-western po l i cy . 
However, a f t e r 1950 the r e l a t i o n s between the 
two coun t r i e s began to impcove. The recogni t ion of the 
communist Government of China by India in 1950 and vocal 
co lon ia l stand in the uni ted Nations removed the misgivings 
p reva i l i ng among the Soviet l eade r s , m fac t , soviet 
Union s t a r t e d showing deep goodwill and came forward to 
I n d i a ' s rescue whenever Ind ia was in need of I t s help, 
since independence India v i r t u a l l y made her earnes t 
over tures to have good r e l a t i o n s with both the Super 
power namely, U»S.A. and U.S.S.R. But Pakis tan which 
s t a r t e d crying a l l of (a) sudden t h a t Kashmir i s not 
an i n t e g r a l p a r t of Inida> c e r t a i n l y posed a t h r ea t t o 
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Indian national integrity and security. Now India 
wanted that Pakistan must be condemned by both the 
super powers since Kashmir is an integral part of 
India, In (a) few years India realized that U.S.A.'s 
attitude was quite which encouraged Pakistan's 
devilous design to destablize India. But in this hour 
of need U.S«S*R« stood with India and even criticised 
vehemently her fellow country china when it attacked 
India in 1962. Therefore, India was bound to reciproc-
ate Soviet Union's response. "India was virtually 
wholly dependent on Soviet sympathetic attitude in 
the Security Council to obviate the adoption by the 
Council of totally unacceptable resolutions that were 
sought to be moved by western countries on the Kashmir 
issue. This was followed in 1955 by unequivocal Soviet 
acceptance of the position that Kashmir was an integral 
part of India. Also indispensable was Soviet aid in 
developing a heavy industrial complex in India. Then 
catne the Soviet refusal to accept Chinese arguments 
and position on the conflict with India, which was 
converted into open criticism of China for the armed 
action against India in the winter of 1962."^^ 
16. Dutt, 0£. cit., p. 132. 
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A new turn was provided to the Indo-Sovlet relations 
in 1971 with the conclusion of Treaty of Peace, Friendship 
and Cooperation, This treaty was concluded at a time when 
Pakistan was displaying a belligerent attitude towards 
India and there were imninent chances of a war between 
the two countries. Under this treaty India and Soviet 
Union agreed to respect each other's foreign policy and 
to work for peace in Asia as well as 'the , world. The 
leaders of the two countries were to held regular contacts 
and discussions on international problems and to cooperate 
with each other in resolving international issues. Above 
all the two countries agreed not to conclude military 
alliances against each other. The two countries were to 
hold reciprocal consultations in case either of the 
party was subjected to an attack. This provision of the 
treaty assured India soviet support in case of sino-
American intervention in conflict between India and 
Pakistan. In fact, the conclusion of other treaty brought 
a change in India's foreign policyt It was the first 
political treaty concluded by India with any big power. 
In certain quarters an allegation was made that this 
treaty was in violation of the principle of non-alignment. 
However, the Indian leaders asserted that this did not 
affect the non aligned character of India's foreign policy. 
It was because of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's tremendous diplomatic 
71 
vision to provide p r io r i ty for national in te res t rather 
than ideological moorings, "The treaty lent a new dimension 
to the Indo-Soviet relat ionship wherein Soviet backing 
ceme to be crucial for warding off the most serious threat 
to Ind ia ' s integrltcy and socio-economic pol i ty . For the 
f i r s t time Soviet friendship's bearing on the fundamental 
national i n t e re s t s of India seeped down in mass consciou-
17 sness. No ideological Jus t i f ica t ion were needed." 
No doubt, after t h i s t rea ty , re la t ions between 
India and Soviet Union Improved leaps and bounds in a l l 
spheres like economic, sc ient i f ic and cul tural e tc . This 
was a h is tor ic development in the Indian foreign policy 
because i t did not only change India 's a t t i tude towards 
Soviet Union rather changed the ent i re gamut of India ' s 
re la t ions with the world community par t icu lar ly in Asian 
continent. But after the collapse of Soviet Union there 
i s a sea change in the global s i tuat ion. Therefore, India 
i s compelled to bring a shif t in her foreign policy 
accordingly. 
China, another giant of Asia also influenced 
India ' s foreign policy as a whole, par t icu lar ly in Asian 
17. Ibid. / p. 155. 
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region, xndta and China have maintained c lose re lat ions 
since ancient times. The foundation for these re lat ions 
was laid by the Budhist preachers who went to China and 
spread t h i s re l ig ion through the length and breadth of 
the country. A large number of Chinese Budhist scholars 
came to India in search of knowledge. The prominent 
Chinese scholars who came to India included Fahien, 
Huen-Tsang ett» A large number of Chinese students also 
came to India to study at a univers i t i e l ike Nalanda. 
In the modern times India eacpressed sympathy 
for China when she was subjected to Japanese aggression* 
After independence the two countries could not develop 
very intimate re lat ions on account of pre-occupation with 
their respective problems and their re lat ions in the main 
remained formal. However, with the emergence of the 
people's Republic of China the re lat ions between the two 
countries started improving. India consistent ly supported 
the case of China's entry into the United Nations. India 
showed keenness to develop friendly re lat ions with china 
despite i t s mil i tary action in Tibet, In 1952, India 
concluded a treaty with China with regard to Tibet and 
recognised the determination of the two countries to 
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conduct t h e i r r e l a t i o n s on the bas i s of Five p r i n c i p l e s 
(Panchsheel ) which have already been discussed in d e t a i l in 
the beginning. "In explaining the s igni f icance of the 
Agreement to the Agreement to the Lok Sabha, Nehru saidi 
I t i s a matter of importance to us , of course, a well a s , 
I am sure , to China t h a t these coun t r i e s , which have now 
almost about 1,800 miles of f r o n t i e r , should l i v e on 
terms of peace and f r i end l i ne s s , respec t each o t h e r ' s 
sovereignty and i n t e g r i t y , and agree not to i n t e r f e r e 
with each other in any way, and not to conunit aggression 
on each o ther . By t h i s agreement, we ensure peace t o a 
very la rge extent in a c e r t a i n area of Asia. I would 
ea rnes t ly wish t h a t t h i s area of peace would be spread 
over the r e s t of Asia and indeed over the r e s t of the 
18 
world. But the th ings tooH(a) ser ious tu rn in 1962 
when China launched a fu l l f ledged a t tack on India without 
any sign of sens ib le reason. I t was c e r t a i n l y a g rea t 
setback to the leadership of jawahar la l Nehru. Kehru 
was even charged by h i s partymen tha t Nehru had not 
been conscious about ove ra l l s i t u a t i o n a t global l eve l 
18. .aippadvirai and Rajan, 0£. c i t . , p . 115. 
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and showed a gross neglect towards security measures. 
But the fact is that Nehru himself was shocked and 
astonished on the China's stunning and sudden shift 
in its foreign policy. This invasion of china on India 
virtually brought'the relations between the two countries 
to standstill for a long period. "The cooling of India-
China relations was greatly abetted by the developments in 
Tibet, the Khampa revolt, the flight of the Dalai Lama 
and the large scale exodus of Tibetan refugees to India, 
and the consequent embitterment of relations. In its 
wake came the border dispute and the 1962 war. Nehru's 
policy towards China lay in shambles, even though the 
postulates on which it was founded were not wrong and 
are still validj;_ Nehru had not realized the full extent 
of the change in Chinese foreign policy and its implica-
tions and public opinion in India had been left totally 
uneducated by the mass media in this regard; in fact 
the newspa$)6rs made their contribution to the irrational 
and unrealistic approach on the border conflict at the 
time. The conflict left a trail of bitterness whose 
traces are still present in their relations. For many 
years to come their mutual hostility determinedv their 
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foreign policy. There were no amb|issadors in each other's 
capital for many years and there was virtual absence of 
contact Internationally, they traded abuses and generally 
adopted opposite standpoints. The domestic constraints 
were much greater in the case of India, but both the 
countries suffered from a fair degree of obsession of 
each other and the return to normalization was necessarily 
19 
an agonizing and long porocess. Inspite of all this 
India supported China's entry into the United Nations 
and showed keenness to resolve outstanding disputes with 
China amicably. The Chinese leadership also responded 
favourably. As a result several rounds of talks were 
held between the two to find out a solution of the 
prevalent problems. But in the last few years very serious 
and earnest efforts were made by the leadership of both 
the countries to bring India and China (closer) on a 
quite cordial line. The visit of Narsimha Rao, Prime 
Minister of India to China in August 1993 opened a new 
chapter in the history of India and Chinese relations 
signing an Indo-Chinese pact. This pact certainly has 
created a conducive atmosphere between the two countries 
to improve bilateral ties. 
19. Dutt, V.P,, op. cit.,pp. 279-80. 
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No doubts various developments between Indian 
and Chinese re lat ions since independence, part icularly , 
the invasion of China in 1962 brought an overall change 
in the entire gamut of Indian foreign pol icy which l e f t 
i t s impact ott India's re lat ions with global community 
part icularly with Asian re la t ions . 
South -East Asia remained an impottant region 
for Indian foreign pol icy makers since independence* 
India has many canmon h i s tor i ca l , soc ia l , economic and 
p o l i t i c a l bonds with the nations of these regions, 
"India's l inks with South-east Asia reached back into 
history and legend. All over South-east Asia one finds 
numerous symbols of these ancient t i e s . Indian philosophy, 
culture, re l ig ion , Budhism, art and l i terature architec-
tures languages, a l l these l e f t abiding impact on many 
20 
countries of South-east Asia", south-east Asian region 
played a v i t a l role even in Indian freedom struggle. 
Subhash Chandra Bose, one of the greatest leaders of 
Indian National Congress went to th i s region and mobilised 
Indian community in t h i s region for the cause of India's 
independence from the Yoxe of Brit ish rule. Southeast Asia 
from geographical point of view i s also quite c loser after 
20. Ib id . , p. 345. 
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South Asia. "India's re lat ions with South-east Asia 
are of abiding importance to her. Next to south-Asia, 
India has v i t a l stakes in South-east Asia whose inde-
pendence and security are bound up with her own". 
Therefore, the foreign pol icy orientations and attitude 
of India towards the nations of t h i s region had been 
very pos i t i ve right from India's Independence. As 
Jawaharlal Nehru said. "India was the gateway to both 
West and South-east Asia and, therefore, inevitably came 
into the picture* The independence and security of south-
east Asia served to strengthen India's own independence 
and security and any serious setback there constituted 
a potent ia l threat to India too. I t was with th i s under-
standing that India played an active role in mobilizing 
opinion against the then Dutch Government's e f fort reim-
posi t ion of colonial rule in Indonesia in 1948 and the 
active in teres t taken by India in various phases of the 
22 struggle in Indo-China", prom strategic point of view, 
south-east Asian region attracted utmost to Indian foreign 
pol icy . Indian t e r r i t o r i e s of Andaman and Nicobar is lands 
make India a maritime neighbour of Burma, Thailand, Malasia 
21. Ib id . , p. 345. 
22. Ib id . , p. 345. 
78 
and Indonesia , The d i s tance between the Great Nicobar 
i s l a n d of India and Indonesian i s l a n d of Sabang i s l e s s 
than a hundred m i l e s . The great channel between these 
two i s l a n d s prov ides d i r e c t access t o the Malacca s t r a i t . 
India thus share long land border with one South-east 
Asian country, Burma, and maritime boundaries with £our 
countries-Burma, ThJl^iland, Malaysia and Indonesia, Host-
i l i t y of any of these c o u n t r i e s can pose a c r e d i b l e 
danger t o India . Therefore, the newly emergent India under 
Nehru's leadership looked forward t o an Asian r o l e and an 
Asian p e r s o n a l i t y , and South-east Asia f igured q u i t e 
prominently in I n d i a ' s world view , I n d i a ' s keen i n t e r e s t 
was seen in South-east Asian reg ion when Jawaharlal Nehru 
reacted sharply to the newly born Republic of Indonesia 
in July 1947 in fo l lowing words, "no European country, 
whatever i t might be, has any b u s i n e s s t o use i t s army 
in Asia, Foreign armies funct ioning on Asia s o i l are 
23 
an outrage t o Asian sent iments . Since the mid f i f t i e s 
I n d i a ' s g lobal involvement in the i n t e r e s t of g loba l 
peace had pushed South-east Asia and reg iona l a f f a i r s , 
to a secondary p l a c e , and there i s l i t t l e evidence of 
23. A. Appaddrai & M.S. Rajan, 0£ . c i t . , p. 350. 
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serious thinking about Indian policy towards th i s region. 
By the mid s i x t i e s , India's re lat ions with Indonesia 
had deteriorated partly because of neglect and partly 
because of the changing international s i tuation in 
South-east Asia, The Association of South-east Asian 
Nations (ASEAN ) consist ing of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Phi l ip ines , Singapore and Thailand came into being in 
1967. I n i t i a l l y India showed keen Interest to Join the 
ASEAN, but^countries l ike Indonesia^ Thailand and Phi l ip-
ines were not In favour of India Joining the same because 
of the poss ib le risk of India dominating the Association 
on account of her vast s ize and resources. India's c lose 
t i e s with U«S.S«R. also stood in the way. 
In fact , changes which occured in India's foreign 
pol icy In f i f t i e s and sijcties , only due to the Impact 
of cold war, NO doubt, considerable emphasis was again 
associated to t h i s region when Mrs. Indira Ganohi came 
to power, "Ini t ia l ly perhaps because of the sharpness of 
cold war India seemed to accord disproportionate atten-
tion to big powers and global p o l i t i c s but that was 
because the Issues of war and peace and colonialism in 
general hung precariously in the balance ana the Gold war 
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threatened to devour most, i f not a l l , countries . 
Gradually, however, the focus veered inevitably 
towards Asian-African countries, particularly neigh-
bours and South-east Asian nations and the West Asian 
and Gulf region. I t vats during Mrs. Gandhi's f i r s t 
tenure as Prime Minister that a much greater emphasis 
on the countries around us became noticeable". 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi made India's intentions clear in 
willington (New Zealand) during her v i s i t there in 
May 1968, "Progressive nationalism" , she said, was 
the "best guasantee against subversive influences and 
external pressures". India was against any outeide 
force f i l l i n g the vacuum l e f t in South-east Asia after 
the Brit ish mil i tary withdrawal."^^ 
In shows, that India had always tr ied to 
improve herr re lat ions with a l l the nations of South-
east Asia. If there had been cool att itude from the 
the side of India then i t was only in the context of 
24. Dutt, 0£. c l t . , pp. 345-46 
25. I b i d . , p. 346. 
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world situation prevalent at that time. But the recent 
changes at global level compelled Indian foreign policy 
makers to take a new look of India's relations in the 
new international order. Southeast Asia will certainly 
assume greater significance in India's foreign policy 
due to its emergence as one of the most economically 
prosperous region(s) of the world. To give a stable to 
its economy India is bound to improve her ties with 
this region. 
India's relations with japan which had already 
emerged an important economic giant of the world, are 
discussed in detail in the next chapters. 
The era of global changes could be defined as 
systematic changes, in which old alignments yield to 
new pressures and an entirely a fresh approach seems 
to be desirable after thoroughly going into the new 
equations of power balance. However, these changes look 
differently to different nations and groups of nations; 
it can not seem to be similar from Delhi, Beijing, 
Washington and Moscow. India has to make its own appraisal 
and identify the emerging realignment of forces as helpful 
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or injurious to our national and international interests. 
"The changes in the global equilibrium of power and 
ideology dxoring the last few years has imposed upon all 
countries the need to reassess familiar foreign policy 
Strategies. It is true of all states, big and small. 
The almost sudden and cataclysmic dismantling of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 which remained a super power for 
almost four decades since the end of the Second world 
war, and an alternative pole of Socialist ideological 
world-view for over seven decades after the October 
Revolution in 1917- had been a major and decisive turn 
in global affairs. It has basically altered the power-
equations in world politics, world economy and the world 
27 
security system". This is the first tasK of foreign 
policy in contemporary eraj a deep, continuing apparaisal 
of world forces at work and identifying changes that 
are actually or potentially hostile. 
In the post-cold war world, India has also 
brought changes in her foreign policy in order to get 
adjusted in the altered global context. It is in this 
26, World Fopus, op. cit., p. 3. 
27. Ibid., p.11. 
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new perspective of the changed international 
scenario that India has to review its earlier 
policy assumptions, reshape its foreign policy 
priorities and reevaluated its role at global level, 
especially in the Asian continent. 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
Indo-Japanese Relat ions!Ear ly Phase 1947-76 
C H A P T E R I I I 
IMDO-JAPANESE REIATIOMSi EARLY PHASE 1947,76 
India and Japan, l y ing in the eastern and 
southern p a r t s of Asia r e s p e c t i v e l y • occupy g e o p o l i t i c a l l y 
convenient p o s i t i o n s from which i t i s easy t o observe 
countr i e s of Asia and beyond. Never the le s s , s i t u a t e d at 
the two ends of Asia they have a common i n t e r e s t in ensu-
ring the peace and s t a b i l i t y in the cont inent and thus 
promoting i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . I t must be 
remembered t h a t Ind ia and Japan are both open s o c i e t i e s 
committed t o democracy. By working together more c l o s e l y 
and more e f f e c t i v e l y , they w i l l b e n e f i t immensely not only 
the A s i a - p a c i f i c region but the whole world. 
I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with japan can be traced back 
as ear ly as the s i x t h century A.D. when Buddhism reached 
Japan through Korean pen insu la . Buddhism could leave ever-
l a s t i n g in f luence of Indian cu l ture on the Japanese people 
and t h e i r way of l i f e , ••Although Japanese Buddhism was 
o r i g i n a l l y based on Chinese Buddhism, i t was always known 
that Buddhism was o r i g i n a l l y an Indian r e l i g i o n . In 522 A. D. 
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Buddhism reached Japan an embassy from the King of 
Peckche (Southern Korea), During the reign of Prince 
Shotoku (574-671), Budhlsm came to be patronised and 
eversince (then) it has been one of the major influence 
shaping the lives of the Japanese-art, linguistics, 
architecture, literature, spiritual and norms of indivi-
dual conduct and social behaviour". This is the source 
of the close effinlty the people of Japan could keep for 
India, But an important event occured in the Japanese 
history which brought entire gamut of the Japanese relations 
with the world community virtually to an end when the 
Tokugawa shogun lyeyasu, closed Japan to foreign inter-
course in 1637, keeping in mind the fear to liquidation 
of Japanese culture and European aggression, J^an managed 
to pursue a self-imposed policy of isolation for more than 
200 years until the 'hermit' nation was forced to open its 
doors to foreign trade by the American warships under the 
command of Cammadore perry in 1853-54, ultimately culminating 
in the most memorable event in the history of Japan i.e. 
"Meiji Restoration" (1868) which was destined to change the 
course of Japanese relations with the global community. 
1. K, Ravi Prasad, "India and Japan: cultural closeness", 
Mainstr^anu Vol. XXVI, No, 35, (June 11,1988), p,14. 
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Therefore, India's direct contact with japan was established 
only after the Meiji Restoration by which Japan was open 
to the external world. 
Since India was a British colony she had to 
enter into the second world war in 1939-45 against Japan 
and even meagre economic relations between the two countries 
were suspended. Indian National congress which was the most 
and major force in India, under the able leadership of 
Mahatma Gandhi, also extended its full support to Britain 
in fighting against Japan. In fact Japan wds regarded by 
the congress, at that time, as an expansionist, fascist 
and totalitarian state. No doubt, Japan could inject its 
deep influence on Indian National Movement by boosting 
Indian political morale and inspiration when it taught 
a lesson to the world community by defeating a European 
nation namely Russia in 1905 that Asians possess all 
required abilities and capabilities to give a befitting 
reply to any European country. Even the great hero of 
Indian national movement, Subhash Chandra Bose took the 
side of Japan and his Indian National Army fought against 
Britain. But the fundamental purpose of japan in Indulging 
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in llnd world war was not at all the liberation of Asia 
from the shackles of European masters rather to expand her 
empire in the Asian continent. Japan's slogans like 'Asia 
for Asians' or a 'New order for Asia' were doubted by the 
Indian National congress because of untold atrocities and 
ruthless policies initiated by Japan during the war. This 
barbaric and dictatorial attitude of Japan lead to a wide-
spread hatred against it throughout Asia, Fihally Japanese 
power was ruined by America when it dropped two Atom Bombs 
on August 6th, and 9th, 1945, wiping out the most indust-
rialised Japanese cities Hiroshinia and Nagasaki. The earst-
while powerful empire saw its abysmal cataclysm and had 
no way except to- surrender unconditionally before the 
Allied powers on 14th of August,1945, The emperor himself 
announced the news of Japan's surrender on the Radio on 
I5th August,1945 and said, "Let one entire nation continue 
as one family from generation to generation mindful of the 
long road before it. Unite your total strength to be devoted 
2 
to the construction of the future". Thus the second world 
war came to an end with the defeat of an economically and 
2. B.R, chateril, /il Modern japan (Meerut, Mdnakshi pub,, 
1966), p,85. U / 
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politically powerful empire which brought japan for the 
first time in her long history, under ^ he/ foreign occup-
ation. 
While India was heading fast towards her inde-
pendence/ the independence of Japan was taken away by the 
Allied powers (virtually the U.S.A.) and Gen. McArthur of 
U.S.A. received his official designation as the Supreme 
commander for the Allied powers, Indian National Congress 
was fighting tooth and nail for the dismantling of the 
British Colonial rule and establishment of the democratic 
rule in India, on the other hand allied powers' adminis-
tration under the command of Gen. McArthur abolished the 
Japanese old centralised power structure and introduced 
so many democratic processes and reforms. This common point 
of democratization gave a meeting point to the two countries 
later. "The Japanese people renounce war as a sovereign 
right of the nation. Land, Sea and Air Forces will never 
be maintained, japan could become the Switzerland of the 
pacific was Gen. Mc. Arthur's prediction in 1946" . when 
3. Ibid., p.90. 
89 
India became an independent nat ion on 15th August,1947, 
japan was s t i l l under the All ied occupation. Ind ia adop-
ted a very f r i end ly a t t i t u d e towards japan, A glor ious 
example of I n d i a ' s fr iendly treatment towards Japan came 
in 1949 when an Indian elephant was given to the Ueno zoo 
in Tokyo as a goodwill g i f t by the then Indian Prime 
Minister^X^ndit J wahar Lai Nehru (who named the elephant 
Ind i r a a f t e r h i s daughteO, because the Japanese people f e l t 
an emotional tug at the death of the animal in t h i s Zoo due 
to devastat ing war. And at the par-East ^5i l i tary court held 
in 19 48, Hon'ble J u s t i c e R. Paul from India was the only 
Judge among the eleven who i n s i s t e d on the innocence of the 
Japanese about the war crimes, "Japanese opinion was affected 
by the r e fusa l of the Indian judge on the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
court of Inquiry t o u n i l a t e r a l l y condemn Japan for war 
crimes or to accept what he regarded was the philosophy 
4 
of the v i c t o r " . At the same time, India demanded j a p a n ' s 
complete independence from America when the Japanese peace 
Treaty was signed in 1951 and v i r t u a l l y due to t h i s reason 
she boycotted t h i s t r e a t y . " India did not jo in the St, 
Francisco conference nor did she sign the Treaty for the 
4. V,P, Dutt, I n d i a ' s yoreion Policy (Delhi, v ikas Pub, , 
1987)p. 499. 
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following reasons . The Government of India did not agree 
with the bel ieve of the U.S. Government t h a t t h e i r (American) 
view of the proposed Treaty was shared by the people of 
japan. India wanted t h a t japan, a f t e r §he became a sovereign 
nat ion, should independently make whatever arrangement she 
considered necessary for her se l f defence". India concluded 
a separate Peace Treaty with Japan on 9th June 1952 and 
immediately exchanged Ambassadors. Under the t r e a t y India 
magnanimously abandoned her p r i v i l e g e to demand compensation 
from Japan and approved the r e tu rn of Japan ' s a s se t s in 
India confiscated and kept with the custodian.dur ing war. 
"In September 1949 an Indian r ep re sen t a t i ve s t a t ed in 
Washington t h a t our government was in favour of ha l t ing 
repara t ion as the burden t o l d heavily on the l i v ing standards fef 
Japanese peop le . " In those days I n d i a ' s Premier Pandit 
Jawahar Lai Nehru was attempting to bring together the 
t h i r d world powers with Nasser of Egypt, Sukarno of Indone-
s i a , chau En Lai of China and Tito of Yugoslavia under the 
Non-Aligned Banner, Nehru's Non-aligned a t t i t u d e was a poin t 
5. Chatter j i , 2E.. c i t , , p . 96. 
6. vishwanathan, savitri, Japan: The New Challenges 
(Delhi, Allied ,1982), p.29, 
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of s i l e n t admiration among the Japanese people. I n d i a ' s 
fr iendly a t t i t u d e towards Japan held a l o t to Japan in 
her r e - en t ry i n t o the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community of United 
Nations. Mr. Kawasaki, the then charge-d-Affairs in Delhi, 
remarked t h a t , "The Japanese people a t tach very g rea t 
importance t o t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with the people of Ind ia and 
ind ica ted tha t the Japanese Embassy in New Delhi would be 
one of t h e i r l a r g e s t embassies next only to Washington and 
7 London". Despite I n d i a ' s l i b e r a l and helping a t t i t u d e 
towards Japan and P t . Nehru's much popular i ty in Japan, 
the two count r ies could not develop sound p o l i t i c a l moorings. 
I t i s because of Jagpan's adoption of d i f f e ren t kind of Path 
at the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l eve l or i t s more concentra t ion on 
economic aspect r a t he r than p o l i t i c a l one. Though Japan 
regained i t s sovereignty but i t signed a Defence Treaty 
with the U.S.A. by which i t emerged as an a l l igned nat ion 
and came d i r e c t l y under the American shadow. But India had 
to choose non-al l igned path due to the compelling circums-
tances at macro and micro s t ruc tu re l e v e l s . Ind ia wanted 
to gain moral and mater ia l support from each and every 
na t ion of the world community. Therefore, i t may be said 
7. cha t t e r j i , og.. c i t . , p . 98 
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here that both India and J ^ a n were compelled by 
the i r peculiar circumstances to adopt divergent 
routes and ideologies in thei r process of progress 
and advancement. This difference of the i r perspec-
t ives led them at logger heads so many times u l t i -
mately culminating in the deteriorat ion of the i r 
b i l a t e r a l t i e s at every stage. In Indians external 
involvements whether ever Goa (1961) or the confl ict 
with china (1962) or the Wars with Pakistan or the 
Peace Treaty with Soviet Union (1971), Japan did not 
show even an io ta of sympathy towards India. Rather 
i t cast igated India on several occasions. The peaceful 
Nuclear explosion of 1974 ((India) xwas vehemently 
c r i t i c i s e d by Japan and i t s Parliament ( the Diet) 
passed the unanimous resolution against India, I t was 
certainly stunning and shocking to the Indian Govern-
ment. India, also on her par t , could not show l ibera l 
po l i t i c a l a t t i tude towards Japan because of Americans 
absolute hegimony over Japan. Po l i t i ca l a t t i tudes 
towards Japan in the post-normalisation period were 
marked by a cer tain degree of r ig id i ty . "Those a t t i tudes 
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were derived from a percept ion which placed emphasis 
on J apan ' s a l l i ance with the United S ta t e s . I t was 
assumed t h a t because of i t ' s American connection 
Japan was not fu l ly autonomous in i t s foreign 
r e l a t i o n s and t h a t therefore p o l i t i c a l proofs d i rec ted 
p 
towards i t were unl ikely t o y ie ld tangib le r e s u l t s . " 
The above mentioned divergent pasts:Of Japan and 
India, on var ious Issues at l i i t e rna t iona l leve l both 
could have a low p o l i t i c a l tone in t h e i r b i l a t e r a l 
t i e s , but India and Japan could enjoy much economic 
tone in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s cons tan t ly and Consis tent ly . 
The h ia tus between India and Japan could be minimised 
only by t h e i r t rade r e l a t i o n s r i g h t from the old time. 
In order t o have a c l ea r p i c tu re of Indo-japanese 
t rade r e l a t i o n s in the post-world war I I period i t 
i s des i rab le t o have.br ief look on the h i s t o r i c t rade 
r e l a t i o n s between the two coun t r i e s . 
The ro le of global t rade in the process of 
economic development had been accepted a l l through 
8. Bimal Prasad, I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy (Delhi ,vikas 
Publ. , 1979), p . 236-7. 
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the ages. In India too, i t occupied a prime place 
in i t s economy. Ind ia ' so ca l l ed the golden b i r d ' 
when i t was a t the peak of g lory , had i t s due 
share in global bus iness . "There are ample h i s t o -
r i c a l evidences r i g h t from the Vedic e ra (1200 B.C.) 
9 
about*the importance of t rade in the economy". The 
holy book Bible a lso contained the reference about 
I n d i a ' s foreign t r ade . Dr. Lassen, the well known 
German o r i e n t a l i s t , s t a t e s , "The Egyptians dyed c lo th 
with Indigo and wrapped t h e i r 'Mummies' in I n d i a ' s 
muslim". Thus other wr i t e r s l i ke Fe-Hien (410 A.D.) 
and Hien-Tsang gave d e t a i l s of I n d i a ' s foreign t r ade . 
I n d i a ' s foreign trade composition in ancient 
era was of a favourable na tu re . I t was based on the 
p r inc ip l e of comparative advantage and na t iona l surp-
luses . The comparative advantage implies import of 
such goods which are not produced at comparative cos t 
advantage, while shu t t l i ng a r t i s a n s which are loca l ly 
avai lable at a favourable co s t . 
9. K. T. Shah|) Trade Tarr i f f and Transport in India 
(Delhi, Akhil, Pub., 1958) ,p , l . 
10. Ibid. , p . 1. 
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N ation a l . su rp lu se s.would me an the exce ss 
avai lable a f te r meeting the aggregate demand of the 
country for d i f f e r en t products which would be expor-
ted. The compositional va r i e ty extends a extent and 
opulence of t h i s t rade was well appreciated by I n d i a ' s 
t rade p a r t n e r s . The ancient Indian l i t e r a t u r e provides 
evidences of a growing and expanding sea born commerce 
and India had t rade r e l a t i o n s with china, Japan, Java, 
Sumatra, Burma, Cylon, Arabia, Fers ia , Babylon, Egypt 
and Greece e t c . 
On the bas i s of h i s t o r i c a l r eco ras , one can say 
tha t I n d i a ' s t rade r e l a t i o n s with Japan date back to 
Budhist e ra , "The Indian t e x t i l e was f i r s t introduced 
in to Jai-an alongwlth Budhism around the 7th century. " 
An Overview of Indo-Japan t rade in the middle 
ages gives the impression tha t i t passed through various 
ebbs, withdrawing i t s e l f from the r e s t of the world 
for var ious economic and non-economic reasons . Among the 
non-economic reasons was the ant ipathy towards 
Chr is t ian world. However, under pressure from America, 
Japan again opened i t s doors to i n t e r n a t i o n a l t rading 
by the middle of the 19th century. In 1867 , the pol icy 
11. B. A. Iqb=il, Indo-Japan Trade sinye 1960, I n s t i t u t e 
of Developing Economic, Tokyo, 1989, p . 5. 
96 
TABLE-syiJI 
pEri-CENlAGi:. ShAi^ £ Ci oAiAN li^  BJDIA'S TOTAL IMPOKTS ANi> EXFOi^ TS 
iROH 1961 TO 1940. 
Year Impotra Exports 
1901 1,0 2.0 
1905 1.2 6.3 
1910 2.1 6.8 
1916 3.2 8.e 
1920 9.2 1A.8 
1926 6.9 U.3 
1930 9.8 10.4 
1935 15.7 8.9 
1940 11.6 7.8 
Sourco: Iqbal B.A,; Indo-Japan trade since I960, Institute 
of developing Economics Tokyo, 1989, p.no.7. 
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of 'God King* was manifested and the Meiji e ra 
(enlightened government) began and during t h i s 
period modecnlzation t rend was witnessed including 
the reemergence of t rade as an instrument of economic 
r e h a b i l i t a t i o n . The Indo-Japanese t rade r e l a t i o n s 
were a lso r ee s t ab l i shed . 
In the 19th century the Indo-Japan t rade was by 
and large confined to import of raw cot ton from Japan 
and export of f in ished cot ton yarn from India. By the 
turn of the century Japan made i n d u s t r i a l miracle 
because of i t s dynamic and fars ighted economic p o l i c i e s , 
which influenced the t rade composition between the 
two na t ions . For example, ins tead of importing yarn 
from India, japan s t a r t e d importing raw cotton for 
i t s indust ry . I t s t e x t i l e industry was provided a 
grea t push and India became one of the important 
importers of Japan ' s silK and cot ton t e x t i l e s . 
During the year 190 4 the percentage share of 
raw cot ton in I n d i a ' s t o t a l exports to japan was 
21.2 peccent while in the same per iod the percentage 
share of import of cot ton manufactured in I n d i a ' s 
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t o t a l Imports from Japan reached from a meagre share of 
3 percent to 27.9 percent of the t o t a l by the year 1919. 
The import of s i l k too increased from 37.2 percent t o 55 
percent of I n d i a ' s t o t a l imports from Japan. The composi-
t ion Indo-Japanese t rade a lso went under a r a d i c a l change 
and new items namely j u t e , r i c e , iron and o i lcakes e t c . 
had emerged on export horizon, while the import of new 
items from Japan included manufactured s i l k and cotton 
manufactured rubber, paper g lass and g lass • e t c . and 
hence gradually the terms of t rade inc l ined in favour of 
Japan, being i t s exports of value added na tu re . 
Apart from rapid i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n in j apan , the 
B r i t i s h pol icy t o discourage Indian i n d u s t r i e s was 
another major cause for such unfavourable compositional 
s h i f t . To feed the growing needs of the country more 
and more f inished goods were imported and hence India 
was in a disadvantageous pos i t ion in regard to the 
world* which was e spec ia l ly considered as the workshop 
of the world. 
There was a continuous growth in I n d i a ' s t rade 
with japan in terms of value. The percentage of imports 
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from 1 percent during 1901 to 9.2 percent in 1920 
while expor ts rose from 2 percent to 14.8 percent 
during the same per iod. But on the resumption of normal 
t rade r e l a t i o n s af ter the end of the f i r s t world war, 
with con t inen ta l and other developed coun t r i e s , the 
12 steep r i s e in Indo-Japan t rade ha l ted . 
From the year 1920 onwards i . e . upto world war 
second/ Indo-Japan t rade moved with ebb and t i d e s . 
In r e l a t i v e terms in 1920 the imports s l ided down to 
9.2 percent as against 19.2 percent during the previous 
year , and remained low for about the couple of decades. 
Japanese imports were r e s t r i c t e d by the shrinkage of 
purchasing power and by the increase of import du t i e s 
in India . India ' s range ,of expor ts t o Japan in the 
twent ies was narrowed /down / fur ther through the d i s -
appearance of some export items l ike opium e t c . 
In t h i r t i e s , the abnormal increase in imports of 
cheap Japanese goods shaked the Indian i n d u s t r i e s . As 
per Indo-Japanese Trade convention of 1904, no p ro t ec t i ve 
imposition could be levied since Japan was t r e a t e d 
12.K.B. Agarwal, Indo-Japanese Trade Rela t ions (Jaipur 
Alekh Pub., 1974, p . 53. 
13.B.N. Ganguli, India ' s Economic Relat ions with the 
Far Eastern and Paci f ic Countries in the Present century 
(Calcut ta J Orient Longmans , 1956) ,p .145 . 
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as most favoured na t ion . But formal not ice of the 
denunciation of the agreement was given to Japan in 
April 1933 and japan made r e l a t i a t o r y boycott of 
purchases of Inaian raw cot ton . TO' resolve t h i s 
unfortunate stalmete a new agreement was signed in 
London on 12th July 19 34 between India and Japan, 
In t h i s agreement both the coun t r i e s extended to each 
other most favoured-nation treatment and agreed to 
have actual consu l ta t ion when t a r i f f charges were 
contemplated by e i t h e r country. The agreement provided 
for a system of l inked quota. 
In 19 37 a newe^ agreement was concluded with 
Japan which replaced the Indo-Japanese Trade Agreement 
of 19 34. While the p r i n c i p l e s of the f i r s t agreement 
were maintained, only basic quotas and c e i l i n g s of 
d i f f e ren t items were changed. With the inception of 
Indo-Japanese t rade agreement of 19 37, the share of 
imports from Japan decl ined, so far as expor ts were 
concerned, there was even steeper dec l ine , with the 
exception of 1928 and 19 34 expor ts of Indian goods 
t o Japan shrinked and reached t o the lowest l eve l 
( to a l l time low ) \of 7.8 percent of I n d i a ' s t o t a l 
exports during the year 1940. steep decl ine in I n d i a ' s 
expor ts and r e l a t i v e l y l e s se r decl ine in imports, 
led India t o have adverse t rade balance with Japan. 
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Before the second world war/ our t o t a l t rade 
with Japan amounted t o about " . 30-40 c ro res (quin-
quen t i a l average) and was next in importance only t o the 
Indo-Br i t i sh t r a d e . India being a B r i t i s h colony had t o 
suspend i t s t rade r e l a t i o n s with Japan in 1941* as a r e s u l t 
of i t s entrying i n t o the war. . : . -
During the war per iod t o t a l t rade on the 
average was about 1.4 c ro res only. 
With a view t o review the t rade connections 
there was no exchange of t rade de lega t ions between India 
and Japan in 1947. However, independent India revived i t s 
t rade r e l a t i o n s with Japan in ea r ly 50s. In the year 1950 
the t rade value was as low as Rs. 20 c ro re s with a few 
items only/ which gradual ly increased in the subsequent 
yea rs . 
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Prime Minister 
of India, provided utmost p r i o r i t y to i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n in 
order to s a t i a t e Indian needs of c a p i t a l goods. Japan which 
had already shown i t s i n d u s t r i a l might in pre-war period 
a t t r a c t e d a l o t t o Nehru. Though Japan was brought to the 
ashes by the Al l ied powers under the command of America in 
14. R.L. Varshney, I n d i a ' s Foreign Tradet during and af te r 
x^j^^^)Wotld war I I (Allahabad/ Kitab Mahal Pub., )p . 34. 
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1945 by destroying J apan ' s most I n d u s t r i a l l y advanced c i t i e s 
namely Nagasaki ar> i .liroshima through atom bomb's explosions. 
But the fac t i s ',>air*R; t h a t the Japanese i n d u s t r i a l 
p o t e n t i a l and genius remained i n t a c t , r a t h e r c i t i e s were 
sabotaged not minds. No doubt* af ter San Fransisco Treaty of 
1951, America played a very v i t a l r o l e in the cons t ruc t ive 
development and progress of Japan in order t o c u l t i v a t e i t 
as a counter-weight against red expansionism in Asia. There 
was an e s s e n t i a l compulsion on the pa r t of America t o take 
a l l strong and susta ined s teps t o curb Russian hegemonial 
wings in Asia. Therefore, i t was global scenario which 
compelled America t o r evo lu t i on i se Japanese economy. But 
we must remember t h a t in the reemergence of Japan as an 
economic g ian t of the world, the only support of U.S.A. was 
not enough r a the r t h e i r own i n d u s t r i a l p o t e n t i a l and genius 
which was already developed by the Japanese af te r the Meiji 
r e s t o r a t i o n . This i n d u s t r i a l p o t e n t i a l of the Japanese 
people in jec ted e v e r - l a s t i n g impression upon the psyche of 
Pt . Jawahar Lai Nehru who was the a r c h i t e c t of Indian 
foreign po l icy . Thus India made a l l s incere e f f o t t s to 
improve i t s r e l a t i o n s with Japan. 
In October 1956 I n d i a ' s Vice Pres ident , Dr. S. 
Radha Krishnan paid a v i s i t to Japan which brought the two 
coun t r i e s at a c lose r l e v e l . This c loseness fur ther brought 
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the f r u i t f u l v i s i t s of J apan ' s Prime Minister M.Kishi 
in May 1957 and of I n d i a ' s Prime Minister Pandit 
Jawaharlal Nehru in October 1957 t o Delhi and Tokyo 
r e spec t i ve ly . These v i s i t s of the highest d i g n i t a r i e s of 
the two coun t r i e s added a new chapter in the h i s to ry of 
Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . In t h e i r v i s i t s the two l eader s 
made a l l ser ious e f f o r t s t o understand each o t h e r ' s point 
of view and signed important and comprehensive agreements. 
Due to t h i s Japan extended a Yen c r e d i t worth $ 50 mil l ion 
to India in 1958, repayable in 10 years at p reva len t world 
bank i n t e r e s t r a t e s . A few weeks l a t e r a government 
sponsored mission reached ant agreement with the Indian 
government for Japanese p a r t i c i p a t i o n in a scheme to 
develop iron mines in the Rourkela D i s t r i c t of Orissa near 
I n d i a ' s East Coast. Of an est imated $ 33 mi l l ion required 
for the p ro jec t , Japan would lend India about $ 8 mil l ion 
in r o l l i n g stock, mining machinery, and harbour f a c i l i t i e s ; 
the Indian governmentwas supposed t o ask the remainder 
from the United S ta tes . Once production was underway, 
Japan would have an assured supply of at l e a s t 2 mi l l ion 
tons of Iron ore annually for 10 years . 
15. Lawrence Olson, Japan in Post-war Asia (Mew York: 
Preager Pub., 1970) pp. 39-40. 
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.In fact Nehru 's p r e s t i g e In Japan was high and 
he received a warm welcome in Japan when he paid h i s v i s i t 
in October 195J. Nehru f e l t t h a t the Japanese people were 
in some r e spec t s , in advance of t h e i r government- on i s sues 
l ike peace, disarmament and the abol i t ion of Nuclear weapons, 
i . e . he found in them a n e u t r a l i s t b i a s more in tune with 
the Indian pol icy of non-alignment then the o f f i c i a l Ja^^snese 
could volunteer . In any case i t was af te r Nehru's v i s i t 
t h a t Japan extended i t s f i r s t yen c r e d i t t o India which 
continued with more magnitude and volume. 
The agreements signed in February 1958, by Japan 
and India became the i n f r a s t r u c t u r a l base for t h e i r b i l a t -
e r a l r e l a t i o n s . They were almost e n t i r e l y concentrated on 
the economic r e l a t i o n s and exchanges which opened a new 
door for t h e i r Independent r e l a t i o n s . By t h i s goodwill and 
s incere e f f o r t s India and Japan could fur ther make stronger 
t h e i r b i l a t e r a l t rade t i e s . The ex te rna l invasions and 
i n t e r n a l d is turbances faced by India , brought an economic 
d i s a s t e r which c rea ted t e r r i b l e t roub les for Indian t rade 
but anyway she could continue the pace of the growth of 
t r ade . On the other hand Japan was perpe tua l ly making 
stronger her economic pos i t ion taking 6.6 percents 
share of I n d i a ' s t o t a l imports in the year 1968 while 
exports from India to Japan touched the weight of ( a l l 
time high) 11.5 percent during the same per iod. 
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TABLE - : I l l ( a ) 
Pe rcen tage of JaJ^an i n I n d i a ' s To ta l Impor ts and Expor t s 
"iear Imports Expor t s 
1959-60 5.3 7 .2 
1960-61 5.2 7.9 
1961-62 5.7 6.2 
1962-63 5.1 4 .7 
1963-64 5.5 7 .1 
1964-65 5.6 7 .6 
1S65-66 6.2 6.9 
1966-67 5.6 6.5 
1967-68 5.1 11.0 
1968-69 6.6 11.5 
1969-70 4 .3 12.2 
1970-71 4 .6 13.9 
1971-72 8.4 11 .6 
1972-73 9 .2 11.1 
1973-74 10.0 14 .1 
source J Compiled and computed from v a r i o u s i s s u e s from 
1960 t o 1975 of d i r e c t i o n of t r a d e S t a t i s t i c s : 
I^J year Book. 
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(a) 
Table H I clearly shows that during 1960s 
the growth of exports and imports were continuous. 
But in absolute terms the growth of imports was much 
steeper and India s tar ted having adverse trade balance 
which was in favour in the early plan periods. After 
1966, exports expanded at ;a faster ra te and the balance 
of trade was again in favour of India for about a decade. 
During the o i l c r i s i s of 1973# Japan was inclined to diver-
sify and expand'the trade quantum with India, At the same 
time India saw certain p o l i t i c a l al ternations that resulted 
in the impositicai of national emergency and they had their 
deep impact on India ' s trade re la t ions . The Japanese 
traders were afraid of taking r i sks in such instable 
s i tuat ions of India and therefore the growing pace of 
b i l a t e r a l trade between the two countries was substantial ly 
slowed down. 
In fact/ the international sway of pandit 
Jawahar Lai Nehru's diplomacy began to suffer setbacks 
and his i dea l i s t i c policy came under a severe attack after 
Sino-Indian border dispute in 19 62. The sudden attack of 
China on India, without any sensible reason (without any 
provocation) gave a severe j o l t to the idea l i s t foreign 
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Policy adopted by Nehru. Even Nehru 's own par ty men 
vehemently c r i t i c i s e d him for being completely aloof 
from the r e a l i s t look t h a t ignored the defence aspect 
absolutely and concentrated only on the economic sphere at a 
time when the cold war was at i t s peak. Nehru could 
not bear the brunt caused by the stunning invasion of 
China and passed away on 27th May 1964. In fact Nehru 's 
c r i t i c s were unable t o understand tha t af ter a l l in any 
s i t u a t i o n and circumstances man has t o act and i n t e r e s t 
with man and as a person, Nehru could not harbour doubts 
about China's i n t e g r i t y which had already signed a 
h i s t o r i c a l peace t r ea ty known as Panch-sheel. No doubt, 
China v io l a t ed a l l the norms of i n t e r n a t i o n a l behaviour 
and above a l l China deceived Nehru, a good human being. 
But Japan could not show any sign of fr iendly a t t i t u d e 
or sympathy t o India a t t h i s c r u c i a l junc tu re . India was 
beset with so many i n t r i c a c i e s and complexi t ies during 
s i x t i e s but Japan could not come forward t o give any 
helping assurance (hand) from i t s side t o India . "The 
s i x t i e s were a decade in which India was faced with 
a s e r i e s of p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y problems such as the 
l i b e r a t i o n of Goa (196l) , border skirmishes with China 
(1961), the waT/'bf Pakistan (1965), On none of these 
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occas ions did Japan show any overt I n t e r e s t e i t h e r 
by way of lending support t o India or by way of 
opposing I t . On the Goa I s s u e , In p a r t i c u l a r , Japan's 
f a i l u r e t o denounce Portuguese c o l o n i a l i s m l e f t a sense 
Of disappointment among the Indian I n t e l l l n g e n t s l a . ", ^^ 
After the short l i v e d cabinet of Lai Bahadur 
Shas tr l , Mrs, Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister of 
India made f u l l blooded e f f o r t s t o r e s t o r e and re furb i sh 
the p r e s t i g e of India. Mrs. Indira Gandhi looked upon 
Japan wlbh keen I n t e r e s t as a country with the remarkable 
post-war development. She made very s incere e f f o r t s t o 
Improve Indo-Japanese b i l a t e r a l t i e s . Mrs, Indira Gandhi 
paid a v i s i t t o Japan in 1969 t o c u l t i v a t e renewed s p i r i t 
and enthusiasm In Japanese a t t i t u d e which became q u i t e 
slow and s l u g g i s h towards India. "By 1968, Japanese 
pessimism had deepened. In s p i t e of some hopeful s igns 
In agr i cu l ture , India* s economic d e c l i n e and stagnat ion 
over the previous f i v e years had caused a warning of what 
hope there had been among Japanese there that the country 
would achieve solvency and make I t s way Into the modern 
^ 
16,' Vimal Prasad{^ op. c l t . . p. 240. 
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I n d u s t r i a l world. I n t e r e s t in India decl ined as i n t e r e s t 
in South-east Asia increased. New c r e d i t s flowed i n t o 
Indonesia a f te r 1965* and more Japanese money found i t s 
way t o Malaysia* Thailand and elsewhere. By con t r a s t , 
many pointed t o I n d i a ' s unhealthy dependence on foreign, 
aid, which the Japanese found offensive to t h e i r deepest 
regarding s e l f - r e spec t and s e l f - r e l i a n c e . They thought 
t h a t the Indian government had not made a r e a l l y urgent 
17 e f f o r t s to end such dependence". India could get a 
p ro jec t loan for the cons t ruc t ion of the vishakapatnam 
Outer Harbour spec ia l ly af te r Mrs. Gandhi 's v i s i t in 
1969. Soon af ter an unprecendented problem came before 
Indian Government when floods of Bangladeshi refugees 
I n f i l t r a t e d on Indian so i l due t o untold hardships 
and a t r o c i t i e s I n f l i c t e d on them by West P a k i s t a n ' s 
army. India condemned t h i s r ep ress ive pol icy of west-
Pakistan t o hold down the democratic voice of East 
Pakis tan i people. Ind i ra Gandhi, the then Prime Minister 
of India* brought the e n t i r e scenario to the no t ice of 
almost a l l the Western coun t r i e s spec ia l ly U.S.A. India 
had to bear huge expenses in susta ining the burden of 
17. Lawrencefipg.Cit.) pp.228-29. 
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refugees. Unfortunately there was no pos i t i ve response 
from the side of U.S.A. Thus India headed towards 
soviet union which rec iproca ted and both the coun t r i e s 
signed a peace and Friendship Treaty for twenty years 
in 1971. The year 1971 was a lso marked by the t h i r d 
Indo-Pak war and the b i r t h of Bangladesh, During the war 
and a f t e r , Soviet Union proved t o be a timely t r u s t e d 
fr iend of India . Since then I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with 
sovie t Union remained very co rd i a l and p leasan t . 
This c loseness of India and the sovie t Union 
c e r t a i n l y c e r t a i n l y did widen the gap between India 
and Japan . I t i s impottant t o mention here t h a t 
Indian c loseness should not be considered as I n d i a ' s 
departure from non-aligned po l i cy . At the same time 
India was ful ly independent in i t s a f f a i r s having no 
in te r fe rence from Soviet Union in i t s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s 
But on the other hand Japan remained under the American 
umbrella and undoubtedly i t s independence was influenced 
by the U.S.A. Therefore, i t i s emerging at i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
scenario in the beginning of 1970s brought again the two 
coun t r i e s p o l i t i c a l l y a t loggerheads. India was stunned 
and shocked Over the Japanese a t t i t u d e which' came against 
against India in 1974 when India made a^Feacefu l^uc lear 
}/xplosion on i t s s o i l . I t was c e r t a i n l y a remarkable 
I l l 
achievement on the p a r t of India due to i t s tremendous 
u t i l i t y in the peaceful developmental work. India made 
i t completely c l ea r t o the world 'that t h i s achie . 
vement of India wi l l be ful ly converted only in 
peaceful and cons t ruc t ive workUpurpose))rather des t ru -
c t ive ones. Even though Japan came out against India 
forceful ly and not only c r i t i c i s e d India vehemently 
but the Japanese Diet passed a unanimous r e so lu t ion 
against India. But t h i s decision of the Japanese 
government was regarded by India as immature, not based 
on t h e i r own observat ions and i n t e r a c t i o n s but r a t he r 
borrowed from other n a t i o n s - f i r s t from China and then 
from the v.est. Therefore^ India was bound to harbour 
doubts about Japan ' s independence from the western 
world because of i t s dance to t h e i r tune in most of 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s . 
Apart from these p o l i t i c a l divergent a t t i t u d e s 
between India and Japan at i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l , there 
was no harmony between the two economies during the 
post-war per iod. India, a f t e r i t s independence took 
plenty of new steps t o r e s t r u c t u r e i t s economy under 
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the able leadership of the then Prime Minister 
Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru, the a r c h i t e c t of modern 
India, but the s teps did lack something and were 
not in conformity with the Japanese economic i n i t i a -
t i v e s . "The economic p o l i c i e s of India and Japan 
had l i t t l e degree of harmonisation between them even 
though the economies were canplementary to each 
o ther , Japan has s t a r t e d t o pave the way for more 
i n d u s t r i a l co l l abo ra t i ons , since ear ly 1960s, with 
the developing coun t r i e s , mainly were • technica l 
col laborat ion* and ' j o i n t ventures • .The two 
mechanisms were t yp i ca l of Japanese overseas i n v e s t -
ments whose f i e l d s of operat ion were r a the r of labour-
in tens ive and technology based investments . Most of 
the jo in ventures and technica l co l l abo ra t ions have 
so far been executed in labour in t ens ive i n d u s t r i e s . 
The average s ize of the investment was of small 
sca le . This pa t t e rn i s in sharp con t r a s t to s imilar 
ventures by other i n d u s t r i a l i s e d western coun t r i e s . 
Some of the developing coun t r i e s which are I n d i a ' s 
competi tors in the Japanese market, have harmonized 
with Japan s p o l i c i e s so t h a t i t can be poss ib le for 
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those coun t r i e s so as to enable those coun t r i e s to 
proceed and move towards the areas where Japan 
reaches the re-Import s tage , Indian p o l i c i e s , on the 
other hand/ were not harmoneous with the Japanese 
p o l i c i e s and as a consequence >.om no sub-
s t i t u t i o n of the Indian indus t ry In place of the 
19 Japanese Industry has taken p lace" . Therefore I n d i a ' s 
economic t i es with Japan could not show any impressive 
sign Of Improvement. In fac t , upto ea r ly pas t of the 
1970s the value of b i l a t e r a l t rade between India and 
Capan could not Increase as per expec ta t ions . As a 
matter of fac t , Japan could not show i t s economic 
s t rength even upto l a t e 1960s, with the emerging o i l 
c r i s i s and growing need t o have b e t t e r terms and gains 
of foreign t r ade , Japan s t a r t e d d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of 
i t s t r ade . 
During 1974 t o 1979 the t o t a l value of t rade 
between India and Japan Increased by 27.7 percent 
while the world t rade growth r a t e was 50,3 percent 
during the similarf (samen per iod. Thus Indo-J apanese 
19. vishwanathan, o p . c i t . , p . 54. 
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t rade growth was almost half , japan outpaced the 
t rade growth r a t e of the world as well as India . 
The growth r a t e of b l l l a t e r a l t rade between India 
and Japan lagged for behind the growth r a t e of 
the world, Japan and India . 
Ti^ reasons for such an e r r a t i c trend were 
i n s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l condi t ions in India . Mrs. Indi ra 
Ganahi, the then Prime Minister of India , declared 
na t iona l emergency due to i n t e r n a l d is turbances in 
1975. This unprecedented p o l i t i c a l development on 
the mature democratic s o i l of India, c e r t a i n l y c rea ted 
i n s t a b l e p o l i t i c a l condi t ions which led to tremendous 
c i sconten t among the people against Mrs, Gandhi. This 
sudden development in Indian pol icy c u l t i v a t e d even 
fear among the fore igners . Japan was no exception 
as while making extensive e f f o r t s to bui ld up her 
t rade surpluses she did not increase her b i l a t e r a l 
t rade with India as an element of high r i s k was 
involved on account of the uncer ta in economic condi-
t i ons p reva i l ing in India , 
The Indo-Japan t rade l o s t i t s share in the t o t a l 
t rade of Ind ia as well as Japan, The r e l a t i v e share 
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Of b i l a t e r a l t r ade In I n d i a ' s t o t a l t rade lowered down 
from 9.13 percent to 8.52 percent , while in J apan ' s 
t o t a l t rade the share came down t o 60.69 percent from 
00.85 percent during the p lan . Hence the overa l l t rade 
performance between India and Japan remained for from 
s a t i s f a c t i o n . 
The I n d i a ' s import performance during the plan 
was j u s t the confirmation of the cau t ious nature of 
Japanese expor te r s in t h e i r t rad ing with India . They 
took no r i s k t o export t o India in an e ra of na t iona l 
emergency r e s u l t i n g in a f a l l of as much as 33 percent 
in imports from Japan, while India s t o t a l exports 
from the world f e l l only by 17 percent in the year 
1975-76. 
During the plan I n d i a ' s t o t a l imports increased 
by 26.2 percent while imports from Japan increased by 
17.4 percent . In the l a t e r years of the plan imports 
from the world as well as from Japan s t a b i l i z e d and 
shov,ed a steady growth. There was a f a l l in r e l a t i v e 
share of imports from Japan in I n d i a ' s t o t a l imports 
and Japan ' s t o t a l export , which came downfrom 8.29 
to 7.7 percent and from .92 to .61 percent r e spec t ive ly . 
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TABLE - I I I <b> 
•^TAL WORLD TRADE TOTAL TRADE Of INDIA AND JAPAN AND 
THEIR RELATIVE SHARES IN TOTAL TRADE OF THE WORLD 
(US ; Diiiijoii) 
Year Total Horld Indiix'a Jap^n'n 
Trade Total Trade Total Trade 
Value % of tho Value X of tho 
total world total world 
trade trades 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1986 
1987 
18,49, 
38,43, 
36,30, 
40,71, 
47,69, 
,100 
.IWi 
, i.00 
,200 
600 
10122 
23159 
27980 
29512 
33113 
.56 
.60 
.76 
.72 
.69 
1.32,211 7.15 
2,71,737 V.«7 
3,07,652 6.33 
3,30,310 6.31 
3,82,268 7.98 
Source: Direction of trade itattaticai 
IHF Year Book various iaauea from 1976 to 1988. 
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The r e l a t i v e share of India s imports from Japan 
in J apan ' s t o t a l expor ts f e l l not only because of 
f a l l in imports from Japan but a lso because the 
growth r a t e of I n d i a ' s imports from Japan was much 
l e s s than the growth r a t e of j a p a n ' s t o t a l expor t s . 
Luring the plan I n d i a ' s export performance, too, was 
not s a t i s f a c t o r y . Though i t recorded p o s i t i v e growth 
but in r e l a t i v e terms when compared to I n d i a ' s t o t a l 
exports the performance can not be considered as 
s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
As shown in the t ab l e IH'.Ct^except in the year 
1975-76 the growth of I n d i a ' s exports to Japan was 
much lower then the growth r a t e of expor ts to the 
world. However, growth r a t e of t o t a l imports of Japan 
was also low enough hence the share of imports from 
India was maintained in j a p a n ' s t o t a l imports. But 
the growth r a t e of exports of India t o the world was 
higher and I n d i a ' s expor ts to Japan l o s t t h e i r share 
in the t o t a l expor ts of India . 
The o i l c r i s i s of 1973 seems to be the main 
cause Of lower imports made by the Japanese economy. 
TABLE ^ T T ' 118 
PERCENTAGE OF JAPAN IN INDIA'S TOTAL IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
YoAr Imports Exporto 
19S9-60 5.3 7.2 
1960-ei 6.2 7.9 
10G1-6V 6.7 ,j.? 
19G2 G3 5.1 4.'. 
1963-64 5.5 7.1 
1964-65 6.6 7.6 
1966-6G 6.2 6.d 
1966-67 5.6 8.0 
1S67-6Q 5.1 1L.0 
i968-6& G,6 li.6 
i969-7e)« "i.a 12.ii 
1970-71 '..6 13. w 
1971-72 8.4 il.6 
1972-73 9.2 11. 1 
1973-74 10.0 14.1 
SouToe: Coapllod and coiaputed from various laauoa frum l&6ii3 
to 1976 of dir-;ctlon of trade atatlatlca- IKF Year 
Book. 
* Note: From the year 1969-70 onwarda data aro compiled and 
computed fro« the Direction of trade. IMF &» IBRD 
Year Booh, 1GT6. 
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which has shown I t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y and was compelled 
t o read jus t i t s p o l i c i e s , japan became highly 
caut ious and s t a r t e d making extensive e f f o r t s to 
d ivers i fy i t s t rade as much as pos s ib l e , • with 
specia l emphasis on the d i v e r s i f i c i a t i o n of i t s 
sources of imports . 
The t ab l e -TZ of shOws t h a t with the exception 
Of the f i r s t year of the plan i , e , 1974-75 India 
recorded favourable t rade balance with >:apan which 
during the year 1975-76 jumped by 35.3 percent over 
the previous year,During t h i s per iod Indo-japanese 
t rade balance followed the same t rend as in I n d i a ' s 
t rade balance with the world. But the unfortunate 
p a r t of the fact i s t h a t the t rade surplus was the 
r e s u l t of decrease in imports from Japan in place of 
increas ing the exports t o Japan, 
In fac t , the i n t e n s i t y of b i l a t e r a l t rade amongst 
the two na t ions depends mainly on the composition of 
t rade as well as the stage of economic development of 
the two coun t r i e s . The exports of developed count r i es 
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usually consist of manufacture and value added 
products while high concentration of non-manufa-
ctures in the exports of a developing country i s 
considered to have arisen from the fact that in 
most cases i t special ises in producing and export-
ing non-manufacturers to advanced countries^ which 
i s not beneficial for developing country, i,ith 
added manufactured goods in exports, a country 
generally improves i t s terms of trade. Hence i t i s 
desirable to analyse the compositional shif ts in 
Indo-J ^ a n trade so as to see whether the India ' s 
terms of trade are improving. 
Indian economy i s expanding fast with high 
absorption capacity of imported technology and 
highly sophisticated machines, India, determined 
to achieve accelerated economic growth and higher 
exports, i s inevitably bound to import high quali ty 
intermediate and capi ta l products. Consequently, 
consumer goods re la t ive ly los t their share and were 
replaced by heavy indust r ia l products. However, 
trade optimists think that export i s pract ica l ly 
an effective measure to counter the balance of 
lai-
payments d e f i c i t in the short run caused by l a rge r 
import b i l l s . India i s producing and supplying non-
manufactured goods. As a r e s u l t India ' s terms of t rade 
in r e l a t i o n t o c e r t a i n coun t r i e s , are cons tant ly 
unfavourable, 
India imports a la rge number of items from 
Japan, but only six major items are analysed. These 
items are ; -
1. Foodstuffs and raw mater ia l 
2. Light i n d u s t r i a l products , 
3. chemicals, 
4. Iron and Steel , 
5. General machinery and 
6. Transport equipments 
Luring the period from 1974 to 1977 India's 
imports of foodstuffs and raw materials could 
barely increase by 0.2 points, major import items 
were those of manufactured sector. However, there 
was a major compositional shift in imports from 
some of the heavy industrial products that is, 
chemicals and Iron ana steel to light industrial 
n2 
products. Chemicals and Iron and steel which 
together snatched a share of more than 60 percent 
came down to less than 40 percent of the total 
imports of India from Japan, While light industrial 
products increased their share in the total imports 
by five times • 
The rise in oil prices in 197 3 was reflected 
in the cost of Japan . The annual percentage change 
in wholesale prices average at 3.2 percent between 
1965 and 1972 and increased upto 31.3 percent in 
1974. This state of affairs forced Japan to readjust 
her economy and re-allocation of the energy using 
industries such as iron and steel abroad in order 
to reduce the import requirements of fueld, parti-
cularly crude oil,of the economy. Further Japan also 
recognised the growing environmental threat because 
Of chemical industries at Japan and hence reduced 
its production and exports of these items, and 
consequently these items of imports lost their 
share in India's total imports from Japan. 
India's growing thrust to boost her exports 
and liberalise import policies for the import of 
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c a p i t a l goods caused an increase in imports of general 
machinery from Japan by 6,4 percent Somehow I n d i a ' s 
import of t r anspor t equipments had stagnated during 
the period with a meagre decl ine in i t s share in 
I n d i a ' s t o t a l imports . 
In the l i g h t of the above mentioned fac t s and 
f igu res , i t can be said t h a t even in t rade r e l a t i o n s 
between the two coun t r i e s India could not gain the 
corresponding p lace , "The growing s ignif icance of Japa-
nese expor ts t o Indian economy can well be judged by 
the increas ing share of Japanese exports to India from 
5,4 percent in 1960-61 t o about 11 percent in 1976-77, 
I n d i a ' s expor ts t o Japan, desp i te an average growth 
Of 20 percent per year are only about 1,2 percent of 
Japan ' s imports . Evidently India does not enjoy 
corresponding s t a t u s in Japanese t rade scheme. While 
i t wi l l be ambitious to seek a corresponding share in 
view of the large turnover of Japanese t r ade , i t can 
not be denied t h a t , in the long run, India needs a 
more pos i t i ve response from the Japanese market than 
h i t h e r t o . I t i s no concidence t h a t in 1977-78 the 
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TABLE-IV (a; 
TOTAL WORLD IMPORTS, TOTAL IMPORTS OF INDIA AND JAPAN 
AND THEIR RELATIVE SHARE IN THE TOTAL TRADE OF THE WORLD 
(US $ mil Lion) 
Year Total World India's Japan a 
IllPORTS Total IMPORTS Total IKPOKTS 
Value % of the Value % of tlit^. 
total world tot/il world 
trade trade 
1976 
1980 
1985 
1986 
1967 
81S400 
1936800 
1692400 
2079600 
2128900 
Source : Same as Table III, (6y 
6966 
14,598 
17,656 
18,830 
20.683 
. ^ 3 
.76 
.92 
.92 
.97 
54,447 
1,41,284 
1,30,516 
1,27,660 
1,50,926 
G.64 
7.30 
6.80 
6.13 
7.08 
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t r ade turnover has been in favour of Japan, According 
to Japanese s t a t i s t i c s t h e i r expor ts t o India went 
up by more than 37 percent whereas Indian exports 
19 increased by only 3*9 pe rcen t , " 
With a look at the t ab le I5t(ct.) one may simply 
conclude t h a t the export composition of India to Japan 
was t h a t of a country playing a t r a d i t i o n a l ro le in 
the foreign t r a d e . The tab le i n d i c a t e s a very high 
concentrat ion on manufactures in India export s t r u c -
t u r e , while shrimps, raw cot ton and iron ore alone 
c o n s t i t u t e s more than 60 percent of I n d i a ' s t o t a l 
exports to Japan, 
The Japanese import market of shrimps since the 
1970s he has been cha rac te r i sed with steady increase 
in demand which was around 178 thousand tons in 1977 
while the domestic ca tches were around 54 thousand 
tons in the same year . Hence there were good exports 
prospects of the and India p a r t i c u l a r l y mate r ia l i sed i t . 
19. vishwanathan, savitryz/l op, c i t , p,54. 
126 
The nominal catches of shrimps between 197 2 and 1981 
recorder a slower growth than that in the world as a 
whole, which led to a decline in i t s share in the world 
catches from 13.1 percent to 10,4 percent. Hence India 
with higher efforts to increase i t s supply, could 
have exported even more quantity of shrimps. 
Japan's s t ructural shift in s tabi l iz ing production 
units of iron and steel in other countries in order to 
reduce the import b i l l s of fuel led to the stagnation 
of export of iron ore to japan, Alongwith th i s , raw 
cotton also los t i t s share in India ' s to ta l exports 
to Japan during the 1974-1977 period.During th i s 
period, to ta l indust r ia l products improved their share 
in India ' s to ta l exports to Japan, Though the export 
of the leather products was stagnant and that of 
t ex t i l e recorded a decline but the export of iron 
and s teel increased. I t i s heartening to note that 
non-metallic products consisting of precious and semi-
precious stones, glass and glassware and worked stone 
which were absent from the export horizon of India^ 
emerged as a v i t a l export item and gained popularity 
in Japanese market. 
127 
In India , on the other hand there was 
tremendous pressure of the people, on the then prime 
Minister ' Mrs. Ind i ra Gandhi t o hold e l e c t i o n s and 
seek a fresh mandate. As i t had already been mentioned 
above t h a t India was running under the guise of 
na t iona l emergency since 1975. Out of tumultuous 
pressure from a l l the corners of the country Mrs. 
Indi ra Gandhi had to announce e l e c t i o n s and a l l the 
opposi t ion forces got uni ted under the banner of Jan ta 
Par ty . In 1977 : Janlia Party came i n to power and 
Mocarji Desai became the Prime Minister of India . 
I t was la big change in the Indian p o l i t i c s because 
ever since independence for the f i r s t time a non-
Congress Party had captured power and i t was expected 
t h a t there wi l l be a change in the Indian foreign 
po l icy . I t i s not des i r ab le to d iscuss the changes 
which took place in Indian a t t i t u d e towards Japan 
or the world community because here we have to 
deal with Indo- Japanese r e l a t i o n s t i l l 
1977. After going i n to the eax>ve f ac t s 
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and circumstances we can safely assume t h a t I Indo-
Japanese r e l a t i o n s from 1945 to 1977 remained economic 
or ien ted r a t h e r than p o l i t i c a l one. Although r e l a t -
ions between the two coun t r i e s were normalised by the 
Peace Treaty in 1952 and b i l a t e r a l t rade s t a r t e d , the 
pace of progress in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s remained slow in 
comparison to I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with other coun t r i e s . 
This probably was due t o the emergence of Japan as an 
a l ly of America in the post-war years which was a 
matter of g rea t concern to a non-aligned country l ike 
India, India was bound t o assume t h a t J apan ' s ro le in 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s c a n ' t be as independent 
and autonomous one because of the American p o l i t i c a l 
hegemony over her . Therefore, the Indian leadership 
r e a l i s e d t h a t her p o l i t i c a l manoeuvres d i r ec t ed 
towards Japan were l i k e l y to be a f a i l u re in producing 
des i rab le r e s u l t s . 
Thus I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with Japan could not have 
any p o l i t i c a l moorings because of t h e i r 
a l toge ther separate and dil^ergent pa ths in the 
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i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . From 1945 to 1977 l o t of global 
developments took place and both the count r i es found 
themselves a t loggerheads. TJ)Ujp T i l l 1977 from 1945 
there was no c l ea r evidence which could be c i t e d as 
an example of t h e i r s incere des i re to have p o l i t i c a l l y 
mature toes . In t h i s per iod Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s 
remained mainly of economic or commercial nature and 
even progress in t h i s was very slow and sluggish in 
comparison to o ther coun t r i e s . But af ter 1977,due t o 
tremendous changes in global p o l i t i c s and the emergence 
of ' d e t e n t e ' between the two super powers- the Soviet 
Union and the U.S.A., gave a new dimention to Indo-
Japanese r e l a t i o n s which i s being discussed in the 
next chapter . 
C H A P T E R . I V 
Indo-Japanese R e l a t i o n s x Turning P o i n t 1977-9 3 
C H A P T E R IV 
Hi DO-JAPANESE RELATIONS: TURNING POINT 1977-93 
As seen In t h e l a s t c h a p t e r r e l a t i o n s 
between I n d i a and Japan were normal i zed by the Peace 
Trea ty s igned between them in 1952. B i l a t e r a l t r a d e was 
resumed bu t p r o g r e s s in b i l a t e r a l c o o p e r a t i o n was slow 
in comparison t o I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s wi th o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . 
At the same t ime , Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s could no t have 
any p o l i t i c a l o v e r t o n e s and were con f ined t o economic 
or commercial t r a n s a c t i o n s . 
But the y e a r 1977, was a t u r n i n g - p o i n t in 
pos t -1947 Indian h i s t o r y because of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y 
p o l i t i c a l developments which took p l a c e in the c o u n t r y . 
In a s i n g l e s t r o k e t h e Indian e l e c t o r a t e b rough t 
an end of the t h i r t y y e a r s of Congress p a r t y r u l e , 
e l e v e n y e a r s of government under the Prime M i n i s t e r s h i p 
of I n d i r a Gandhi and twenty months of an emergency t h a t 
had s e t I n d i a on a c o u r s e of a u t h o r i t a r i a n government, 
Mrs, Gandhi i n a s u r p r i s e announcement i n mid-January 1977 
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declared tha t na t iona l e l e c t i o n s would be held in March. 
I t was widely expected at the time, not only outs ide 
observers but apparently by Mrs, Indi ra Gandhi as wel l , 
t ha t the e l e c t i o n s would l eg i t imize her declarat ion^of an 
emergency* demonstrate t h a t the country supported her moves 
to i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e many fea tures of the emergency. All 
of t h i s , we know# was nothing but her journey in ' 
fantasy. Like many au tho r i t a r i an regimes, t h i s one too was 
unaware of how unpopular many of i t s p o l i c i e s and programmes 
were, or indeed how l i t t l e popular support there was l e f t 
for the regime and for the emergency. The lack of e f fec t ive 
feedback in i t s e l f might not have jeopardised the regime 
had i t not made the ex t raord inary , indeed, unique decision 
to t e s t i t s popular i ty by holding an e l e c t i o n . 
The e l ec t i on t o Indian Parliament in March 1977 
brought an e l e c t o r a l , debacle t o congress Party for the 
f i r s t time in the post- independent Indian h i s to ry and provided 
an opportunity t o opposi t ion p a r t i e s which had already 
been uni ted under the banner of Jan ta Party to form a 
government a t the Centre under the Prime Minis tership of 
Morarjl Desal. Atal Behari Vajpayee, a former r i g h t -
leaning Jana sangh leader assumed the off ice as the new 
Minister of External Affa i r s , 
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With the ccsning of Jan ta Farty in power, many 
hopes were expressed, in India as well as abroad tha t 
there may be a sh i f t in Indian foreign po l icy . A sh i f t 
in Indian foreign policy was expected under the Jan ta 
regime because the e a r l i e r congress Government under the 
Prime Minis tership of Mrs, Indi ra Gandhi showed a t i l t in 
favour of Soviet Union in I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy/ af ter 
the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and cooperation 
was signed on 9th August 1971. That i s why India was blamed 
by many count r i es of the world for being deviated from i t s 
t r a d i t i o n a l non-al:Jgnment po l i cy . Many opposit ion leaders 
even in India( ( l a t e r pro-Janta) saw a departure from I n d i a ' s 
non-alignment, "Hence, during the e l ec t ion campaign in 
February-March 1977, the Jeuita l eaders repeatedly declared 
tha t there had been "some t i l t " and some foreign i n t e r -
ference in I n d i a ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s during the emergency. 
In a "Meet the Press" programme (on 10th February 1977), 
Morarji Desai h ighl ighted I n d i a ' s heavy dependente (as he 
saw i t ) on the U.S.S.R. by dec lar ing: "Don't you see, we 
do whatever the Soviet Union does". At the same time he 
(K^yr-'' 
1. K.P. Misra^ "Janlta/Foreign Policy (New Delhi, vikas Pubj 
1979), p . 30. T\ 
\ 
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made i t c l e a r that I f h i s party ( Janjta Party) comes t o 
power in India. "Indo-Soviet Treaty might automatical ly 
go", implying as i t were, tha t i t was a t rea ty between 
2 MOSCOW and Mrs, Gandhi, " when Moraifji Desai became Prime 
Minister he t o l d the "American news Magazine Newsweek 
that there was a f e e l i n g that India was leaning towards the 
U.S.S.R. and added t h a t , "Such leaning should not happen". "^  
Atal Bihari Vajpayee who became Foreign Minister on 7th 
Apri l , in h i s address at the meeting of the coordinat ing 
Bureau of the non-al igned c o u n t r i e s ( in New D e l h i ) , dec lared, 
"India ' s r e s o l v e t o fo l low, as he put i t , the path of 
"genuine non-alignment". 
xThe, ab6v« ut terances of l e a d e r s l i k e Morarji 
Desai as the Prime Minister and Atal Behari Vajpayee as 
the Foreign Minister gave an impression that India , under 
the Janta regime, w i l l not only fo l low the genuine noti" 
alignment p o l i c y but at the same time new ventures w i l l 
be made t o improve r e l a t i o n s with U.S.A. or with western 
2. I b i d . , p . 30. 
3. I b i d , , p . 30. 
4. I b i d . . p . 27. 
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- natlona /vhlch had already deteriorated due to India's 
Peace Treaty with Soviet Union, Obviously, the change in 
the Indian leadership at the Centre was a pleasant develop-
ment to the U.S.A. and to i t s a l l i e s as well , 
Japan, an a l ly of America, also f e l t the change 
in the Indian leadership as pleasant and pos i t ive for i t s 
future re la t ions with India. On the other hand Janta regime 
in India was also quite confident to receive desired support 
from U.S.A. and i t s a l l i e s . Therefore, the future of Indo-
Japanese re lat ions seemed to be brighter and better under the 
leadership of Morarji Desai than the ear l i er leadership of 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi. 
No doubt« very sincere e f for t s were made by 
Janta regime to improve India's re la t ions with Japan, Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee, the then Foreign Minister of India, made 
i t clear that ve can not be sparea for our ignorance towards 
an important industrial ized Asian country Japan in the 
past and there i s an urgent need to repair our t i e s with 
japan. In his speech delivered at the Seminar held at 
jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi on May 13, 1978, 
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Vajpayee said that "another area that had received i n s u f f i -
c ient attention in the past and which i s now an important 
focus of foreign policy a c t i v i t i e s i s South-East Asia and 
japan, we are endeavouring to strengthen the sinews of 
multi-sided cooperation with that great Asian country, 
5 Japan." In another address to the India-Japan Committee, 
delivered in New Delhi, on March 29, 1978 Vajp^ee said," 
soon after assuming off ice of Foreign Minister in the new 
janta Government, I made statement in our Parliament in 
June l a s t , that India needs to repair i t s ear l i er hesi tat ion 
to recognize the v i t a l i t y and Importance of Japan through 
closer rapport with that dynamic country (and Industrial 
g iant) . Almost at the same time news came from Tokyo that 
His Excellency Mr, Hatoyama, the previous Foreign Minister 
had decided to accept an invi tat ion to v i s i t India. In 
the fu l l blooded e f for t s were made by janta regime 
India's re lat ions with Japeui, India could impress 
upon Japan that there i s sincere desire on the part of 
India to have stronger and more cordial t i e s with japan. 
Japan, on the other hand was emerging as an economic power 
at international l eve l and wanted to enkance i t s economic 
role at global l eve l and particularly in the Asian continent. 
5.A.B. Vajpayee^ 'New Dimensions of India's Foreign Policv 
(New Delhi, Vision Books, 1979),p.63. 
6. Ibid. , p. 183. 
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Therefore, Japan reciprocated India's move which led to 
the v i s i t of the then Japanese Foreign Minister Mr, I, 
Matoyame to India in July 1977. This v i s i t of Mr, I.Hatoyama 
to India occupied a great significance because after a 
long gap of seven years any high dignitary of Japan paid a 
v i s i t to India, This certainly gave a boost in the impro-
vement of b i la tera l t i e s . In return, Atal Beharl Vajpayee, 
the then India's Foreign Minister, paid a v i s i t to Japan 
in August 1978, The mutual v i s i t s of Foreign Ministers 
of Japan and India brought the two countries quite c loser 
and cheated conducive culture for their stronger b i la tera l 
t i e s in the future. Both the countries started showing 
great enthusiasm towards each other and i t was expected 
that a l l the past notches which brought the Indo-Japanese 
re lat ions in doldrum wi l l be removed sooner. 
But t h i s liieagre) pleasant journey of India and 
Japan could not l a s t long due to the emerging discontent 
and dissidence among various Jai^ta party leaders against 
the leadership of Morarjl Desai, This p o l i t i c a l in s ta -
b i l i t y in India gave a great setback to India's re la t ions 
with the world community, Japan, which was too eager to 
respond pos i t ive ly , was also compelled to rethink about i t s 
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approach towards India. In a very short span of time 
Morarji Desai government had to go and Charan Singh 
who was Home Minister in the Ministry of Morarji Desai, 
became the Prime Minister of India with the support of 
Congress led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi. This internal p o l i t i c a l 
i n s t a b i l i t y had i t s own impact on India's foreign pol icy . 
Japan, watched a l l the p o l i t i c a l developments very carefully 
which were taking place in India and nurtured i t s foreign 
policy according to the prevalent Indian scenario and 
s i tuat ion . 
At l a s t , p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y was over in 1980 
when Mrs. Indira Gandhi came back in power with thumping 
majority in the Parliamentary e l ec t ions held after the 
downfall of the Charan Singh government in 1980. 
After a l l , governments come and governments go, 
but the state re la t ions are governed..by enduring conceptions 
of v i t a l national i n t e r e s t s . Though, renewed e f forts were 
made by Janta regime to improve India's t i e s with Japan 
no s ignif icant development took place in their b i la tera l 
re la t ions . I t was not only because of meagre duration or 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y in that period but at the same time 
the national in teres t s of both the countries did not demand 
radical sh i f t or change in their foreign p o l i c i e s . Therefore, 
the pace of Indo^japanese re lat ions could not see any sort 
of pos i t ive change. 
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The iindisputed leadersh ip of Mrs. Ind i ra Ganfihl 
in the congress par ty and the v ic to ry of congress under her 
leadersh ip in 1980, gave a c l ea r s ignal t o i n t e r n a l as well 
t o ex te rna l world t h a t now I n d i a ' s p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i s 
not a t a l l in doubt. This p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y in India 
was an encouraging development for japan because by t h i s 
time Japan had emerged an economic g ian t of the world and 
was eager t o play a wider r o l e in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l spheres. 
At the same time, Japan being an economic g ian t wanted 
t o maintain peace in the Asian cont inent and India , since 
the super power of Asia could not be ignored by Japanese 
l eadersh ip . 
In the beginning of 1980 the Japanese leadership 
gave a se r ious thought and showed a "sincere des i re t o 
improve her r e l a t i o n s with India, due t o the r a d i c a l changes 
in the global t rends of world p o l i t i c s , India , which 
remained cool for i t s own reasons and did not seek Japanese 
aid in la rge measure, a l so showed a s incere and 
p o s i t i v e response towards Japan which culminated in 
the v i s i t of the then Prime Minister Mrs. Ind i r a Gandhi 
to Tokyo on her way back to the U.S.A. and an o f f i c i a l v i s i t 
t o the Japanese Foreign Minister "iLOshio Sakurauchi t o India 
both in August 1982 which fur ther added a l o t to the 
progress of Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . J a p a n ' s Foreign Minister 
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s igned a fresh agreement for further Japanese aid of 
Rs,127 crores t o fund foxir p r o j e c t s , inc luding the 
1,000 MW Anpara 'B' Thermal Power s t a t i o n (Plant) in 
Uttar Pradesh and a l s o agreed t o g ive Rs» 17,28 ,000 as 
a c u l t u r a l g i a n t . In the decade of 1980s Uln 1980s)"^ 
r e l a t i o n s between the g loba l economic power (Japan) 
and the so c a l l e d the supreme power of South Asia 
(India) improved dramat ica l ly . But the r e l a t i o n s between 
the two countr i e s ' could improve because of the 
fo l lowing f a c t o r s j -
1- Japan's ambition t o re-emerge as an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
actor , Nakasone's the former prime Minister 
repeated c a l l s for the i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of 
j^pan i s an i n d i c a t i o n of t h i s embit ion. 
I t has been seen that former Prime Min i s t ers 
of Japan Mr. Takeshita, JWr, Toshiki Kaifu and 
Mr, Kichi Miyazawa had a l s o repeatedly empha-
s i s e d that Japan must rev ive and widen i t s 
trading t i e s with other nat ions rather than 
remain a f f ec t ed with western na t ions and the 
U.S.A. All have shown that Japan wished t o 
adopt a high i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o f i l e in order 
t o maintain peace in the world and to secure 
the prosper i ty of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. 
This d e s i r e i s nothing but an ex tens ion of the 
same dream. 
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2. Japan's continuing fractions with U.S.A. 
and the European community on matters 
of trade, t arr i f s and investments pose a 
serious threat to japan_jB economic growth. 
Under th i s strange s i tuation Japan i s botind 
to find out i t s new markets for i t s goods 
and investments. For th i s obvious purpose , 
the s ize and potential of India's market 
wi l l certainly be an attract ive area to 
Japan. 
3. After acquiring certain leve l of progress in 
agriculture/ industry and technology, India 
i s in a posit ion to take utmost benef i ts 
from Japanese economic and technological 
assistance. 
In the l i ght of above mentioned factors 
i t may be seen that both the countries have real i sed the 
imperative of their economic inter-dependence both the 
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coun t r i e s have come to r e a l i z e the s igni f icance of mutual 
inter-dependence}• Fortunately both have r e a l i z e d 
the urgency and made fu l l e f f o r t s t o provide added s t rength 
t o t h e i r r e l a t i ons* p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e i r economic sphere. 
"In 1983 Japan imported $ 1.130 mi l l ion worth of goods 
and exported $ 1,431 mi l l ion in t rade with India , major 
imports were i ron ore (35.836 of a l l imports by va lue ) , 
(22,6%), diamond (11.7%) and t e x t i l e s products (3.9%). 
Major expor ts were general machinery (24.5%) of a l l 
expor ts by va lue ) , i ron and s t e e l (23.0 %), e l e c t r i c 
machinery (14.1%), t r a n s p o r t a t i o n machinery (12.7%), and 
chemical products (6.9?:). Japan was the fourth b igges t 
exporter t o India (af ter the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia 
and the U. S.A») accounting for 7.5% of I n d i a ' s imports 
by value and the t h i r d l a r g e s t market for Indian expor ts 
(a f te r the Soviet Union and the United States) accounting 
7 for 8.9%.^ Indian government which was giving p r i o r i t y 
to the economic development and technological improvement 
did not miss the opportunity and showed much eagerness 
t o meet with the Japanese response p o s i t i v e l y . "The Indian 
7. Japan^India Re l a t i ons^Mln l s t ry of Foreign Affairs 
of Japari, April 1984, p . 2. 
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TABLE-VI 
P L K C E N T A G E D E P E N D E N C Y Oi l i \ E l \ Al\iJ JAPAl^ ON EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
C c u n t r t e a Xage> D<jpondonGy uri %ago dfiptandency 
e x p o r t o on I m p o r t s 
1975 1980 190& l.'.'uY 1975 1980 1985 1987 
I n d i a 6 . 7 4 6 . 6 6 A.^l -i. [17 8 . 1 0 1 1 . 3 6 (i. 16 7.(50 
Jiiy^m 1 1 . 2 0 1 2 . 5 0 I ' j . l i 3 3 . 7 0 1 1 . J. 9 1 3 . 6 0 8 . < i C . CC" 
jCrrS, tc.e l i u r o p a Yfe&i: booL ' 1 iJ'^l \--. 1988) aiul Ji-ipan; An 
m t o r n - a t l o a i ^ i l c o c n p a r l a t o a liJb'J 
F i g . 2 
145 
8 - i 
€H 
5 H 
5 — 
I t I I 1 U I l i 
I 
i i 
M81 i<^te i<>»^  i''9'» i s t r i<i«( >"^ «'' I'^ eyi i*i8<) '^^0 i«i^ i /^c\a 
u s ;^  1 ^ - 2 7 l o i l L i o r . 
. toutce I Same as f l g . l 
146 
Government approved 614 cases of f inanc ia l and technical 
co l labora t ion with Japanese corpora t ions between 1959 
and 1982. This was the fourth l a r g e s t number of such 
col labora t ions^ following i ,641 for United Kingdom, 
1,415 for the United Sta tes and 1,274 for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, of the 614 cases with japan, 10 3 
were f inanc ia l co l l abo ra t ions and the c e s t were t echn ica l 
ones. At p resen t , about 90 Japanese companies eure opera-
t ing in India under (d i f fe ren t ) co l l abora t ion agreements. 
The products l i n e s and Japanese companies involved include 
(The products involved include\ medical supplies (Sankyo) , 
dry battOT^s (Toshiba, Matsushi ta) , t ransformers (Hi tachi ) , 
g e l a t i n (Nichimen), wall t i l e s (Danto), f i s h e r i e s (Taiyo 
F ishery) , g l a s s (Asahi Glass) , alcohol (Nissan Chemical 
I n d u s t r i e s ) , video casse tees (£ony), hotel (Hokke c l u b ) , 
8 
and automobiles (Suzuki Motor). 'if we peep back i n t o 
the pas t we would find that India was the f i r s t country 
to which Japan extended Yen c r e d i t , s t a r t e d from 1958, 
In fac t , t h i s cons i s t an t Yen c r e d i t support which India 
received from Japan did a grea t h e j p ^ g r e a t l y h e l p e d ^ to 
India in i t s econoraic development. "Japan had provided 
8, I b i d . , p , 3. 
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a cumulative t o t a l of Rs. 574.700 mil l ion in yen c r e d i t 
to India at the end of March 1983. This was the second 
l a r g e s t amount a f te r the 971,600 mi l l ion provided to 
Indonesia over the same Period and accounted for 11,2% 
of Japan ' s dimulative t o t a l yet c r e d i t s , (Thailand 
ranked t h i r d with 3332 mi l l ion anc the Republic of Korea 
f i f t h with 3,174 m i l l i o n ) . These yen c r e d i t s have financed 
the cons t ruc t ion of f e r t i l i z e r p l a n t s , al loy s t e e l p l a n t s , 
shipyards, an o i l - d r i l l i n g ship , power s t a t i o n s and a 
tPlecommunications network, worth specia l mention are 
the seven f e r t i l i s e r f a c t o r i e s at Gorakhpur, Tu i t i cor in 
and elsewhere, ana Bombay High's o i l d r i l l i n g ship named 
9 
£ ag ar £ amr at" • 
Nakasone's a r r i v a l in India coulc provide 
an opportunity to both the na t ions to understand t h e i r 
divergent and d i f f e r en t p o l i t i c a l outlook in l a s t thref 
decades on var ious i n t e rna t i ona l i s sues , "The Nakasone 
v i s i t proved useful by way of providing an ins igh t and 
9. I b i d . , p .4 
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understanding to both s ides of the p o l i t i c a l scenario 
as viewed from Tokyo and New Delhi , As Nakasone i s 
understood to have explained to Ind i ra Gandhi in the 
course of a review of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , 
J apan ' s percept ion i s t ha t i t needs U.S. defence 
umbrella and has found i t to i t s advangage he might 
have acced t h a t Japan could concentrate on rapid economic 
recovery a f te r the war l a rge ly by adopting posture of 
a nat ion wedded to peace, a posture which has gradually 
been given up during the l a s t decade under growing 
American p ressu re . On the other hand, the Japanese side 
showed grea t i n t e r e s t in appreceating the fu l l 
meaning of I n d i a ' s percept ions of non-alignment as 
well as i t s re la t ionshi i - with the Soviet Union, when 
Nakasone asked Indi ra Gandhi to throw more l i g h t on 
I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with U.S.S.R,, she explainec in 
d e t a i l how the Soviet Union has been a cons i s t an t 
supporter of India diplomatic , and economic f i e l d s , 
India f inds no t h r e a t from the USSR, Indian Prime 
Minister was also able to underscore for the under-
standing of her Japanese counterpar t t h a t i t has 
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been I n d i a ' s advantage to keep close r e l a t i o n s 
with Moscow, I t was thus t ha t Nakasone concluded 
at the end of t h i s exerc i se t h a t he now under-
stood how India had benefi ted from i t s r e l a t i o n s 
with U.S.S.R, and a lso I n d i a ' s importance as 
a major power in the reg ion" . 
In f ac t , for the f i r s t time the two heads 
of the governments could r e a l i s e the s ignif icance 
of t h e i r interoependence despi te the fac t tha t 
India and Japan had d i f f e r en t kind of percept ions 
and p o l i c i e s on p o l i t i c a l l i n e s in the global se t up. 
This r e a l i s a t i o n of t h e i r interdependence compelled 
both the s ides to keep t h e i r p o l i t i c a l d i f ferences 
aside and kept on maintaining considerable cooperation 
in the economic sphere. I t was, undoubtedly, an 
important achievement of Nakasone's v i s i t which 
provided renewed p p i r i t in the b i l a t e r a l relationsl'ThfejrcBt 
10. O.P. Sabherwal, "Nakasone v i s i t and After", 
Mainstream, May 12, 1984,p. 5. 
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significant point that emerged from the high level exchange 
on the occasion of Nakasone's v i s i t was that India and 
Japan need not hamper closer t i e s between them in the 
economic sphere, dictated by the needs of the i r respe-
ctive economices. I t i s in th i s sett ing that the 
Nakasone v i s i t marks the onset of a phase in which both 
the countries find i t useful to elevate the level 
and volume of the i r economic re la t ionship. No doubt, 
i t i s pragmatism and enlightened national in te res t s 
that are the basis for the new pattern of Indo-Japanese 
t i e s . And though primacy goes to the economic sphere, 
some of the benefits of the elevated Indo-Japanese 
re la t ions ship sp i l l over to the p o l i t i c a l arena,"*^ 
I t i s a fact that high concentration of 
non-manufacturers in the export structure of develop-
ing economy i s not desirable. Ins tab i l i ty in export 
eeurnings from non-manufacturers i s l ikely due to high 
price fluctuations in the short run, while the rate 
of return from exporting them would decline in the 
long run due to innovations of synthetic materials 
n . Ibid». p. 5. 
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and use of better technology to avoid waste 
and hence use lesser Inputs, India on the other hand# 
has a high concentration of non-manufacturers with 
a l l out efforts^, tQ-expand I t s exports, which seems 
rather contrary because of lesser prospects to increase 
the exports of non-manufactures very s ign i f i cant ly . 
During the f i r s t two years 1980 and 1981 
the share of foodstuffs and raw materials in export 
remained almost constant but in the subsequent years 
as evident in th table , their share went down due to 
high fluctuations and keen competition; for example, 
"In January-July period in 1983, i t was observed that 
some suppliers weresell ing, even below cost pr lce- in 
order to stimulate demand under substantial inventories 
and l iquidi ty problems^ share of raw cotton and 
iron ore declined considerably with 21,8 percent share 
in India's tota l exports to Japan while i t was 24,9 
percent in 1982, There was further increasing share 
of industrial products in India's tota l exports to 
Japan, which strengthened i t s posit ion by 6,1 points . 
Amongst the industrial products, leather products and 
12. A. Joseph, India's Trade with Japan (New Delhi, 
Gian Pub., 1987), p. 15. 
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t e x t i l e products l o s t t h e i r share r e l a t i v e l y while 
the non-metallc mineral-products increased t h e i r 
share t o 13.6 percent of the t o t a l exports to Japan. 
The export of i ron and s t e e l was a t i t s lowest ebb 
in the f i r s t year of the plan with 0,2 percent share 
of the t o t a l export and could marginally increase 
during 1980 t o 1984. This was mainly because of the 
fact t ha t India could not na t iona l i ze the cos t of 
production and le«3ged far behind i t s compet i tors . 
In th«» per iod of 1984 to 1967. Table 
confirms I n d i a ' s firm and steady compositional s h i f t 
from foodstuffs aiid raw mate r i a l s to the export of 
i n d u s t r i a l and value added products . The pr ice f luc -
tua t ions supply c o n s t r a i n t s and keen competi t i ton seems 
the reason for the s tagnat ion of shrimp exports to 
Japan. Raw cot ton s t a r t e d to pick up i t s share in 
I n d i a ' s t o t a l expor ts to Japan, According to study 
"Raw cot ton may have g rea te r demand in fu ture" , "^  
This i s due to the; fac t t ha t Japanese firms have devel -
oped a very high q u a l i t y fabr ic from Indian cot ton and 
hence prospects aire b r igh t e r for high expor ts of raw 
cot ton , "The Japanese are consider ing l i f t i n g a large 
1 3 . The Economic Trends (New Delh i ) , " India , japan 
Keen on t i e ups", vo l . XVI, No. 10, May 16,1987, 
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quantity ot raw cotton from India with •mphaais on 
best quality and hence India should not miss the 
14 
opportuni ty , " 
The export of i ron ore was fur ther reduced 
ana i t s share in India* s t o t a l expor ts came down to 
as low as 27,9 percent only. In fact I n d i a ' s i ron ore 
export s t r a tegy did not take i n t o account the decl ining 
magnitude of Japanese import requirements, i t s cos t 
of production, shipping cos t s became l e s s competi t ive 
compared with i n t e r n a t i o n a l s tandards , "Another 
reason tor such decl ine was I n d i a ' s increas ing expor ts 
to East European coun t r i e s l i ke Romania and Yugoslavia 
15 
of who's shares in 1974-75 were almost negligible '*! 
The above t ab l e revea l s t h a t the share of 
i n d u s t r i a l products in the t o t a l exports increased 
considerably , < t i ^ i t ' and reached to as much as 
, 31» 4 percen t . Such favourable compositional 
sh i f t for India was probably a long des i red outcome 
Of extensive e f f o r t s made by the country. Though the 
increase in l ea the r products and t e x t i l e products 
U . B,A, Iqbal , Indp-Japan Trade since I960. I n s t i t u t e 
of Developing Economics, Tokyo, Japan, 1989, 
15 . Joseph, 0£, c i t , . p ,157. 
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strengthened their share considerably. It is heartening 
to note that India has taken out the share of Israel and 
the U.S.A. in these items. It being a labour intensive 
industry by nature, there are high prospects to increase 
its supply to Japanese market provided India maintains 
its quality of products. 
On the other hand Japan increased the pace of 
trade liberalisation in its resi^onse to the call of rest-
ructure and reform of the global econcxny towards freer 
trade. For improved access to Japanese market'«n action 
programme was announced by the government of Japan on 
July 30,1985, This bold programme was guided by the prin-
ciple "Freedom in principle, restrictions only as excep-
tions". This programme included reduction of tariffs 
on over 1800 items, simplification of Import procedures, 
acceptance of foreign granted test data and greater 
harmonization of global standards etc. "On 4th August 
1988, government of Japan confirmed the full implement-
17 
ation of the three year action programme". 
Alongwith this, the GSP scheme that was 
introduced in 1971, has been made operational upto 1991, 
16, Updated and final report on Japanese Market Opening 
Action Programme, Official Bulletin, Government of 
jai^ an, October 1987, p, 2, 
17, IbiG.. 1988,p,4. 
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In the scheme developing cotintrles will be getting 
special treatment for various agricultural and 
industrial products. Zero duty tteatment and elimi-
nating exclusive list of items of imports is another 
improvement in the GSP Scheme, so far as quota is 
concerned, Japan has promised to enhance it further. 
While in India, in the 1970s, the efforts 
to streamline the existing export incentives, introduce 
new instruments for export promotion and import subs-
titution and various committees were set up from time 
to time to achieve the fore-said purpose. 
One report of the committee on Trade Policies (Abid 
Hussain Committee) in 1984 points out that i " as 
the technology have increased, the productivity diff-
erentials have entered and they continued to rise"; 
So to remove obsolescence of technology and machineries 
and to increase the productivity to make 
full use of inputs by reducing wastes, the government 
of India adopted deliberate and positive measures for 
the evolution of the import policy. 
In order to ensure availability of capital 
goods, machinery and equipments, spares and components 
18. Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, Report 
of the committee on Trade Policies (New Delhi 1984) 
164 
and key inpu t s , the Open General Licence Scheme (CX3L) 
i s enlarged. The OGL ecoinpas6jL£gL-99 c a p i t a l goo<^ 8« 
209 items of l i f e saving equipments and 106 medicines 
and drugs and many other items with a t o t a l of 745 
i tems. The imposed Replenishment Scheme has a lso been 
enlarged but i s based on actual user p r i n c i p l e . To 
derive the comparative cos t advantage. Imports at 
cheaper r a t e s and se l ec t ive i tems which are domestically 
not ava i lab le and are used in production process are 
allowed for import. 
In order to enhance expor ts the government 
encourages the establ ishment of 100 percent export 
or ien ted u n i t s and un i t s in the Free Trade and are 
allowed duty free import of c a p i t a l equipments, i n t e r -
mediaries and key inpu t s . So Indian pol icy makers made 
a l l out e f f o r t s t o import items in such a t r a d i t i o n a l i s e d 
way tha t in the short run they enhance the competit ive 
s t reng th Of the country so as t o boost expor ts and 
mi t iga te the expanding t rade d e f i c i t while on the long 
run, i t has been observed t h a t economic d i s t o r t i o n s 
from such imports are not beyond cont ro l and they u l t i -
mately help to achieve an economic growth. 
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India ' s bid to expand i t s exports included 
cash compensation support, duty drawbacks and import 
replenishment schemes as mentioned ea r l i e r . The cash 
compensation support and duty draw back was to comp-
ensate fully for indirect taxes paid by exporter on 
the inputs for export production. Further in the area 
of export promotion measures, the two other s ign i f i -
cant steps are Bvailabil i ty of export credi t at 
concessional r a t i o of in te res t and supply of raw 
materials at international prices under the Interna-
t ional price Reimbursement Scheme (IPRS). 
In fact, the v i s i t of the then Japanese 
i-rime Minister, Mr, Yasuhiro Nakasone in May 1984 
gave a revolutionary upward and posit ive mobility to 
the Indo-Japanese re la t ions . This v i s i t suddenly 
awakeneo Indians for a qual i ta t ively different kind 
of relat ionship between the two countries. Since 
the early 1980s japan s tar ted playing a more powerful 
role in international affairs as a major industr ia l ised 
and financially powerful country. 
By the entry of well xnown international 
grants l ike Tyota and Suzuki in India ' s indus t r ia l 
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TABLE-XI 
RELATIVE SHARES 01 BILATERAL TRADE IN INDIA AND JAPAN'S 
TRADE AND THEIR SHARE IN THE WORLD 
TRADE 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-6A 
1984-85 
Percentage al 
World Total 
India' 
Total 
Trade 
.60 
.38 
.68 
.76 
.63 
s 
tiare in the 
Trade of 
Japan'a 
Total 
Trade 
6.03 
5.66 
7.30 
7.62 
7.78 
Percentage 
India's 
Total 
Trade 
6.33 
6.72 
9.33 
10.12 
8.16 
Share of Bilateral 
Trad« in 
Japan'a 
Total 
Trade 
.71 
.49 
.89 
.96 
. 76 
Source: Coesplled and computed from t a b l e •rX, 
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scene, Indo-Japanese cooperation i s showing p o s i t i v e 
t rends over the y e a r s . "The number of Indo-Japanese 
col laborat i<»ifrom 27 in 1981 t o 51 in 1983. In the 
f i r s t six months of the cu r r en t years , 40 agreements 
have been signed. In the automobile and anc i l l a ry 
sector alone, there have been more than 23 co l l abora -
t i o n s during the l a s t 18 months, with the growing 
economic re la t ionsh ip* the number has suddenly jvimped 
to 70 t o 80 a year . So far the t o t a l number of Indo-
Japanese co l l abo ra t ions stand at around 700, A major 
breakthrough was achieved in the automobile sector 
where the Maruti-Suzuki venture has a large equity 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the Japanese s ide . I t can be t rue ly 
regarded as a model Indo-Japanese Jo in t ven ture" . 
Improving t rends i n Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s have led 
to many Japanese i n d u s t r i a l l y strong firms to inves t 
on Indian s o i l , "well known Japanese firms in the 
automobile sec tor who have shown wi l l ingness t o 
co l l abora te include the DCM-ToyOta co l l abora t ion for 
the manufacture of l i g h t commercial veh ic les and 
passenger c a r s , both d i e s e l and p e t r o l - d r i v e n . Nissan 
19. F.G. Sa lv i , Indiarjln world Affairs (Delhi,B.R,Pub, 
1985) p . 113. 
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Motor Company has signed an agreement with the 
Premier Automobilies for the production of 
Sunny engines (Sunny i s the most popular Japanese 
ca r s in the domestic and American market) . Mitsubishi 
Motors i s co l l abora t ing with Ayesha Tractors for 
the production of l i g h t commercial v e h i c l e s . Honda, 
Izuzu, Yamaha and Kawasaki are a l l in India for 
mopeds and scoo te r s . Furthermore, the secondary 
and t e r t i a r y anc i l l a ry and au to -anc i l l a ry sec tor , 
connected with the auto and au to - r e l a t ed s ec to r s , 
i s now beginning t o move to India and wi l l be an 
important element of co l l abora t ion over the next few 
yearsl'^® 
The emerging pos i t i ve a t t i t u d e of Japan 
towards India , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the v i s i t of 
Kakasone, the thep Prime Minister of Japan ( in May 
1984), who i s a l so known as an a r c h i t e c t of l i b e r a l 
policy towards India, provided s t ronger grounds for 
Indo-Japanese r e l a t i ons* India on i t s own p a r t showed 
immense s i n c e r i t y and goodwill towards Japan as 
evident by the v i s i t of the then Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi t o Tokyo in November-December 1985 which 
20* Ib id . ,pp .113-114. 
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further strengthened Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . 
Mr, Rajiv Gandhi who received warm welcome in 
Japan t r i e d to impress upon Japanese leadersh ip 
tha t India which en te r t a ined t r a d i t i o n a l t i e s with 
Japan i s qu i t e keener , and eager t o have fur ther 
s t ronger r e l a t i o n s with Japan, Prime Minis ter , 
Rajiv Gandhi a l so addressed the j o i n t session of 
the Diet and revealed I n d i a ' s ea rnes t des i r e to 
have co rd ia l and c lose r t i e s with Japan for which 
fu l l blooded e f f o r t s should be made by both the 
coun t r i e s , so t h e i r g lo r ious h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s 
can be rediscovered and revived. Dr.Kato, a Japanese 
i n t e l l e c t u ^ who was speaking on the c u l t u r a l dimen-
sion of Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s saidi) "He hoped 
t h a t the process of /"/rediscoveryl"y to which the Indian 
prime Minister Ijad r e f e r r ed in Tokyo in 1985, would 
be helped by the c u l t u r a l f e s t i v a l s , India and 
Japan had decided to organise in each o t h e r ' s 
c o u n t r i e s . r This c o r d i a l i t y and s i n c e r i t y which was 
shown by India could make a way for i t s b e t t e r t i e s 
with Japan, "The Kudremukh Iron Company signed a 
2 1 . U.S. Bajpayi, India and Japan (Delhi Lancer Pub.» 
1988) , p . 28. 
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a c o n t r a c t i n Tokyo on 19 March wi th the Japanese 
S t e e l M i l l s for con t inued supply of i r o n ore concen-
t r a t e for t he t h i r d yea r runn ing in 1987-88. The 
company c la imed t h a t the new c o n t r a c t for t h e 
f i s c a l y e a r 1987 was a major achievement . I t s a i d 
the Japanese market for i r o n ore was t h e most compe-
t i t i v e i n the world . The e x p e r t t o i r o n ore t o 
Japan was expec ted t o be reduced 10 m i l l i o n tonnes 
i n t h e f i s c a l yea r 1987, bu t t h i s c o n t r a c t ma in ta ined 
22 the same volume for the company as i n 1986. " 
P r ince N a r u h i t o of Japan , grandson of 
Emperior H i r o h i t o p a i d a s ix day o f f i c i a l v i s i t to 
Ind ia on 19th March 1987, During h i s s t ay i n I n d i a , 
he rfiet t he P r e s i d e n t and t h e V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of 
I n d i a and took keen i n t e r e s t i n knowing Indian a r t 
and c u l t u r e . The then e x t e r n a l A f f a i r s M i n i s t e r of 
I n d i a , Mr. N.D. Tiwar i a l s o p a i d a v i s i t t o Japan 
i n May 1987, This v i s i t of t he Foreign M i n i s t e r of 
I n d i a «&s a proof of I n d i a ' s u tmost s i n c e r i t y towards 
j a p a n , Mr, N,D, Tiwari t r i e d t o impress upon h i s 
J apanese c o u n t e r p a r t t h a t I n d i a i s a peace l ov ing 
n a t i o n and w i l l i n g t o have very c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s 
with a l l i t s ne ighbour s and r e s t of the world community. 
2 2. S a t i s h Kumar, Year Book on I n d i a ' s Foreign Policv^ 
1987, p , 5 1 , 
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"The E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s M i n i s t e r Mr.N.D. Tewau-i 
met t h e Japaaiese Fore ign M i n i s t e r Mr, Tadashi 
Kuranas i on 20th May i n Tokyo, for an e x t e n s i v e 
review of i n t e r n a t i o n a l develoi»nents and b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s w i th P a k i s t a n and China, But as added 
t h a t the s ide t o o roust make c o n s t r u c t i v e r e s p o n s e s . 
He a l s o e x p l a i n e d I n d i a ' s r o l e in t r y i n g t o f ind 
a s o l u t i o n t o the e t h n i c problem i n Sr i Lanka. 
The two l e a c e r s a l s o d i s c u s s e d the s i x t h 
month long " F e s t i v a l of I n d i a " i n Japan beg inn ing 
in Apr i l 1988/ La t e r Mr, Tiwar i announced t h a t 
Japan would s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n c r e a s e i t s a i d t o I nd i a 
23 i n 1987 and lower the i n t e r e s t r a t e s for l o a n s , " 
In r e t u r n , t h e then Japanese Fo re ign M i n i s t e r Mr, 
Tudashi K u r a n a r i , p a i d a one day v i s i t t o I n d i a on 
9 th August and s a i d , "Japan wishes t o be a good 
p a r t n e r of I n d i a n o t only i n t h e economic f i e l d bu t 
i n o t h e r wide rang ing a r e a s a s w e l l . He exp re s sed 
t h e hope t h a t h i s v i s i t cou ld c o n t r i b u t e t o promo-
t i n g r e l a t i o n s in p o l i t i c a l and economic f i e l d s 
between the two c o u n t r i e s . On 10th August a f t e r h i s 
t a l K s wi th Mr, Natwar Singh, M i n i s t e r of S t a t e 
for E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , Mr, Kuranar i announced h i s 
c o u n t r y ' s d e c i s i o n t o i n c r e a s e the c o n c e s s i o n a l 
23. I b i d , , p . 5 1 , 
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TABLEi-XV 
MAJCR ITEMS 01 IMPORTS FROM JAPAN INURING THE Fl i 'TK FlVE 
YEAR PLAN 
(in percentage) 
Commoditiea 1974 1976 1976 1977 Variation 
during th« 
fifth plan(a) 
Foodatufla & 
Raw i t iat«rial3 
Light i ndus -
t r i a l pr>:jduct3 
Chemicala 
Iron & Sto«l 
General 
Machinery 
Transport 
Squiptt«nt 
0 . 7 
: . 9 
20,1 
42.2 
6 .7 
16.2 
0.4 
6.2 
e.9 0.9 
14.1 
7.9 19,6 
36.2 17.5 14.3 
37.8 30.0 23.8 
7.9 21.9 13.1 
8.2 15.1 
*• 0.2 
+-15.6 
- 5.6 
-18.4 
f 6.4 
-1.1 
Source'. Compiled «md computed froox the various iasuos from 
1975 to 1978 of White Paper on International Trade, JETRO, 
Japan. 
a) Percentage aha^e in 1977 - percentage ahare in 1974 
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loan to India by over 40 percent . Off ic ia l 
Development Assistance (ODA), as the Japanese 
concessional loans are ca l l ed , wi l l now amount 
to 68.477 mi l l ion yen ( equivalent t o Rs. 593 crores) 
for the f i s ca l year 1987-88. The ODA for 1986 
amounted t o 48*430 mi l l ion yen. By stepping up 
i t s o f f i c i a l Development Assistance to 68.5 
b i l l i o n a year , Japan had become I n d i a ' s b igges t 
donor under ODA. The Japanese government a lso 
decided to reduce the i n t e r e s t r a t e by 0.5 percent 
24 
to 2.75 percent on the ODA from 1987." 
Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Mini-
s t e r of India , again made a stop-over in Tokyo on 
October, 12,1987 and could u t i l i s e the opportunity 
t o impress upon h i s Japanese counterpar t Mr.Nakasone 
tha t India i s making i t s ea rnes t e f f o r t s t o a t t r a c t 
foreign i n v e s t e r s by introducing economic r e f o r a s . 
Rajiv Gandhi a lso explained the d i f f i c u l t i e s faced 
by Indian government due t o unprecedented drought 
condi t ions in the country. Mr, Nakasone, Japanese 
prime Minister announced "a spec ia l c r e d i t of Rs. 270 
c io res for I n d i a ' s drought r e l i e f programme and for 
24. I b i d . , p . 51 . 
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supporting the balance of payments, a f t e r h i s t a lk s 
with prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Tokyo on 12th 
October, The fresh Japanese c r e d i t was in addi t ion 
to the Of f ic ia l Development Assistance of $ 474 
mil l ion sanctioned in August 1987, Rajiv Gandhi 
=5sked Japan for support in the area of technology 
t r a n s f e r . He mentioned t h a t I n d i a ' s i n d u s t r i a l growth 
r a t e had been 8.7 percent in 1987 desp i te var ious 
"25 
d i f f i c u l t i e s . 
But Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s saw a dramatic 
and revolut ionary growth only a f te r the o f f i c i a l 
v i s i t of the then Indian Prime Minis ter Rajiv Gandhi 
to Tokyo in April 1988 which opened a new chapter 
of the two coun t r i e s t i e s towards the twenty f i r s t 
(21st ycentury. Mr, Rajiv Gandhi inaugurated a much 
published c u l t u r a l f e s t i v a l of India in Tokyo which 
was organised t o warm up Indo-Japanese Fr iendship. 
This type of Indian f e s t i v a l of India in Tokyo which 
was organised t o warm up Indo-Japanese f r iendship . 
Thip type of Indian f e s t i v a l was held for the f i r s t 
time in any Asian country, Mr. Goro Koyame, chairman 
of the Japanese Fes t iva l Committee and Mrs, Pupul 
Jayakar, the Chairman of the Indian Fes t iva l committee 
said about t h i s f e s t i v a l we come to Japan as p i lg r ims . 
India i s a land of pilgrimage and when p i lgr ims atep 
25. I b i d . , p . 52. 
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on the s o i l they hope t o reach, they embark on a 
process of giving and rece iv ing . 
This i s what the world needs and t h i s 
i s what c u l t u r e , a stream unlike any other , for i t 
knows no froia*i««js,achieves. I t Indeed transforms 
a l l t ha t i t touches Mr, jayakar c a l l ed Japan "the 
land of alchemists " t o which India was bringing 
i t s ' t r e a s u r e s ' in the hope tha t they wi l l help 
i gn i t e new flames for not only the c r ea t i ve rena-
issance of the two coun t r i e s but the whole world". 
This " f e s t i v a l got off t o a colourful s t a r t in 
Tokyo on April 14, The two Prime Minis ters l i t a 
lamp signifying the opening of the f e s t i v a l . During 
the next s ix months the people of Japan wi l l have 
glimpses of I n d i a ' s a r t and cu l tu re as a r t i s t s v i s i t 
32 c i t i e s and towns of Japan, The packed Sta te 
Theatre ha l l broke i n t o a deafening appause as 
Mrfc Takeshita and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi walked t o the 
g ian t stage accompanied by the senior members of 
the Indian delegat ion and Japan ' s youngest e lder 
27 
statesman Mr, Nakasone", Mr, Gandhi showed keen 
26. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, Friday April, 
15, 1988, p, 13, 
27. Asian Recorder, July 1-7, 1988, p, 20089, 
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Interest in continued friendship with Japan and 
deep Impression on the Indian mind. Mr. Gandhi 
said, "the festival was a return gesture from the 
people of India for the 'Japan Month' which was 
staged in India. He recalled the age old spiritual 
links between the two countries. He said Japan 
had emerged as a big economic power in the world 
and addedt your passion for work and pursuit of 
excellence has become a legend. He dedicated the 
festival to the growth of Indo-Japanese relations".^® 
Appreciating Indian friendship, the then Prime 
Minister of Japan Takeshita said, "Indo>japanese 
relations have been quite good in recent years and 
close ties of cooperation have been established at 
all levels. He expressed his readiness to work 
hard in hand with Mr. Gandhi to further cement 
friendly relations between the two countries and 
pursue common goals of peace and cooperation in the 
29' 
international community of nations". Prime Minister 
18, Ibid.,p. 20089. 
29. Ibid. , p. 20089. 
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Rajiv Gandhi and h i s Japanese counterpar t Nobarvi 
Takeshita welcomed the signing of the Afghan Peace 
accord and hoped t h a t peace and normalcy would 
r e tu rn t o the s t r i f e - t o r n na t ion . The two leaders 
agreed t h a t some of the problems in the way 
of promoting laurger jQi^anese investment in India 
would be sought t o be removed. Mr, Gandhi pointed 
out c l e a r l y t h a t Pakistan was aiding Punjab t e r r o -
r i s t s and showed no i n t e r e s t to a l l i n i t i a t i v e s for 
b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s with India and Pak i s t an i s nuclear 
programme was not for peaceful pxirposes but a 
weapon or iented one. Mr, Gandhi r e j ec t ed Takesh l ta ' s 
suggestion t h a t both India and Pakis tan sign the 
NPT because i t would be wrong to do so, India has 
already given proof of i t s wi l l not t o embark on 
any m i l i t a r y programme. Despite Japanese object ion 
t o the Indian pos i t ion on the Nuclear Non-prol i fe-
r a t i o n Treaty (NPT), the Japanese government agreed 
to speed up the pace of Japanese economic ass i s tance 
and investment in India, 
No doubt, Japan has welcomed the l i b e r a -
l i z a t i o n of economic p o l i c i e s i n i t i a t e d by Rajiv 
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TABLED VI 
MAJOR ITEMS 01 IMPORTS PROM JAPAN DURING THE SIXTH 
FIVE YEAR PLAN 
(in percentage) 
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Gandhi and looks forward to even a b e t t e r Investment 
cl imate in India . The Japanese government has se t 
up a fas t channel in New Delhi to c l ea r Japanese 
proposals for investments and j o i n t e n t e r p r i s e s . 
Thus constant and steady growth of goodwill in the 
b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s has pointed t o the prospects of 
t h e i r future i n t e r a c t i o n at a l l l e v e l s . Japan has 
emerged as I n d i a ' s b igges t t rading pa r tne r a f te r the 
U.S. and the U.S.S.R. In 1960 Indo-Japanese t rade 
accounted for nearly 6 percent of I n d i a ' s t o t a l 
t r ade . By 1986 the Japanese share has r i s e n to 14 
percent . During 1988 Japanese f inanc ia l investments 
in India and the t o t a l volume of the Indo-Japanese 
t rade turnover haveC (hasl\ shown strong upward t rend 
ana therefore there are i n d i c a t i o n s t h a t they may 
assume even higher propor t ions in the coming yea r s . 
"The Indo-Japanese t rade has r i s e n from $ 3486 mil l ion 
in 1987 to $ 3886 mi l l ion in 1988 r e g i s t e r i n g an 
-) increase of 11.4 percent compared to a r i s e of 
(an i n c r e a s e o i ^ i 2.7 in 1987 over the year , India 
export rose by 17,9 percent in 1988, from $ 1530 
mil l ion in 1976 to $ 1804 mil l ion in 1988. Imports 
189 
from Japan increased marginally during this period 
from $ 1957 million in 1987 to $ 2082 million 
3Q 
in 1988. •• The government of Japan had granted 
annual Overseas Development Aid(ODA) Yen 70 .8 b i l l i o n 
(about Rs.700 crores) in 1988 t o India which i s more 
than double the amount of 34.7 b i l l i o n yen granted 
in 198 3. 
In f a c t , India and Japan both are involved 
in see ing the grounds where they can meet and remove 
the hotches which come in t h e i r way /(come in the way / 
—=—I L-_— 
of t h e i r _ c l o s e r re la t^onsy . Both the governments have 
adopted c o n s t r u c t i v e approach towards each other and 
hodling var ious kinds of seminars and academic a c t i -
v i t i e s to promote Indo-^apanese goodwi l l . A seminar 
was organised by the japan Cultural and Information 
Centre, New Delhi on 4th November, 1988 in which Dr. 
R.C. Pandeya, Professor , Department of Philosophy, 
Univers i ty of Delhi s a i d , "India has captured the minds 
of the Japanese people and j.Japanese people have 
l o t of admiration, ^ f e c t i o n and love to Indian people*. 
30. Japan-India Business Information Serv ice , Madras, 
newslet ter^ No. 10, June. 1989. 
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He said the japan Month which was held in India l a s t 
year and the Fes t iva l of India held in japan t h i s 
year, have enabled both the coun t r i e s to forge ahead 
in e s t ab l i sh ing ye t another milestone in the Indo-
Japanese c u l t u r a l r e l a t i o n s . There i s (a) growing 
trend qu i te v i s i b l e in the Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s , 
"Japan 's programme in India has expanded rapid ly to 
very la rge commitment l e v e ^ . In 1988 alone, OECF 
committedy<an amount off $ 700' mi l l ion and 1989 the 
commitment wi l l approacn ( i s l i k e l y to approach)/ 
$ 1 b i l l i o n , Japan defines the ba s i s of long term 
economic cooperation with India as ass i s tance in 
the development of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e pr imar i ly through 
the u t i l i z a t i o n of ODA loans which have replaced 
EXIM Bank f inancing. Trad i t iona l areas for these 
loans have been e l e c t r i c i t y and power development, 
f e r t i l i z e r and telecommunications". The governments 
of both the count r i es are bui lding t h e i r t i e s at a 
f as te r pace a t a l l l e v e l s p a r t i c u l a r l y in the econo-
mic f i e ld . "The Government of Japan has decided 
to extend an ODA loan of upto 91,164 mil l ion yen 
for FY 1989 t o the Government of India , with a 
3 1 . Koppel & Plummer[»; ' J a p a n ' s Ascendency As a Foreign 
Aid P o w e r ' ^ Asian survey. Vol, XXIX, No, l l ,1989 . 
32. Foreign Press Centre, Japan (ECL),Nov. 5,1989. 
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view to cooperating with the economic development of 
t h a t country. Notes t o t h i s e f f ec t were exchanged on 
November 5(Sun.) in New Delhi between Mr, E i j l r o Noda, 
Japanese Ambassador t o India and Mr, G,K, Arora, 
Finance Secretary of India , "^  "The Government of japan 
has decided t o extend a g r a n t - i n - a i d of upto600 mi l l ion 
yen to the Government of India for increased food prod-
uct ion , with t h i s aid, the Government of India in tends 
to purchase f e r t i l i z e r for improving produc t iv i ty in 
i t s granery region under i t s 7th 5-year plan(1985-1989), 
which makes one of i t s p r i o r i t i e s increased a g r i c u l t u r a l 
product ion. Notes t o t h i s e f f ec t were exchanged between 
34 
the two governments on November 21 (Tue,) in New Delhi" 
Following the same pace Japanese Government has annou-
nced another g r a n t - i n - a i d of "467,093#000 yen in accor-
dance with the r e so lu t ion adopted in March 1978 at the 
9th Minis te r ia l conference of the Trade and Development 
Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), Notes t o t h i s e f f ec t were exchanged 
on Dec. I3(wed. ) i n Hew Delhi between Mr, E j i ro Noda, 
33. Ibid^^Nov, 22,1989, 
34. Ibid^^Nov. 22.1989, 
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Japanese Ambassador to India and Mr. Gopi Krishna 
Arora, Finance Secretary of India. The present 
g r a n t - i n - a i d r ep resen t s the d i f f e r e n t i a l in i n t e r e s t 
on the ODA loans , out of those cont rac ted between 
the Governments of India and Japan upto March 31# 
1988/ based on t h e i r ODA loans out of those cont -
racted between the Governments of India and Japan upto 
March 31, 1988, based on t h e i r ODA loan agreement, 
whose repayment f e l l due I D the f i r s t half of FY 
1989, and the i n t e r e s t based on the subsequently 
softened loan terms. This c o n s t i t u t e s one of J apan ' s 
debt r e l i e f measure, •:, The money donated by the p r e -
sent gcant ass i s tance wi l l be used t o purchase goods, 
e t c . necessary for the economic development of India 
35 
and i t s p eo p l e ' s welfare" . In another sign of 
goodwill Japanese Government decided to extend a 
c u l t u r a l g r a n t - i n - a i d upto "44 mi l l ion yen to the 
Government of India to enable the Sangeet Natak Akademi 
to procure audio-visual equipment, with t h i s aid, 
the Akademi which was es tab l i shed in 1953 a 
35. I b i d . , Dec. 13, 1989. 
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na t iona l a r t i n s t i t u t i o n , in tends to record t r a d i t i o n a l 
a r t s by replacing i t s old audio-visual equipment with 
new. Notes t o t h i s e f fec t were exchanged between the 
two governments on April 25(Wed.) in New Delhi" , ^* 
The v i s i t " of the then Japanese Prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu in April 1990Cwho was the^ f i r s t . J apanese 
i-rime Minister t o v i s i t Ind ia in the l a s t six years 
since Yasuhiro Nakasone was here in 1984, added a 
l o t to the progress of Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . By 
supporting I n d i a ' s s^and on Kashmir to s e t t l e the 
vexed problem in the s p i r i t of the Simla Agreement, 
Japan has shown her s incere des i r e for the f r iendship 
towards India , Kaiful sa id , "I should l i k e t o deepen 
further the exchange of news with the l eader s of 
south Asia, spec ia l ly Ind ia , on global i s sues without 
l imi t ing ourselves t o agenda items of b i l a t e r a l ot 
Asian issues;*' Kai fu ' s announcement of a 100 b i l l i o n 
yen concessional laon to India during the 1990 f inanc ia l year 
36. Ibid., Dec. 13,1989. 
37. Policy speech by Prime Minister Toshiku Kaifu at 
the Parliament House, New Delhi, April 30,1990, 
p. 11. 
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has fur ther boosted the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s between 
the two coun t r i e s . Cul tura l cooperation and academic 
exchanges were the other important proposal which 
c e r t a i n l y made b i l a t e r a l t i e s s t ronger , Kaifu declared 
tha t he intended to i n i t i a t e the "Japan-South Asia 
iouth Friendship Programme, on which five hundred 
young people of South Asia, who wi l l shoulder the 
task of na t ion-bui ld ing in the fu ture , wi l l be 
i nv i t ed to Japan over the next f ive yea r s . The progr-
amme i s intended to promote mutual understanding 
further so t h a t youth wi l l deepen t h e i r understanding 
of Japan ' s economy and soc ie ty" . 
After seeing the above mentioned f ac t s 
and f igures about I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with Japan frran 
1977 t o 1990, we can say t h a t both India and Japan 
could not i n i t i a t e any hopeful venture in the beg i -
nning under the compulsions of e i t h e r ex te rna l or 
i n t e r n a l f ac to r s . Their divergent s tands and a t t i t u d e s 
on global i s sues and on p o l i t i c a l l i n e s kept both the 
3a . I b i d . , p , 20. 
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countries India and Japan at an arms length. Even 
on the economic sphere progress in the 
b i l a t e ra l re la t ions remained sluggish due to Japan's 
alliance with the U.S.A. and India ' s favourable t i l t 
towards U.S.S.R, But due to unprecendented global 
changes and the essent ia l interdependence of both 
the countries compelled japan and India to rethink 
and r e s t a r t a building process of b i l a t e r a l t i e s . 
Therefore, th i s highly sluggish pace in the Indo-
japanese re la t ions was disturbed by the h is tor ic 
v i s i t of the then Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone 
in May 1984 who gave a revolutionary upward turn 
to Inod-Japanese re la t ions . He i s , therefore, highly 
regarded as an architect of Japanese l ibera l 
a t t i tuae and policy towards India. 
Since then so many _ v i s i t s of 
high digni tar ies of both the countries took place 
ana the b i l a t e ra l re la t ions and the cooperations 
between the two nations have increased many fold. 
No doubt, the la te r part of 
1980s has injected a impressive progress in the 
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his to ry of Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . Various ventures 
made by Japanese and Indiai governments at the end of 
1980s proved to be worthwhile for c rea t ing a condusive 
and b e t t e r atmosphere for the growth of t h e i r b i l a t e r a l 
r e l a t i o n s . Therefore, by the end of 1990# India and 
Japan have shown a dramatic progress in t h e i r t i e s 
Of 
at all levels* Thus the end/1990 saw an amazing and 
pleasant progress in the relationship between the 
two nations and could be expected for better prosp-
ects ,' 
C H A P T E R - V 
Indo-Japanese Rela t ions During 1990*s and 
Beyond:perspectives and Prqst/ects 
C H A P T E R V 
IKDO-JAFANESE RELATIONS DURING 1990 ' s AND BEYOND^  PERSPECTIVES 
AND PROSPECTS 
The decade of t h e 1 9 9 0 ' s has been marked 
by changing p a t t e r n s Of g l o b a l r e l a t i o n s . Super power 
d e t e n t e s e t in motion dur ing t h e p r e v i o u s t«o . 'decades 
came t o f r u c t i o n wi th t h e v i r t i c a l ending of t h e Cold 
Vvar, d i s s o l u t i o n of o l d r i v a l r i e s , and h e r a l d i n g a new 
e r a of i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n , A new i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o rde r is on the h o r i z o n . The new g l o b a l o r d e r i s expec ted 
t o be one in which m i l i t a r y o p t i o n s are t o make room for 
economic and p o l i t i c a l accommodation and d i a l o g u e , a 
change under which c o o p e r a t i o n , c o o r d i n a t i o n and nego-
t i a t i o n s are t o p r e v a i l over c o n f l i c t and t e n s i o n s . "The 
a r c h i t e c t u r e of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l and economic 
system i s undergoing r a d i c a l changes . The cu r r ency of 
i-ower i s becoming eve r more mixed, economic f a c t o r s are 
waxing and s t r a t e g i c f a c t o r s waning. The end of t h e cd>ld 
war has removed s t r a i t j a c k e t and be ing the d i s p e r s a l of 
198 
p o l i t i c a l power in bo th i n t e r n a t i o n a l and domest ic terms?" 
No n a t i o n of the world can a f fo rd t o be b b l i v i o u s t o t h e s e 
changes . 
Japeui ' s emergence as an economic c o l o s s u s 
i s a s i g n i f i c a n t development in the changing i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
o r d e r . I t i s because of t h i s economic m i r a c l e t h a t Japan 
has alarmed European n a t i o n s which a re t r y i n g t o browbeat 
»^apan econorriically by e v i c t i n g the wal l of p r o t e c t i o n i s m 
a g a i n s t Japanese e x p o r t s . Even J a p a n ' s t r a d e r e l a t i o n s 
with i t s b i g g e s t p a r t n e r , t he U. S,A.have been in doldrums 
in r e c e n t y e a r s . 
No dotibt, a f t e r becoming an economic g i a n t 
of the world , Japan , which was h e a v i l y dependent upon 
U.S.A. has t r i e d to^,/(^me out of he r s h a c k l e s ^ a n d p l ay 
an independent r o l e in t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . Af ter 
the c o l l a p s e of t h e U.S.S.R#, t h e r o o t s of t h e c o l d war 
go t s h a t t e r e d and t h e much secu r i t ydependence of Japan 
on t h e U.S.A. had widely reduced ' P^W 
T h a t ' i s why J a p a n ' s p u b l i c c^ in ion has 
1. E. Gonsa lves , "Trends in I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s 
i n the I990sj ' Mainstream . Vol.XXXI No. 42, Aug. 28, 
1993iP .10 . 
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turned in favour of persuing an independent pol icy and 
play a more meaningful ro l e in global a f f a i r s , "If 
during the four decades of the cold war i t was general ly 
su f f i c i en t for Japan t o cooperate with the American 
led e f f o r t s t o contain the Soviets and to otherwise 
maintain a determinedly a p o l i t i c a l low p r o f i l e the 
d iv i s ive world i s s u e s , by 1990 i t was apparent t ha t the 
famil iar fixed compass po in t s from which Japan ' s diplomacy 
had taken i t s bear ings %rare l a rge ly gone. The end of the cold 
war meant t h a t the U,S, Japan secur i ty r e l a t i o n s h i p had 
2 
l o s t much of i t s r a t i o n a l e . 
In fac t , the end of the cold war and the 
dismantling of the U.S.S.R, . l ike a house of cards has 
led to such a l t e r a t i o n s in the global s i t u a t i o n by which 
economic factor has assumed g rea t e r s igni f icance than 
the secur i ty fac tor . Since Japan has already gone to 
i t s economic zeni th , she i s expected to play an inc reas -
ingly independent ana important ro le in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
a f f a i r s . For t h i s purpose Japan can very well use i t s 
foreign aid as an instrument t o spread i t s influence 
a l l over the world. But t h i s expenential economic growth 
of Japan has brought r e l a t i o n s with i t s old European 
2. E.Brown, The..deb ate over j a p a n ' s s t r a t e g i c Future, 
Asian survey, vol.XXlII/ No,6, June 1993,p. 544, 
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friends in bad shape as already discussed by me in 
the preceding chapters. Therefore, Japan has found 
the Third World as the most appropriate place for 
future deployment of its capital and technology under 
these circumstances, Japan is bound to give priority 
to Asian continent to which she herself belongs to. 
It is essentially required because the maintenance 
of peace in this region will contribute to its economic 
prosperity. At the same time, the growing strain in 
japan-U.S. relations and the creation of regional 
economic gathering in Europe have compelled Japanese 
government to keep its regional role in Asia at the top 
Of its foreign policy. "However, recent strains in 
U, £.-Japan relations combined with the emergence of 
regional economic groupings in Europe and North America, 
has stimulated a growing feeling in Japan to regard 
its regional role in Asia as its principal foreign 
3 
policy focus," Even Japanese people have started 
criticising Japanese government to persuing this regional 
Asian role slowly, A leading Japanese economist Noaki 
Tanaka formerly chief of the economic forecasting section^ 
the Research Institute of National Economy, "Tanaka 
3. Ibid^^p,546 
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laments the fact that "since the end of world war two, 
Japan has not part icipated in any plan that would 
significantly a l te r the po l i t i c a l pap of Asia". Insisting 
that there i s a "need for Japan's active par t ic ipat ion in 
building an Asian po l i t i ca l and diplomatic order", Tanaka 
asserts that "we are s ta r t ing to move far beyond the 
simple theme of 'wither Japanese money? If economics 
provides the basis of Japan's stature in Asia, the very 
magnitude of i t s economic stature and in te res t s require 
i t to wield power in way that transcend economic issues 
alone, "Japan's great economic potential for creating 
order leaves i t no choice but to par t ic ipa te in building 
4 
a po l i t i ca l order" in the region concludes Tanaka", 
India, which has already eraergedaa 9 super-
power of South Asia, has become an important nation for 
the Japanese in te res t s and ac t i v i t i e s in Asia, India 's 
cooperation and coordination i s inevitably required by 
japan for i t s goal that is#maintenance of peace and stab-
i l i t y in the Asian region. Therefore, i t i s desirable 
to discuss briefly Japanese in te res t and at t i tude towards 
4. Ibid. , p. 547. 
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South Asia in the rapidly changing global politics which 
will certainly •"«» have i ts 
"impact in shaping out Indo-Japanese relations, not only 
at present but also in future. 
The above factors and the forces and the 
changing trends of the global politics due to the end 
of cold war, have had their deep impact on the political 
and economic perceptions and priorities of Japan. After 
becoming tbe economic Superpower of Asia Japanese economic 
interest and activities which were traditionally limited 
to East ano South east Asia, have increasingly shifted 
towards South Asia. "Japan has now become the leaaing 
5 
donor of development for this region." Being a world 
economic power, Japan is bound to engulf the entire 
Asia with her increased activities, "In terms of economic 
aid, however. South Asia appears to be a much more 
important region to Japan, The total value of Japanese 
OuA to the region increased to $ 1,109,47 million in 
1988 from $ 477.17 million in 1979. In terms of its 
5. Okita saburoj,"Japan Quite Strength" Foreign Policy, 
No, 75a Summef^ 1989. 
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spare In overa l l Japanese ODA, with 17,3 percent of 
the t o t a l disbursement. South Asia i s the second most 
important region for Japan af te r Southeast Asia. In 
1987, 18.49 percent of the Japanese ODA flowed in to 
South Asia whereas the corresponding r a t i o for the U.S. 
was 4.7 and tha t for a l l the DAC coun t r i e s taken together 
was 9,57, Japanese ODA to the region in t h a t year was $ 
970.22 mi l l ion as agains t the U.S. figure of $ 329 mi l l ion . 
The value of Japanese ODA was also about equal to the 
combined flow frc«n West Germany, U,K., France, Netherland 
and Sweden, the other l a r g e s t donors for the r eg ion , " 
Thus, routh Asia has now become s ign i f i can t ly an important 
region to the Japanese economic and p o l i t i c a l i n t e r e s t s . 
In sp i t e of the above s i t u a t i o n t h a t has a t t r a c t e d Jaipap, 
there are c e r t a i n other f ac to r s which have enhanced 
Japanese i n t e r e s t in the region. 
Since Japan imports large q u a n t i t i e s of 
i t s o i l trom the coun t r i e s of the Middle East , more 
than 70% of which coming by sea through the Indian ocean, 
the s t a b i l i t y and peace of the south Asian region, which 
6. Iftekharuzzman^ "South Asia; in the Evolving In te rn -
a t iona l contex t : the Role of Japan" BllSS , vol , 11, 
No. 3, 1990, pp, 300-301. 
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includes the Indian ocean of that sea route. Thus, 
Japan is keen (eager) to expand her activities in the 
region by providing substantial economic assistance to 
ensure peace and stability in the region. As the 
Japanese former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in his 
visit to South Asian countries remarked, "Peace and 
stability in Asia ia a matter of great concern to 
7 
J apan ", 
secondly, the t o t a l populat ion of t h i s 
region numbers approximately one b i l l i o n people, almost 
one f i f t h of a l l mankind (India, having the second 
l a rges t in the worldL Hence, promotion of c lose 
t i e s between Japan and the coun t r i e s of South Asian region 
i s expected to con t r ibu te s i g n i f i c a n t l y to the attainm-
ent of the aims of J apan ' s Asian diplcKnacy, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
to i t s long term s t a b i l i z a t i o n and s t rengthening of 
J apan ' s r e l a - t i o n with the Asian coun t r i e s . As Kaifu 
s t a t ed , "the development of t h i s region which i s inhabi ted 
by one b i l l i o n people, or one f i f t h of a l l mankint^ i s 
in i t s e l f one of the major i n t e r e s t s of the whole as 
7. Policy speech by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, Japan 
and south Asia, at the Parliament House, New Delhi, 
April 30, 1990. 
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we move c lose r t o the twenty f i r s t century:' 
Thirdly, the south Asian region i s having 
abundant na tu ra l resources , while japan i s a poor 
resource country, thereby, Japan and South Asian region 
are interdependent* If combined the abundant na tu ra l 
and human resources of the South Asia and Japan ' s very 
advanced technology may bring economic p rosper i ty to 
the region and in turn , J apan ' s economic i n t e r e s t wil l 
a lso f lou r i sh . 
After seeing the above mentioned view i t 
may be concluded t h a t Japan which i s t ry ing to become 
an act ive actor and leader in the Asian region, has 
s t a r t e d wooing south Asian c o u n t r i e s . Thus} , Japan 
i s bound to improve i t s t i e s with India which i s a 
regional superpower of south Asia, offer ing a large s ize 
of market and A bdgchunk of man power, t h a t wi l l c e r t a i n l y 
be an a t t r a c t i v e areas for Japan. At the same time, t h i s 
changing global and regional scenar io has provided an 
opportunity to India to come c lose r to Japan. Closer t i e s 
8. I b i d . , p . 9 . 
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with Japan i ^ essent ia l ly needed because after acquiring 
a cer ta in level of progress In agriculture^ industry 
and technology, India i s in a posit ion to take utmost 
benefits out of Japanese economic and technological 
assistance, India and Japan both have real ised the impera-
tive of the i r economic interdependence and mutual cooper-
ation and coordination for achieving the desired purpose 
that i s peace, prosperity and s t ab i l i t y in the Asian 
region. That i s why the prevalent conditions have created 
a conducive atmosphere for the bet ter t i e s and cooperation 
betvjeen India and Japan, "The stage i s set for envisaging 
a new era of entente cordaile between New Delhi ana Tokyo, 
Japan Is pursuing i t s e l f for assuming a leader ' s role in 
the Asia-Pacific in the context of changing power confi-
gurations and India i s the best bet for japan,Tokyo's 
keen desire to bail India out of her present c r i s i s , 
anxiety of Japanese business community to invest in Indian 
market, enhanced Japanese financial assistance to India 
without s t r ings and po l i t i c a l overtones, Japanese quest 
for Asian identify and similar outlook of both the 
countries on major global issues, are some of the basic 
ingredients that may bring New Delhi and Tokyo much 
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c loser to each other in the near fu tu re , " 
Future of Indo-Japanese holds b e t t e r 
prospects not only because of J apan ' s des i re to 
become a regional leader in Asia but become a regional 
leader in Asia, In fac t , now t h a t Japanese th ink-
tank has r e a l i t e d t ha t India i s no more t i l t i n g i t s 
balance in favour of Russia, since the col lapse of 
Soviet Union, a s i t u a t i o n has ar isen where America 
remains the only super power at the i n t e r n a t i o n a l l e v e l . 
Therefore, India was also compelled to red i f ine i t s 
foreign pol icy( and p r i o r i t i e s ) t ha t have changed 
widely I n d i a ' s ' p r i o r i t i e s and p o l i c i e s towards 
other na t ions . This emerging change in I n d i a ' s p o l i c i e s 
has a lso neu t ra l i zed Japan ' s doubts about I n a i a ' s s o t t 
corner for the i^ussia. Thus, t h e r e ' s room good enough 
for Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . 
However, the v i s i t of the former Japanese 
Premier Toshiki Kaifu to New Delhi in 1990 provided 
a fresh impetus forarierging economic and p o l i t i c a l r e l a -
t ion : and i n t e r a c t i o n s between New Delhi and Tokyo, 
Coming six years a f t e r a v i s i t by a former Prime Minister 
9l "India and Japan" , Third Concept, Aug., 1991,p.15. 
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Of Japan^ Mr, Yasuhiro Nakasone, t h i s v i s i t added new 
dimension to the e x i s t i n g f r iendly r e l a t i o n s between 
the two na t ions . Kaifu ' s v i s i t a l so st imulated increased 
cooperation in var ious f i e ld s of a c t i v i t i e s , including 
economic, t e chn ica l , s c i e n t i f i c and c u l t u r a l between the 
two coun t r i e s , Mr. Kaifu had two rounds of t a l k s with 
Mr. vishwanath Pratap Singh, the then Prime Minister 
of India, Both the l eader s covered a vas t range of 
sub jec t s - i n t e r n a t i o n a l , regional as well as b i l a t e r a l 
i s sues . Both India and Japan agreed to work together 
to see how they could avoid u n i l a t e r a l ac t ion and exclu-
sive agreements in i n t e r n a t i o n a l t rade eind expressed 
apprec ia t ion of each o t h e r ' s cons t ruc t ive and pos i t i ve 
count r ibut ion in t h i s regard. Mr, Toshiki Kaifu appre-
c ia ted I n d i a ' s concern for peace in the region but 
both of them di f fered on the issue of signing of nuclear 
non-pro l i f e ra t ion Treaty (NPT), India t r i e d to impress 
upon Japan t h a t i t s nuclear programme i s committed to 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Japanese premier 
observed tha t he had the f u l l e s t understanding for 
I n o i a ' s deep commitment to peace in the region and Asia, 
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Japan applauded t h i s and would continue to applaud 
I n d i a ' s e f f o r t s to promote peace. The most s ign i f i can t 
development of t h i s v i s i t of Kaifu was t h a t he made 
Japanese pos i t i on amply c l e a r on the Kashmir issue when 
he said t ha t Indo-Pak confrontat ion should be terminated 
through nego t ia t ions in accordance with the l e t t e r and 
s p i r i t of the Simla Agreement. 
Addressing the Indian Parl iament, Kaifu 
said, "The 1990s with which we have j u s t entered under 
such circumstances maurks the dawning of a new e ra . This 
area i s one in which some misgivings are found among 
hopes. The image of i n t e r n a t i o n a l order t h a t should 
guarantee our future has not taken a concrete form, 
we, t he re fo re , must jo in forces t o bui ld a new order . 
This i n t e r n a t i o n a l order must in my view, sa t i s fy the 
following condi t ions . F i r s t , l a s t i n g peace and secur i ty 
must be guaranteed. Secondly, freedom and democracy must 
be respected as fundamental values of the i n t e rna t i ona l 
community. Thirdly, the expansion of world p rosper i ty 
must be ensured under on open and free market economic 
system. Fourthly, a sound global environment aus t be 
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preserved so as to ensure that happenings and welfare 
of mankind. Furthermore, an international order that 
sa t i s f i es a l l these conditions will become attainable 
only through dialogue and cooperation among nations*" 
By recognizing India 's strength and potent ia l i ty Mr.Kaifu 
made th is amply clear that Japan and India can play a 
significant role together in the Asian region, AS he 
uttered, "I also believe that i t i s necessary at th i s 
juncture to re la te to you how we intend to contribute 
positively to the relaxation of tension and peaceful 
resolution of confl ic ts in Asia, whexe both Japan, 
Inaia, and other South Asian countries belong, through 
cooperation with peace-loving nations in the China", 
Mr, Kaifu's announcement of a 100 b i l l ion yen concessional 
loan to India further boosted the b i l a t e ra l re la t ions 
between the two countries. 
The expanding Japanese good-will was-
seen when in Fabruary 1991 a v i s i t of Japanese team 
10. Policy Speech by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, 
11. Ibid. 
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under the leadersh ip Of the Japanese vice Foreign 
Minister t o New Delhi , In recen t years the Japanese 
are r e a l l y i n t e r e s t e d in seeing the increased ro le 
of India and a lso eager to inves t in Indian market, 
"The emerging new t rends in Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s 
are being taken note of by key Jaipanese o f f i c i a l s in 
Tokyo who not only value the new p o l i t i c a l opening to 
India as t h e i r Window on -JU^ tf, the t h i r d world but 
they also suggest t h a t in the p a t t e r n of continuing 
c o n f l i c t s within the developing world. New Delhi would 
be ca l l ed upon t o play a c r u c i a l r o l e . Apart from the 
healthy economic r e l a t i o n s between the two coun t r i e s , 
the Japanese see good scope for investment and b e t t e r 
12 prospects of t rade between the two coun t r i e s . 
Japan has already emerged as the l a r g e s t 
source of foreign exchange for India , "On an average 
$ 2 b i l l i o n c yen flow in to India e i t h e r d i r e c t l y 
or i n d i r e c t l y from Japan, India ge t s about $ 800 mil l ion 
a year as concessional loans from Tokyo, Besides, the 
Japanese commercial banks and the export import bank of 
Japan grant another $ 800 mi l l ion to a b i l l i o n d o l l a r s 
a year to India as loans . In the middle of June t h i s 
12, Third concept^,OP. s i t^P-lS, . f / 
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year, India and Japan signed three new loan agreements 
to ta l l in ig $ 410 mi l l ion for three spec i f ic Indian deve-
lopment p r o j e c t s . The loans in the form of o f f i c i a l 
Development Assistance (ODA) came from Japan ' s Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), which i s administered 
by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, The p ro j ec t s to be 
financed by the loan are Anpara power t ransmiss ion, 
receiving 19,318 b i l l i o n yea^ Karnataka State Comprehen-
sive land use management p ro j ec t ge t t i ng 16.050 b i l l i o n 
yen and the r e s t 20,256 b i l l i o n yen going to small Scale 
' indus t r ies development prograirane. since the Karnataka 
Project needs only rupee funds for i t s development and 
the Japanese loan could thereby be u t i l i z e d for meeting 
foreign exchange requirements. The small scale i n d u s t r i e s 
p ro jec t loan i s a lso coming in quick disbursmenfc*'^ready 
cash in response t o I n d i a ' s request for r e l i e f in the 
wake of Gulf c r i s i s . This i s the second $ 150 mi l l ion , 
Japan had e a r l i e r pledged on Gulf account, the f i r s t $ 
150 mi l l ion was in the commodity c r e d i t . The th i rd $ 
150 mi l l ion was provided by the Asian Development Bank 
at Japanese ins t ance . All those three loans are repayable 
within a period of 30 years and carry 2,5 percent i n t e r e s t , 
13. I b id . , pp. 15-17, 
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But a grea t enthusiasm could be seen 
between India and J ^ a n t o give a new impetus to 
t h e i r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s when Congress government 
came back t o power under the leadersh ip of Narsimha 
Rao, a f te r a short dura t ion ru le of National Front 
government under the leadership of V,P, Singh, But 
dur ing th i s parl iamentary e l e c t i o n , a very young and 
dynamic asse t and former Prime Minister of India. Mr. 
Rajiv Gandhi as a Pres ident of Congress was k i l l e d 
- — ^ ^ r — - - N 
(assas inated )) by LTTE m i l i t a n t s in Tamilnadu when he 
was"~clBnpaIgriing for h i s pa r ty . His sudden death crea ted 
l o t s of d i f f i c u l t i e s for the na t ion , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
na t iona l i n s t a b i l i t y which was expected t o be res to red 
by Rajiv Gandhi. His untimely and unexpected assas in -
a t ion at the hands of the t e r r o r i s t s c rea ted confusion 
and criiSis of l eadersh ip in the Congress p a r t y . But 
t h i s c r i s i s was soon overcome when Narsimha Rao was 
e lec ted the leader by the Congress Party. But i n t e r n a l l y 
and ex te rna l ly as wel l , i t was expected t h a t India 
wi l l have t o pass through a s t a t e of i n s t a b i l i t y . 
Therefore, doubts of foreign coun t r i e s about I n d i a ' s 
s t a b i l i t y got d i spe l l ed when Narasimha Rao government 
took some new i n i t i a t i v e s with fu l l and firm determinat ion. 
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The most daring of the i n i t i a t i v e s which 
a t t r a c t e d Japan a l o t and r e a l l y did c rea te a wide 
scope for Indo-Japanese t rade r e l a t i o n s , wis the i n t r o -
duction of l i b e r a l i s e d economic pol icy of Narsimha 
Rao government. The d r a s t i c reforms in Indian economy 
bas i ca l ly i n i t i a t e d by the Finance Minister Mr,Man Mohan 
Singh a leading Indian economist, who i s regarded now 
as the a r c h i t e c t of l i b e r a l i s e d economy, Mr, Man Mohan 
Singh announced a s e r i e s of far reaching and rad ica l 
changes in the New i n d u s t r i a l pol icy (NIP) on July 24, 
1991, Under t h i s pol icy an attempt had been made to 
consol idate the s t rength b u i l t up during the seven Five 
Year Plans and t o co r r ec t the d i s t o r t i o n s or weaknesses 
tha t have c rep t up in to the i n d u s t r i a l s t ruc tu re over 
the four decades. The new pol icy aims at maintaining a 
sustained growth in p roduc t iv i ty and gainful employment 
and a t t a in ing i n t e r n a t i o n a l compet i t iveness . The Narsimha 
Rao government has decided to take a s e r i e s of i n i t i a t i v e s 
in respect of the p o l i c i e s r e l a t i n g to the areas of 
Indus t r i a l l i c ens ing , foreign investment and technology, 
and publ ic sec tor po l i cy . 
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The government wi l l hence for th provide 
automatic approval for foreign technology agreements 
r e l a t e d to high p r i o r i t y i n d u s t r i e s within speci f ied 
parameters. This has been done with a view to i n j ec t 
the desired leve l of t he chnological dynamism in Indian 
indus t ry . I t has been decided to provide approval for 
d i r e c t foreign investment upto 51 percent foreign equity 
in high p r i o r i t y i n d u s t r i e s . 
The new government undertook a review of 
the Export-import (EXIM) pol icy 1990-9 3 and introduced 
major reforms aimed at vigorous e l iminat ion and 
reduct ion of import l i c e n s i n g , export promotion and 
optimal import saving, A major feature of the Export-
Import pol icy reform i s the enlargement and the l i b e r a -
l i s a t i o n of the replenishment l icenee system (REP) 
which wi l l be c a l l e d the EXiM SCRIP, All expor ts based 
hand ic ra f t s , books and journa l s willD now have a uni -
torjTi KEP ra te of 30 percent of the value of expor t s . 
This r ep resen t s a s i g n i f i c a n t increase over the e a r l i e r 
e x i s t i n g r a t e s ranging from 5 to 20 percent except for 
c e r t a i n items which have large r a t e . Special r a t e s f©r 
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gems and jewel lery , c e r t a i n metal based handic ra f t s 
and books and journa l s wi l l cont inue. The new scheme 
provides maximum incent ive t o export in p laces where 
the import i n t e n s i t y i s low. With subs tan t i a l l i b e r a -
l i s a t i o n of the t rade regime and the exchange t a t e 
adjustment t ha t occured in July 1991. 
Japan has welcomed the l i b e r a l i z a t i o n 
of economic p o l i c i e s i n i t i a t e d by Narsimha Rao 
government and looks forward t o even a b e t t e r inves t -
ment cl imate in India . In fact in t roduc t ion of the 
New I n d u s t r i a l pol icy has in jec ted good impression 
upon the Japanese leadersh ip and i n s t i l l e d in them 
a sense of confidence and t r u s t which has shown keen 
i n t e r e s t in expanding i t s economic a c t i v i t i e s with 
India. "The Government of Japan announced a t the Aid 
India consortium meeting in Pa r i s on 20th September, 
1991, the 31st (FY 1991) Annual ODA Loan Programme 
for India , comprising concessional loans to be extended 
by the Government of Japan t o t a l l i n g 106, 594 mi l l ion 
yen (approximately euqivalent t o Is. 2000 c ro res at the 
cur ren t exchange r a t e ) . This amount r ep resen t s an 
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increase of 1.7% over the previous y e a r ' s loan 
Frogramme in terms of Japanese yen and an increase 
of more than 50% in terms of Indian rupee, with 
the loan amount pledge in Paris^ Js^an maintains 
the pos i t i on of the l a r g e s t b i l a t e r a l donar of 
development ass i s tance t o India, This r e f l e c t s 
the Japanese government's pol icy t o continue to 
reader pos i t i ve support to the economic and soc ia l 
development e f f o r t s of India . The loan amount pledged 
by Japan at the Consortium meeting includes the t o t a l 
of U£ $ 300 mi l l ion (40.5 b i l l i o n yen ) made avai lable 
under the two governments on emergency loans concluded 
e a r l i e r t h i s year . The f i r s t emergency loan of $ 150 
mi l l ion was extended for the import of d i e s e l o i l in 
May 1991 under co-f inancing v i t h the Asian Development 
Bank, The second loan of the equal amount was agreed 
to in June 1991 to s trengthen the f inanc ia l resources 
for lending opera t ions of the Small I ndus t r i e s Develop-
ment Bank of India (SIDAI). These two loans were extended 
in response to the urgent request made by the Government 
of India to provide an immediate r e l i e f to I n d i a ' s 
14 balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s , " 
14. Third Concept. Feb, 1992,p.27. 
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Friendly r e l a t i o n s between India and Japan 
have r eg i s t e r ed new s t r i d e s in recent years and both 
the coun t r i e s ce lebera ted f o u r t i e t h anniversary of 
es tabl ishment of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s in the month 
of January, 1992. I n d i a ' s , the then Foreign Minis ter , 
Mr. Madhav Singh Solanki paid a six day o f f i c i a l v i s i t 
to Japan from 19 t o 24 January 1992. Madhav Singh 
Solanki had a meeting with the then Japanese Prime Mini-
s t e r Mr, Ki ich i Mlyazawa who assured solanki t ha t Japan 
was ready t o expand economic ass i s tance to India , we 
would l ike to do as much as we can, Mr. Miyazawa was 
quoted as saying in response t o reques t from Mr,solanki 
for J apan ' s expanded economic cooperat ion. Both Mr, 
Miyazawa and Solanki agreed t h a t there was an absolute 
need for Japan and India t o in tens i fy t h e i r dialogue, 
aimed at bui ld ing a so l id r e l a t i o n s h i p of cooperat ion, 
MTi Miyazawa was in favour of India and 
Jai^an working together to s t r u c t u r a l l y renovate the 
United Nations.and make i t more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , Mr, 
Solanki succeeded in obtaining a Japanese understanding 
of I n d i a ' s pos i t ion on the nuclear non-p ro l i f e ra t ion 
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a number of r ad i ca l measures which have been accepted 
by the nat ion pr imar i ly because they are being driven 
by a broad consensus among p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and opinion 
makers. In fact t h i s v i s i t of Indian External Affairs 
Minister to Japan has proved instrumental in cementing 
the bonds of f r iendships between India and Ja|.an. "The 
emerging new fr iends in Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s are 
being taken note of by p o l i t i c a l and business c i r c l e s 
in New Delhi as well as In Tokyo. The Japanese c i r c l e 
in Tokyo not only value the new p o l i t i c a l opening to 
India as t h e i r window on the Third world but they also 
sugg<=st t ha t in the p a t t e r n of continuing c o n f l i c t s 
within the developing world, New Delhi would be ca l l ed 
15 upon to play a p ivo ta l r o l e . " 
I t shows tha t Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s 
have assumed much s igni f icance and have shown much 
progress in t h e i r b i l a t e r a l t i e s , "In recent t imes, 
Japan has emerged as the l a r g e s t source of economic 
ass i s tance for India . On an average $ 2 b i l l i o n a year 
15. I b i d . j p . 29. 
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t r e a t y . He a lso made i t c l e a r at a p ress conference 
tha t the NPT issue would in no way affect Japanese 
aid to India, 
Both of them agreed tha t in the rapidly 
changing world, the two na t ions should maintain i n t en -
s i f i e d high l eve l i n t e r a c t i o n s and dialogue, Mr, Solanki 
made i t c l e a r t h a t there was no quest ion of the NPT 
affect ing aid as they were rjot r e l a t e d , Mr, Solanki 
had t a l k s with h i s Japanese counterpar t , Mr. Michio 
Watanabe covered wide range of i s sues p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the change in global s i t u a t i o n and b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . 
During h i s stay in Tokyo, Madhav Singh 
solanki a lso had the opportunity of holding t a l k s 
with the J a p a n ' s Minister for In t e rna t iona l Trade and 
Industry, Kozo Watanabe, The Japanese Minister promised 
q u a l i t a t i v e l y improved and increased aid t o India , 
Foreign Minis ter , Solanki during h i s meeting in Tokyo 
with the Japan based non-res ident Indians(NRls) urged 
them to inves t in India , while explaining h i s government's 
new economic p o l i c i e s t o the members of Indian coonanity, 
Madhav Singh Solanki underl ined the fac t t h a t p o l i t i c a l 
consensus d r ives the Indian reforms. We have undertaken 
72% 
flow into Ind iacd l rec t ly or i n d i r e c t l y from japan. 
New Delhi ge t s about $ 800 mi l l ion a year as conce-
ss ional loans from Tokyo. Besides the Japanese comm-
e r c i a l banks and the import export b«uik of Japan 
grant another $ 800 mi l l ion t o a b i l l i o n d o l l a r s a 
ye>ar to India as loans . 
Ihus Jjspan has been extending economic 
ass i s tance t o t a l l i n g 67.1 b i l l i o n yen, euqiva lent to 
Rs. 1,344 c r o r e s , through respec t ive exchange of 
notes f ina l i zed in New Delhi on December 1991. 
The notes were signed and exchanged by His Excellency 
Shunji Kobayashi/ Japanese Ambassador t o India and 
Mri M. S. Ahluwalia, Secretary, Economic Affa i r s , Ministry 
of Finance, Government of India . The loan ass i s tance 
amounting t o 66.1 b i l l i o n yen i s being extended in 
r e a l i z a t i o n of the pledge made by Japan at the Aid 
India Consortium meeting held in Pa r i s in September 
1991. The Japanese Off ic ia l Development Assistance 
Loans for India in f i s c a l year 1991 t o t a l 106,6 b i l l i o n 
yen (Rs. 2,132 c r o r e s ) . They include the two emergency 
16. I b i d . , p . 29. 
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loans each amounting t o 20* 3 b i l l i o n yen or $ 150 
mi l l ion , extended in the middle of June 1991 in 
response to an urgent reques t made by the Indian 
government to provide immediate r e l i e f to I n d i a ' s 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . J apan ' s ODA loan 
in 1991 represented an Increase of more than 1,7 
percent Over the previous years in terms of the 
Japanese yen and an increase of more than 50 percent 
in terms of the Indian Rupees, Japan continues 
to be the l a r g e s t b i l a t e r a l donor of development 
ass is tance to India "• 
This r e e l e c t s in Japanese government's 
policy to continue t o render pos i t ive support t o the 
economic and soc ia l development e f f o r t s t o India, The 
grant extended under the exchange of Notes includes 
debt r e l i e f grant of 339.426 b i l l i o n yen, a grant 
ass is tance amounting to 719 mi l l ion yen for the 
provis ion of equipment for the government College 
of Engineering, Pune and a c u l t u r a l grant of 45 mil l ion 
yen for the supply of audio-visual equipment for 
producing teaching ma te r i a l s of the Japanese language 
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to be i n s t a l l e d a t the Jawharlal Lai Nehru Universi ty 
(JNU), New Delhi . The ODA loan package covers f ive 
p r o j e c t s , of which two are for the improvement of bas ic 
i n f r a s t u r c t u r e . Thfc Gandhar Gas combined Cycle Project 
i s designed to mi t iga te the ser ious shortage of e l e c t r i c 
power. The second p ro jec t for which Japanese ass i s tance 
has been made avai lable i s National Highway No,2 Improv-
ement Pro jec t (Mathura^-Agra Section) which wi l l f a c i l i t a t e 
i n d u s t r i a l growh in the region by ensuring smoother and 
heavier t r a f f i c flow on t h i s highway. The ODA loan pol icy 
of Japan has s t a r t e d a t tach ing s ignif icance to the p r e s -
e rva t ion and improvement of environment. This has found 
r e f l e c t i o n in the se l ec t ion of two p r o j e c t s in t h i s 
sector for ass i s tance in India during 1991. The Aravali 
H i l l * Afforestat ion Projec t has been planned to check 
the d e s e r t i f i c a t i o n and help conserving f l o r a and fauna 
of the affected region. The Urban City water Supply 
Project i s on the other hand designed to improve water 
supply systems in the c i t i e s of sholapur and New Bombay, 
The Ajanta Elora Conservation on the Ajanta-Elora caves 
which are I n d i a ' s c u l t u r a l he r i t age of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
repute . The p ro j ec t includes archeological conservation 
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works for the caves , environment pro fac t ion in the area 
as well as development of in fras tructure f a c i l i t i e s for 
t o u r i s t s . This p r o j e c t has been taken up for a s s i s t a n c e 
as a fo l low up of the statement made by the former 
Prime Minister of Japan, Toshiki Kal£u, in h i s p o l i c y 
speech at the s p e c i a l Jo int s e s s i o n of the Indian P a r l i a -
ment in New Delhi i n May 1991 where he had underlined 
Japan's d e s i r e t o contr ibute t o the preserva t ion of 
c u l t u r a l her i tage in south Asia. 
Beslde8t_the other p r o j e c t s for which 
Japanese f inancial^^assistance would be made ava i lab le 
include Anpara Power Transmission Projec t , Karnataka 
State Comprehensive Land use management p r o j e c t and 
17 Small Scale Industr ie s Development programme. 
This growing trend in Indo>-Japanese r e l a t i o n s 
i s not only constant but a l s o I s c o n s i s t e n t one. Therefore, 
India i s r e c e i v i n g economic a s s i s t a n c e from Japan c o n s i s -
t e n t l y , which i s badly needed for the developemental 
17. IbiQ. , pp. 29-30. 
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e f f o r t s of India . Besides t h i s economic a s s i s t ance , 
India i s in need of foreign investment and i s also 
capable of en te r ing in t h i s f i e l d as wel l . In t h i s 
respec t many e f f o r t s have already been made by the 
Indian Ambassador in Tokyo and other embassy o f f i c i a l s 
by holding so many meetings with the important Japanese 
o f f i c i a l s , major na t iona l economic o rgan i sa t ions l i ke 
the Japan Chamber of Commerce and indus t ry and other 
Japanese business big guns t o provide them f i r s t hand 
information about the new i n d u s t r i a l pol icy which i s 
in tegrated with much economic reforms to c rea te conducive 
atmosphere for foreign inves to r s . I t i s genera l ly expected 
and even claimed in India t h a t the fabr ic of Indian 
economy wil l be strengthened and I n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t i e s 
wi l l be widened. Due to t h i s radical opening in Indian 
economy Japanese businessmen wi l l c e r t a i n l y find India 
an a t t r a c t i v e place to Invest in . 
I t means pure he l l i "Since the announcement of new 
i n d u s t r i a l po l icy , the Japanese p r iva te inves to r s as 
well as the Japanese government have s t a r t e d evincing 
keen i n t e r e s t in India thereby s igna l l i ng the b r igh te r 
i-rospects of Japanese investment in t h i s country. 
Akira Nishigaki , during h i s v i s i t to New Delhi held 
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f r u i t f u l d i scuss ions with the Union Finance Minis ter . 
Man Mohan Singh. The d iscuss ion centered round I n d i a ' s 
new economic pol icy i n i t i a t i v e s , pro jec ted performance 
of the Indian economy and the e f fec t iveness of the recent 
measures taken by the government for economic reforms. 
The v i s i t i n g Japanese d ign i t a ry expressed deep apprecia-
t ion for the econcxnic reforms of India and expressed 
confidence t h a t these measures would enable India not 
only to resolve the presen t d i f f i c u l t balance of payment 
18 s i t u a t i o n but a lso lay the foundation of strong economy". 
As per the f i gu re s of the Ministry of 
'V Commerce, Government of India , I n d i a ' s expor ts during 
(April-December 1990-91) wereTTwere to the tune of! ""^  
Rs. 2,113.5 c ro res and I n d i a ' s imports from Japan amounted 
to Rs. 2,379.2 c ro res as agains t Rs. 1,903.6 ccores and 
Rs. 1,989.9 c ro re s expor ts and imports r e spec t ive ly during 
the same period of 1989-90. Infac t , t h i s i s a strong 
growth in I n d i a ' s expor ts t o Japan in recen t time and 
were se t to be more than doubled from Rs. 1,190.1 c ro res 
in 1985-86. Despite a wide scope for Indian goods in 
Japanese markets India i s s t i l l unable to suck up f u l l 
f r u i t s in the f i e l d of expor t s to japan, though she had 
18. Ibid. , pp. 30-31. 
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been making effor ts pers is tent ly and consistently for 
l a s t so many years to widen the gamut of i t s exports 
to Japan. "The most revealing aspect of India ' s trade 
with Japan which i s of concern, has been India 's 
Inabi l i ty to diversify significantly i t s export basket, 
despite serious effor ts being mace during the l a s t 
decade. This does not mean that no new export items 
have been enlisted into India ' s major exports to Japan 
but that overall Impact on the export structure has 
so far been marginal. The most recent item which has 
penetrated into Japanese sophisticated market has been 
dyes and dye intexrroediates. Other non-traditional items 
which have also gained consicerably are leather goods, 
garments, text i le fabrics , engineering goods including 
autoparts and machine tools , fresh f ru i t s and vegetables, 
chemicals, household furnishing floorings, software 
and sports goods, however, there are cer ta in t radi t ional 
items and as also iron-ore and marine goods which have 
recorded considerable decline in 1990-91. Another fact 
has been that Ind ia ' s export basket to Japan i s dominated 
by t rad i t iona l goods. I t i s amusing to note that only 
three goods[ (itemsj^lron-ore, marine gooQS(^'?procucts) 
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and diamonds c o n s t i t u t i n g nearly 75 percent of the 
I n d i a ' s t o t a l expor t s . I t i s alfO important to reveal 
t ha t about a dozen goodsC (items)) account for more than 
90 percent of I n d i a ' s t o t a l expor ts t o japan. They 
include readymade garments* l e a t h e r , g r a n i t e , f r u i t 
ana vegetables , cot ton and cot ton f a b r i c s . The export 
of these items t o Japan has been the outcome of I n d i a ' s 
e f f o r t s to d ive r s i fy the i tems to en te r i n to Japanese 
market. Products which have provided good p o s s i b i l i t i e s 
for increasing expor ts to Japan in 1990-91 include l i g h t 
engineering goods, gold j ewel le ry , c a r p e t s and b icyc les 
components and computer software. These t r ends show tha t 
there has been gradual and steady d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n of expor ts 
to Japanese market. However, these e f f o r t s are modest 
and Indi^" has to go a long way in d ivers i fy ing expor t s 
to Japan as there has been an enormous p o t e n t i a l of 
19 pene t ra t ion of Indian goods i n to Japanese market." 
No doubt, there i s an urgent nee a on the p a r t of Indian 
big shots (tycoons) in the sphere of expor t s to take 
i n i t i a t i v e to improve the qua l i t y of t h e i r products so 
upto 
they can be offered to Japanese market^so tjiat they can come-
Japanese s tandards and i n t e r n a t i o n a l s tanoards . Therefore, 
19.lAlam/Badar,^' " I n d i a ' s Exports to Japan; Problems and 
I ssues" , Indian Quarter lv . Vol.XLVII, No. 4, Oct-Dec. 
1991, pp. 13-14. 
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e f f o r t s must be made to bring Indian manufactured 
goods in global market with h ighes t q u a l i t y tomake 
a place for Indian goods in the changing condi t ions 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l market. Japanese market i s offering 
a much widerscop^to absorb Indian manufactured goods, 
a fac t t h a t has already been r ea l i zed even ^y the 
Japanese o f f i c i a l s . The Japanese ambassador to India , 
S. Kobayashi, has r i g h t l y suggested t h a f ' t h e p o t e n t i a l 
Indian expor te r s should explore every poss ib le measure 
to offer h ighes t qua l i t y products as there has been 
enormous scope of Indian goods t o en te r in to Japanese 
market". Hence India must strengthen i t s foreign exchange 
earning c a p a b i l i t y for i t s economic growth and t h i s 
could be possible only when India would improve fur ther 
the i n t e r n a t i o n a l competi t iveness of i t s manufacturing 
industry as Japan has g rea t p o t e n t i a l to absorb Indian 
goods in a big way in the years to come, confirming the 
worst f ea r s I n d i a ' s t rade gap for the year 1990-91 has 
crossea the Rs, 10,000 crore mark to f i n i s h a t Rs. 10,500 
c r o r e s , showing an alarming r i s e of nearly 36 percent 
on the f i gu re s of the l a s t year i . e . 1989-90 amounting 
to fc. 7,731 c ro r e s . Under such s i t u a t i o n India has t o 
come out with a l l out e f f o r t s to increase expor t s to 
the na t ions where there i s an enormous scope of absorbing 
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Indian goods such as Japan , Germany and E.E.C. c o u n t r i e s . 
If c o n c e r t e d e f f o r t s are m a d e / ( r i g h t away/ I n d i a could 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y I n c r e a s e he r e x p o r t s t o Japan in a b ig way 
and come out of the c l u t c h e s of the a larming t r a d e gap, 
I nd i a w i l l commit a fundamental mis take in i t s expo r t 
s t r a t e g y i f i t does not take note of the r a p i d l y changing 
g l o b a l market c o n d i t i o n s e s p e c i a l l y i n Japan , Germany 
and the EEC, If I n d i a s e r i o u s l y does want t o promote i t s 
e x p o r t s expans ion , the Japanese market must no t be 
u n c e r s t i m a t e d . Keeping in mind the e x i s t i n g t r e n d s in 
I n d i a ' s f o r e ign t r a d e , I n d i a - J a p a n s t and ing Committee 
( U s e ) , has formula ted an a c t i o n o r i e n t e d s t r a t e g y 
for i n c r e a s i n g e x p o r t s t o Japan a t the r a t e of 17 t o 
20 18 p e r c e n t . " 
Indo-Japanese t r a d e has shown the s ign of 
growth s u b s t a n t i a l l y over the decades and Japan has 
emerged as an impor t an t t r a d i n g p a r t n e r of I n d i a , having 
t h i r d p l a c e . After see ing the p a t t e r n of Indo-J apane se 
t r a d e , i t can be s a i d t h a t i t i s c o n t a i n i n g t h r e e 
impor tan t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . F i r s t l y , I n d i a has moved from 
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having a surplus with Japan which was the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
t i l l 1980, t o a country which has continuous d e f i c i t 
with Japan since t h e n , I t occured due to a more l i t e r a l i -
zea a^,],roach and a t t i t u d e for imports in to India , Secon-
dly, the conunondity concentrat ion in Indian exports i s 
dominant. Nearly 75 percent of I n d i a ' s expor ts c o n s i s t s 
of iron ore , shrimps and minerals . The Japanese market 
had emerged an important market having wide scope for a l l 
such products , Japan shares more than 60 percent I n d i a ' s 
t o t a l expor ts of i ron ore , ana nearly more than 70 per-
cent of t o t a l shrimp expor t s . Thirdly, mostly India 
rece ives low values for expor ts e i t h e r because of low 
uni t value items being exported, or because of the pos i -
t ion and pre s t ive of India as a suppl ie r , lacking in 
q u a l i t a t i v e products . I t may be due to c e r t a i n fundamental 
d i f f i c u l t i e s fejced by Indian expor te rs in ge t t i ng desired 
condi t ions for t h e i r products . 
Therefore, the growing trend in Indo -
Japanese r e l a t i o n s and much enthusiasm to improve 
t h e i r b i l l a t e r a l t i e s i s v i s i b l e , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f te r 
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the revolut ionary reforms introduced by the Narsimha 
Kao government in the Inaian economy. But to maintain 
the pace of economic growth India has to improve i t s 
foreign exchange earnings c a p a c i t i e s , India can reach 
t h i s t a r g e t only by widening i t s expor ts t r ade . If I t can 
be mateer ia l ized , India wi l l have to increase and 
enhance i t s export of manufactured i tems, India i s 
bound to improve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l competi t iveness of 
i t s manufacturing indus t ry . I t may be allowed only through 
an in t roduc t ion of g rea te r competi t ion both dotnestic 
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l by improving the qua l i t y of t h e i r 
products . This g rea te r com, can be ensured by r e l a t i n g 
the e f fec t ive cont ro l of government applied to i n d u s t r i a l 
a c t i v i t i e s in India ever since i t s independenc:^. But the 
r ad ica l changes in the e n t i r e fabr ic of Indian economy 
have c e r t a i n l y provided b e t t e r condi t ions and conductive 
to the Indian expor te r s and they are expected to come 
up to the expec ta t ions of Indian government by enhancing 
Indian expor ts to Japan and overa l l progress in IndO* 
J ap ane pe re 1 at ion s. 
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India had shown Immense enthusiasir, and 
cons i s t en t goodwill towards Japan cons tant ly as 
evident from the o f f i c i a l v i s i t of the Indian Prime 
Minis ter , Mr, Narsimha Rao to Japan in June 199 2 
which opened a new chapter of the two count rys ' 
r e l a t i o n s towards the :21s t century, Narsimha Rao 
had wide ranging t a l k s with h i s Japanese counter-
p a r t , the then Prtme Minister Mr, Ki ichi Miyazawa on 
var ious i n t e r n a t i a i a l and b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . Both the 
leaders agreed t o explore a new i n t e r n a t i o n a l consensus 
on the nuclear non p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s sue . The two coun-
t r i e s also decided to incorporate arrangements which 
were both comprehensive and non-usus. Mr, Rao expressed 
I n d i a ' s r e se rva t ions Over the non-pro l i fe ra t ion t r e a ty 
and said t t were no d i f f e r en t from Japan ' s which while 
signing the t r e a t y in 1975 had wanted I t s r e c t i f i c a t i o n 
on the grounds t h a t i t was descriminatory as i t gave 
a special s t a t u s to nuclear powers. Sharing the Japanese 
p remier ' s concern over the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear 
weai-ons, Mr. Rao said t ha t the r i sk war not from one or 
two coun t r i e s which had not signed the non p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
t r ea ty . There was the f r igh ten ing p o s s i b i l i t y of ready-
made nuclear weapons and technology being used. In addi t ion . 
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some coun t r i e s which had signed the non-pro l i fe ra t ion 
t r ea ty were having c landes t ine nuclear programmes which 
c l e a r l y indicated the g la r ing inadequacies of regional 
approach to the nuclear i s sue . "Addressing a news 
conference at the Japan National Press Club here , Mr, 
Rao c a t e g o r i c a l l y rule© out the p o s s i b i l i t y of India 
signing the NPT, This i s the time for reviewing the 
KPT and not for signing i t . He pointed out t ha t the 
NtT was due for review in another three years and 
sought a commonlity of views with Japan and other i n t e re s t ed 
coun t r i e s on the issue of nuclear non-p ro l i f e ra t ion . He 
reca l l ed in t h i s context t h a t at the time of signing the 
NPT, Japan i t s e l f had observed t h a t the t r e a t y was d i s -
cr iminatory . Responding to a quest ion from a Japanese 
j o u r n a l i s t , he emphasised t h a t India was not only 
concerned about the issue of nuclear non-pro l i fe ra t ion 
but was i n s i s t e n t t h a t there should be no nuclear weapons 
21 on the face of e a r t h . " Mr, Narsimha Rao t r i e d to 
impress upon the Japanese leadership t ha t "the only 
r i gh t fu l so lu t ion of nuclear problem, pending review 
21. National Heraldic Lucknow),oune 25,1992, p . 1 
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of the NFT, was o u t l i n e d in the p l an proposed by 
Mr. Raj iv Gandhi a t t h e Uni ted N a t i o n s Suinmit on 
n u c l e a r disarmament in 1988. The p lan , he r ecoun t ed , 
envisaged d i s m a n t l i n g of weapons by the n u c l e a r weapon 
s t a t e s , unde r t ak ing by n u c l e a r weapon s t a t e s t h a t they 
w i l l not c r o s s the t h r e s h o l d and ban on t e s t i n g of 
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n u c l e a r weapons and manufacture of f i s s i o n a b l e m a t e r i a l s . 
Mr, Naysimha Rao r e c a l l e d the Congress govern-
m e n t ' s economic p ' o l i c i e s a f t e r 1980. He sa id t h a t 
Mrs. I n d i r a Gandhi took the f i r s t s t ep in the d i r e c t i o n 
of economic re forms in 1980s which was f u r t h e r c a r r i e d 
on by Mr. Raj iv Gandhi* But he admi t ted t h a t h i s government 
has i n t roduced r a d i c a l re forms i n the Indian economic 
p o l i c i e s . He j u s t i f i e d h i s governmen t ' s i n i t i a t i v e s 
and d e c l a r e d t h a t t hese re forms were e s s e n t i a l l y and 
i n e v i t a b l y needed t o s t r e n g t h e n Ind i an economy. There fo re , 
t he re i s no q u e s t i o n of r e t r e a t i n g or withdrawing of 
the government from these r e fo rms . Mr, Rao t o l d the 
Japanese businessmen t h a t the most v i t a l p o i n t of app re -
c i a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t he se economic reform? i s not in 
overcoming i d e o l o g i c a l h i t c h e s b u t c u l t i v a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l 
2 2 . I b i d . 
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consensus behind these reforms. Therefore, Inaaan 
government i s qu i te confident about i t s i n i t i a t i v e s 
because i t had been successful in evolving t h i s 
consensus. Thus, the doubts about the s t a b i l i t y and 
i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y of the economic reforms of Narsimha 
Rao government, by and l a rge , could be removed by t h i s 
five day o f f i c i a l v i s i t of Mr.Rao. brought the two 
count r i es qu i te c lose r and gave a new upward turn to 
t h e i r economic and commercial t i e s . Many big business 
houses and agencies of Japan assured Mr, Rao to enhance 
t h e i r economic and t rade a c t i v i t i e s in India, They 
showed t h e i r utmost l i k ing and apprec ia t ion of the 
rad ica l reforms moves i n i t i a t e d by the Indian government, 
"Japan 's a l l powerful Ministry of In t e rna t iona l Trade 
and Industry (MITI), which provides adminis t ra t ive guidance 
to the Japanese bus iness , has offered to provide f inanc ia l 
and information support for promoting trade and inves t -
ment in India , Besides, MITI has a l loca ted 56 b i l l i o n 
yen for underwrit ing insurgence cover for p ro jec t 
export s to India . These dec is ions were communicated to 
the F-ime Minis ter , Mr, P.V, Narfeimha Rao, when Mr. 
K, Watanabe, Minister- incharge of MITI ca l led on him on 
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Wednesday. Mr. watanabe, who was accompanied by the 
Japanese Finance Minis ter , Mr. Tsutumu Mata, a lso 
assured the Prime Minister t h a t a Japanese decis ion 
on providing aid for the Sarovar Project would be 
taken shor t ly . J apan ' s f i r s t instalment of aid on 
t h i s count was 2.35 b i l l i o n yen. The forthcoming 
instalment i s expected to be in the region of 17 
b i l l i o n yen. Both the min i s t e r s to ld the Prime Minister 
t ha t they were impressed by I n d i a ' s determination to 
implement economic reforms. They said t h a t even though 
the p reva i l ing l eve l of Japanese investment in India 
was low, MITI would now act a? a c a t a l y s t for more 
investment. Mr. watanabe and Mr. Hata re fe r red to India 
and Japan as Asian coun t r i e s and said t ha t t h i s commodity 
of i d e n t i t y would ac t as a spur to upgrading economic 
23 ' t i e s . I t was apprehended tha t Japan may make a 
linkage between the NPT and J apan ' s aid to India as 
i t was aired by few (some) people in both the coun t r i e s . 
I t was completely c leared when Japanese Premier 
Mr. Ki ichi Miyazawa maae a statement about i t . "The 
Japanese Premier made no linkage between the NPT issue 
and Japan ' s aid to India . In fac t he ina ica ted t h a t 
2 3. Ibid . , pp. 1-8. 
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the t o t a l Japanese a id t o I n d i a t o be p ledged a t the 
Aio I n a i a Consort ium meet ing beg inn ing in P a r i s 
toBBOrrow would be r a i s e d by s ix p e r c e n t t o yen 112 
b i l l i o n as a g a i n s t yen 106 b i l l i o n fo r 1991-92, This 
would inc lude a f a s t d i s b u r s i n g a s s i s t a n c e of $ 250 
m i l l i o n fo r the hydrocarbon s e c t o r wi th a matching 
amount from the Asian Development Bank which I n d i a 
h^s a l r e a d y n e g o t i a t e d , Mr, Miyazawa conveyed t o 
Mr, Rao J a p a n ' s a p p r e c i a t i o n of the measures of 
d e r e g u l a t i o n and s a i d t h a t a number of Japanese comp-
24 
a n i e s had env inced i n t e r e s t in I n d i a , " 
The Prime M i n i s t e r Mr, Rao underscored 
another a s p e c t of the Indian s o c i e t y t o woo the yen. 
He po in t ed t o the burgeoning middle c l a s s in I n d i a , 
Whose number touched the 200 m i l l i o n mark and r e f e r r e d 
by I m p l i c a t i o n t o t h e i r p u r c h a s i n g power. He p o i n t e d 
out t h a t a d v e r t i s e m e n t s of Japanese p r o d u c t s l i k e 
N a t i o n a l t e l e v i s i o n s e t s , Cas io watches and sharp 
VCRs were a l r e a d y appear ing in the newspapers- even 
though the se p r o d u c t s were no t a v a i l a b l e fo r s a l e in 
I n d i a , Narsima Rao t o l d the Japanese businessmen about 
24. The Times of I n d i a , J u n e , 24,1992, 
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his economic p o l i c i e s are widely supported by I n d i a ' s 
middle c l a s s . Therefore, there i s a wide scope and 
b e t t e r prospect for Japanese i n v e s t o r s in India . The 
Prime M i n i s t e r ' s v i s i t , apar t from turning the a t t en t ion 
of the Japanese inves to r s towards India , had the added 
s ignif icance of occuring in a year when both the count r i es 
are ce lebe ra t ing the 40th anniversary of signing a 
b i l a t e r a l Treaty of Peace and Amity. The Indo-Japanese 
Treaty i s an important psychological input in b i l a t e r a l 
t i e s since i t was the f i r s t t r e a t y which war-devastated 
Japan signed on equal terms with another nation.=^after 
regaining i t s sovereignty. On the other hand, the opening 
up of the Indian economy at a time when the t r a d i t i o n a l 
Japanese markets in Europe and North America are proceeding 
in reverse d i r e c t i o n towards protect ionism has cu l t i va t ed 
considerable i n t e r e s t in j a p a n ' s business c i r c l e s . 
Over the l a s t few years , the number of Japanese govern-
ment and economic missions v i s i t i n g India have enhanced 
considerably . Major investments l ike Fu j i t su India , 
Asahi Glass and Suzuki Motors have already ma te r i a l i s ed . 
Over the years Japan has emerged as I n d i a ' s 
biggest aid giving pa r tne r and has been making cons i -
s t e n t , constant and s ign i f i can t ges tures from time to time. 
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When India got i t s e l f under s t r a i n due to balance 
of payments s i t u a t i o n in 1991, Japan came to I n d i a ' s 
rescue by f a s t d isburs ing loans through the Asian 
Development Bank and the world Bank. India too has in 
recent years taken several i n i t i a t i v e s to s t rengthen 
t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p , A three-day o f f i c i a l mourning was 
declared in India on the occasion of Emperior showa's 
death . I n d i a ' s the then Pres ident Mr. R. venkataraman, 
attended Emperor Shovra? s funeral and h i s successor ' s 
enthronement ceremony both. Two prominent Japanese 
c i t i z e n s , Mr, Sakurauchi and Mr. Goro Koyama, have 
been honoured with Padma Bhushan awards. India has 
been cooperat ive of Japanese p o s i t i o n s at the global 
fora . Also, when japan sent i t s minesweepers to the 
Gulf in the wake of the war t h e r e , India r ead i ly 
acceded to Tokyo's reques t to provide f a c i l i t i e s a t 
Indian p o r t s . Around c^  year back government land ' 
was provided at concessional r a t e to the Japanese 
embassy in New Delhi for cons t ruc t ing a school for 
the ch i ld ren of the embassy s taf f . This c o r d i a l i t y 
and goodwill of India have not remained unnoticed by 
the Government and the people of Jap an. Even though 
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India and Japan have been cooperating with each 
other at international fora and both of them are 
also widening and increasing their economic and 
commercial a c t i v i t i e s at a faster pace, rrore than 
ever before, India and Japan are s t i l l finding them-
selves at loggerheads on the Nuclear non-proliferation 
Treaty. Mr. Narsimha Rao, certainly did narrow down 
th i s difference of perception during his v i s i t to 
japan by suggesting that both the countries s t a r t 
a dialogue to evolve a common stand on the issue of 
nuclear prol i ferat ion. This proposal of the Prime 
Minister was taken by Japanese leadership posi t ively. 
Therefore, there was no attempt of Japanese leadership 
to link the NPT issue with i t s overseas development 
assistance programme. I t shows that once again Japanese 
leadership had come to terms with India ' s stated 
position-only because of Japan's strong and renewed 
desire to improve i t s re la t ions with India. 
As we observed in the preceding chapter, 
internal factors and forces play a very v i t a l role 
in shaping out a na t ion ' s destiny and they a t t r ac t 
international attention accordingly. Par t icular ly , 
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when a countxry I s making a l l out e f f e o r t s to a t t r a c t 
foreign investment, technology and economic a s s i s t ance , 
i t has to c u l t i v a t e the image the p re s t i ge t o the 
a s p i r a t i o n s and expecta t ions of i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. 
Above a l l , the country has to show to the world 
community i t s p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y which g ives a sense 
of secur i ty to the foreign i nves to r s . Therefore, 
cons i s t en t peace and s t a b i l i t y of a nat ion are the 
utmost important i n t e r n a l f ac to r s which c rea te conduc-
ive cu l tu re for b e t t e r ex t e rna l and i n t e r n a l economic 
prospects of a country. 
No doubt, NarjBimha Rao government emerged 
successful in providing p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y to India 
which was doubted ex t e rna l ly and i n t e r n a l l y due to 
the untimely and unexpected a s ses s ina t ion of Rajiv 
Gandhi. The death of Rajiv Gandhi created a leadership 
vaccum in the Congress Earty and i t was apprehended 
tha t no leader of Congress could continue in the office 
as a strong leader l ike t h e i r predecessors and 
the re fore , p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y was on the cards . 
But Narsimha Rao managed t o remove a l l such misgivings 
by overcoming the l eadersh ip c r i s i s in h i s par ty and 
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by managing t o obtain the e f fec t ive support of even 
the opposi t ion p a r t i e s for h i s p o l i c i e s of r ad i ca l 
reforms in the Indian economy. The magnitude of 
changes in the lildian economy introduced by Narsimha 
Rao government was the l a r g e s t in the post- independent 
India. These r ad i ca l reforms showed a sign of progress 
in the Indian economic s t ruc tu re which was widely 
appreciated a t a l l l eve l s i . e . in India and abroad. 
When India was leading towards steady economic 
growth because of i t s unprecedented move of l i b e r a l i z a -
t ion policy which s t a r t e d a t t r a c t i n g foreign c a p i t a l 
to Indian market and even Indian economic a c t i v i t i e s 
go widened and picked up tremendous momentum. India , 
a l l of a sudden,was entangled with an unexpected i n t e r -
nal imbroglio t h a t sha t te red a l l hopes and dreams shown 
by government p o l i c i e s of r a d i c a l reforms. This 
cancerous c r i s i s was the Babri Masjid -Ram Janama 
Bhoomi d i spu te , which took an ugly tu rn on 6th December 
1992, when <^tg^disputed]]jtxug^ur£_o£jjabri Masjid 
was demolished by the people of r i ^ h t wing organisa t ions 
l ike Bajrang Dal, vishwa Hindu Parishad and B.J .P . 
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This dangerous development t a rn i shed I n d i a ' s secular image 
at In t e rna t iona l l e v e l . An unprecedented communal frenzy 
Of grea t magnitude f la red up in no time and the whole 
country was in flames of communal hatred which, for a 
moment, brought to a grinding h » l t , t h e wheels of progress , 
peace ancr~tranquility of the na t ion , Narfeimha Rao Government 
t r i e d i t s bes t t o deal with s i t u a t i o n with a firm hand 
to r e s to re law and order and i n s t i l l confidence in minori-
t i e s and at a l l l e v e l s , and managed t o contain the wide-
spread communal voilence and sense - l e s s k i l l i n g s which 
resu l ted in co lossa l losses beyond r e p a i r . 
This -disputed- i s sue • niost c e r t a i n l y did push 
I n d i a ' s secular and democratic p o l i ^ in a t i g h t corner . 
India hac to i n s t i l l a sense of confidence among, the 
minor i t i e s as well as the majority community t h a t t h e i r 
l i v e s and p rope r t i e s in India were safe and the same wi l l 
be taken care of very e f f ec t i ve ly to avoid the recurrence 
of such f l a re ups. At the sane time the world community 
too had to be convinced t h a t India i s as peaceful anc 
democratic as i t was t h a t India s t i l l bel ieved in communal 
harmony, universa l brotherhood and valued democracy 
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as before without the s l i g h t e s t devia t ion in i t s 
p o l i c i e s and the values for which the nat ion always 
stood f o r i . In fac t the turmoil was fur ther aggravated 
and abetted by some ex te rna l forces which were bent 
upon making India weak. This was amply evident when 
Bombay was sikaken by s e r i e s of bomb-blasts in March 
t h i s year which l e f t over 300 persons dead and thousands 
injured with property worth mi l l ions of d o l l a r s destroyed. 
But above a l l what was r e a l l y shaken was the c lose ly 
kn i t secular- ' fabr ic of amity, love and brotherhood 
which took the g r e a t e s t j o l t . 
Therefore these painful development dis turbed 
the pace of peace and progress e s t ab l i shed by the 
Narsimha Rao Government through var ious bold measures, 
Japanese government observed a l l these i n t e r n a l 
developments of India as unfortunate and Japanese big 
business houses were compelled to adopt a very caut ious 
policy towards India, Before these developments* those 
Japanese who were considering India as a good land for 
t h e i r investments prospec ts , got feared and s t a r t e d 
showing re luctance to come forward in the investments 
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areas.But Indian government has been successful In 
providing peace and s t a b i l i t y to the nation and thereby 
could n e u t r a l i s e vanom injected by the ugly developments 
upon the Vvorld Community^ P a r t i c u l a r l y , with japan, India 
could r e - e s t a b i 3 i s h the same rapport as i t had e a r l i e r , 
Japanese are, now, very much impressed by the e f fec t ive 
s teps of the Indian government to check In t e rna l problems. 
They are fur ther moved by the continuous pace of reforms 
in the Indian economy. The l i b e r a l i s a t i o n pol icy i n i t i a t e d 
by Nar/simha Rao Government i s s t i l l continued with 
more ferver and f i l l i p ; and government's indominatable 
des i re to go ahead for more economic reforms in years 
t o come, are few of the very appealing and a t t r a c t i n g 
o f f i c i a l s t r a t e g i e s to the global Community, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
to Japan and i t s people, "India i s well on i t s way to an 
economic take off, according to a repor t by two univers i ty 
p rofessors . Under h is prime Minis te rsh ip , India embarked 
on a r a a i c a l t ransformation of the economy and the 
momentum for change in the country i s unstoppable, say 
Columbia Universi ty Professor j agd i sh Bhagwati and Ya le ' s 
T.N. sriniwasan, "If he (Bhagwati) i s r i g h t the future 
i s b r igh t , the seven t o e igh t percent growth r a t e of 
the Asian miracle economics i s p o s s i b l e " . ( i n Ind ia ) , 
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25 the Kew "lork Times s a i d " . 
Undoubtedly, I nd i a i s emerging among the deve lop -
ing Ra t i ons and making f u l l b looded e f f o r t s t o d i s c h a r g e 
i t s major r o l e a s an impor t an t c o u n t r y . P r e s e n t l y , I n d i a 
i s c h a i r i n g G-15 c o u n t r i e s . As chairman of G-15 Narsimha 
Rao t r i e d t o Impress upon G-7 t o extend t h e i r economic 
a s s i s t a n c e t o deve lop ing n a t i o n s th rough Japan which i s 
a l s o a member of G-7. As "P.M. P.V. Naiyfehimha Rao has 
sa id l e s s e n i n g of t e n s i o n , c o r r e c t i o n bf imbalances and 
removal of o b s t a c l e s t o g l o b a l growth can be p o s s i b l e 
only i f " C o u n t r i e s , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r l e v e l s of 
p r o p e r i t y and development , agree t o work t o g e t h e r ' . In 
a message t o nex t mon th ' s G-7 summit i n Tokyo, the P.M. sa id 
momentous changes had taken p l a c e i n the world i n 
the l a s t t h r e e y e a r s and "We have e n t e r e d an e r a where 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n has g iven way t o a s e a r c h for c o o p e r a t i o n 
anc p a r t n e r s h i p " . Mr, Rao i s the c u r r e n t Chairman of 
the G-15 which r e p r e s e n t s nona l igned and deve lop ing 
c o u n t r i e s . His message on beha l f of t he deve lop ing 
25, The Hindustan Tlmes^ August 28, 1993. 
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world was handed over to Japanese P.M. Kilch Miyazawa 
on June 29 by Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, Mr. 
Miyazawa assured Dr. Singh t h a t he would pass on the 
message to the G-7 summit. The message said the 
developing world sought "a mutuali ty of i n t e r e s t between 
the G-7 and G-15 to coordinate global e f f o r t s guided 
by humanitarian imperative of e rad ica t ing poverty, 
hunger and disease p a r t i c u l a r l y a f f l i c t the poores t" . 
The Finance Minister in h i s t a l k in Tokyo with Japanese 
leaders said G-15 was ready to work with the G-7 and 
there was no b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e to cooperation between 
the developing and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d na t i ons . In h i s mee-
t i ngs on June 29 with Mr. Miyazawa-and Finance Minister 
Y. Hayashi, he said both the developing and developed 
coun t r i e s must share r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 
Infac t , the economic t i e s between the two 
count r i es are s t rengthening day by day. I t i s evidenced 
by the economic ass i s tance extended to India by Japan", 
26. Data India , July 5-11, July 28, 1993 p . 545. 
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The 68 bn Yen pledge i s for 3 power p r o j e c t s , 420 MW 
Bakreswar coal-based thermal power p l an t in west Bengal, 
400 M^v gas based thermal power s t a t i o n in Faridabad 
and 1000 MW Anpara thermal power p ro jec t in Ut tar 
Pradesh , according to an o f f i c i a l r e lease in New 
Delhi on July 9, The ass i s t ance to power sector i s 
pa r t of J apan ' s pledge of Rs. 32 bn (119.64 bn Yen) 
at Aid India consortium meeting in Par i s in F i r s t veek 
27 
of Ju ly . 
Japan on the other hand is also seeing sea changes 
inside of its own. For the first time in the 38 years 
of democreatic History of Japan, the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party is defeated by the 7 opposition parties 
alliance in the recently Parliamentary elections, held 
July 1993. Certainly it is a big change in the political 
set up of Japan and it was expected that it may give a 
new shape for Japanese foreign policy* Though some 
political reforms are taking place withing the country 
but it is difficult to the new Japanese leadership to 
pursue even a little bit change in its foreign policy 
towards external world. Therefore, Asia will remain 
27. Ibid. 
250 
the priority region even there is an internal political 
change in the Japanese leadership, Japan will contin4je 
to make Its all laborious efforts to achieve Its longfelt 
ambition i.e., maintenance of peace and stability in 
the Asian continent. When leader of seven political 
parties agreed to form a coalition government and 
elected Morihlro Hosokawa as the new Prime Minister 
of Japan in the end of July 1993# Mr. Hosokawa openely 
apologised for Japanese past dlctotorial acts against 
asian pepple during the second world weu:, "Mr, Hosokawa 
also became the first Japanese Prime Minister since 
world War II frankly and formally to express remorse 
for the aggression and conquest which the army-dominated 
Japanese Government carried out against China and the 
South-East AsiaPcountries for almost 15 years until 
1945, Speaking of "the great mistake we had made", 
he said "I believe it is important at this Juncture 
that we state clearly before all the world our remor'se 
at our past history and our renewed determination to do 
better. I would like to take this opportunity to express 
our profound remorse and applogles for the fact that 
past Japanese actions, including aggression and colonial 
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r u l e , caused unbearab le s u f f e r i n g and sorrow for so 
many people and t o s t a t e t h a t we w i l l demons t ra te our 
new d e t e r m i n a t i o n by c o n t r i b u t i n g more than even 
28 be fo r e t o world p e a c e . 
The New Government of Japan under the l e a d e r -
sh ip of Morihero Hosokawa i s bound t o pursue h i s 
p r e d e c e s s o r s p o l i c y p a r t i c u l a r l y i n d e a l i n g wi th 
e x t e r n a l world, j apan w i l l con t inue t o p lay a l a r g e r 
r o l e in the world a f f a i r s and s p e c i a l l y peace and 
s t a b i l i t y of Asia w i l l assume t o p p r i o r i t y in the 
Japanese f o r e i g n po l i cy* Japanese new l e a d e r s h i p i s 
a l s o bound t o f ind new market for Japanese p r o d u c t s 
i n t h e p r e v a l e n t world s c e n a r i o i n which i t s r e l a t i o n s 
wi th America and western powers are i n doldrums. 
Thus* I n d i a can n o t be ignord by the Japanese 
new l e a d e r s h i p because the l and of r i s i n g sun may g e t 
on the s o i l of India* what i s b a s i c a l l y bad ly needed 
t o J a p a n . I t was c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d by t h e Hosokawa 
gove rnmen t ' s d e c i s i o n t o ex tend ecomomic a s s i s t a n c e 
28. Asian Recorder , v o l . XXXIX* No. 38, Sept . 17-23* 
p . 23414. 
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t o preserve and r e s t o r e Budhlst Monument In Central 
India, "japan w i l l o f f e r 500,000 d o l l a r s t o a United 
Nations p r o j e c t t o excavate , preserve and res tore 
Budhist .Monuments in c e n t r a l India, the fore ign 
Ministry s a i d on Sept 16, the Ministry sa id the fund 
would be used for the 3 year p r o j e c t by U.N. Educational 
S c i e n t i f i c and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) at the 
29 Sanchi Satdhara Complex in Madhya Pradesh". Japan 
i s expected t o announce a considerably larger amount 
of her annual overseas Development Aid(ODA) to India 
in the year to come. The new government of Hosokawa 
has a l s o apreciated the l ibD(al i sat ion of economic 
J p o l i c i e s i n i t i a t e d by Nanshimha Govt. At the same t ime, 
India has become an important nat ion , not only in 
South Asia but a l s o i n the Asian cont inent due t o i t s 
cons iderable m u l t i - f a c e t e d developments. I t has been 
r e a l i s e d by Japan as well as other c o u n t r i e s of Asia, 
Dr, Thanan Khoman, Chairman, I n s t i t u t e of Foreign 
Af fa ir s and Asian I n s t i t u t e of Technology, Bangkok 
29. Data India , Sept. 13-19, 1993, p .707 , 
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Observed India ' s position in the region as "he feels 
India i s a potential actor in the Asia-pacific and 
y 
wonders why i t has not so far played i t s role , he 
advocates creation of a new Asian order in order 
to coalesce a l l Asian nations to work for the common 
goal of peace, s t ab i l i ty and progress, "India as a nation 
of 900 million people with great potent ial in economic* 
po l i t i ca l philosophical, cul tura l and Science and tech-
nological f ie ld , can play a very successful role in 
•^0 Asia-Pacific region". 
No doubt, both Japan and India are inclined 
towards each other because of prevailing trends in 
International economic and po l i t i ca l re la t ions . There-
fore, the future appears to hold a bright prospect for 
an exponential growth of Indo-Japanese re la t ions p a r t i -
cularly in the economic f ie ld and eventually for some 
sort of po l i t i ca l understanding on major po l i t i ca l 
issues facing the Asia Pacific region. 
30, The Hindustan Tiines# Nov. 12, 1993# p. 12, 
C H A P T E R- VI 
C o n c l u s i o n 
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COHCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion leads us to the 
conclusion that J e a n ' s foreign policy in post-war 
Asia Is primarily motivated by economic in teres t s 
rather than p o l i t i c a l and strategic in teres t s . 
The economic and technological backwardness of Asian 
nations provides an opportunity to Japan to expand 
her econ«nic a c t i v i t i e s in the area. The far-sighted 
and shrewd leadership of Japan has been exploit ing 
th i s opportunity consistent ly since 19 52, and has 
eventually emerged as the most inf luent ia l power in 
Asia. During the later years of 1960s Japan realized 
that Asian_developmentJje_lther^ affects her own welfare 
direct ly or indirect ly . Thus, Japan began to follow 
such p o l i c i e s which could lead to peace and s t a b i l i t y 
in the Asian continent. After emerging as an economic 
giant of the world, Japan started playing an increasing 
role in Asia, for most of the time since 1950s 
economically, but l a te ly p o l i t i c a l l y , as wel l . For 
h i s tor i ca l , geographical, economic and at the same 
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t ime, p o l i t i c a l reasons I t i s a l s o a fac t that within 
the Asian cont inent , Japan has favoured more a 
p a r t i c u l a r reg ion , south-eas t Asia , than the other 
r e g i o n s . South Asia has occupied low p r i o r i t y i n 
Japanese preferences* India, a part of the South Asian 
reg ion , was accorded an i n s i g n i f i c a n t p lace by the 
Japanese l eadersh ip in the postwar per iod . In a 
aymposixm held in New Delhi i n 1981, Vishal Singh 
remarked, "I do uot know how c l o s e we are in the economic 
f i e l d . My fjtiend next to me has t o l d me Just now that 
we are coming c l o s e , well that i s good. But I have 
a f e e l i n g that there i s hardly any communication. The 
misunderstanding I think was very c l e a r l y ind ica ted by 
what Mr. Subramaniam said and some do say that when 
Japan t a l k s of Asia , t h i s Asia ends somewhere near 
Manipur. I t i s East Asia, China, japan, Korea, 
y e s , they are Asia, so i s the ASEAN t e r r i t o r y . I 
think they a l s o consider Indoichina as a part of Asia. 
This i s my understanding of Japanese consc iousness of 
Asia. I wonder whether i t inc ludes south Asia. So on 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r aspect we would expect more(^lignment 
from the Japanese scho lars here and t e l l s us whether 
t h i s country i s a party of Asian consc iousness of 
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Japan, •• Inder Nalhotra« a noted Indian J o u r n a l i s t , 
supported Vishal Singh's view and s a i d , "I am 
d e l i g h t e d t o be at t h i s seminar because t h i s i s the 
second occas ion which shows some tang ib le evidence 
of Japanese i n t e r e s t in India as f e l l ow Asians . I 
think i t i s not at Manipur that the Japanese concept 
2 
of Asia ends^ but at Rangoon", 
But changing trends of g loba l p o l i t i c s in 
the wake of detente between the two superpowers in 
the mid 1980s and the revolut ionary growth of Ja^^an's 
economic might have broughtvarious changes in Japanese 
diplomacy i n Asia, In the present s i t u a t i o n when the 
world has transformed from b i ~ p o l a r i t y i n t o m u l t i -
p o l a r i t y , Japan i s bound t o play an expanded ro le in 
Asia, in p a r t i c u l a r , and in i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , in 
genera l . The utmost p r i o r i t y of Japan in Asia i s to 
maintain peaee, and s t a b i l i t y which u l t i m a t e l y would 
serve her own economic purposes . Thus, under the 
present scenario Japeui i s bound t o take keen i n t e r e s t 
1,"Role of Ja^an and India", Japan-India Symposium , 
1981, (New Delh i ; Japan Cultural Centre, 1981) ,pp. 26-7, 
2, I b i d . . p. 28, 
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in the South Asian reg ion , 
Slnce^ India has already emerged as a super-
power of south Asia by v i r tue of her large geographical 
area and huge populat ion In t h i s e e g l o n ^ A t the same 
time, India I s undoubtedly far ahead In other aspects 
by I t s Overall development i n comparison t o other nat ions 
of South Asian reg ion . Therefore, Japan c a n ' t afford 
t o Ignore India , an ii^portant country of Asia which may 
contr ibute a l o t t o achieve Japanese targe t of mainta in , 
ing peace and s t a b i l i t y in the reg ion . At a time when 
Japanese r e l a t i o n s with i t s most favoured nat ion America 
and western-powers have already suf fered a setback on 
account of the l a t t e r * s p r o t e c t i o n i s t p o l i c i e s to brow-
beat Japan econoroically« I n d i a ' s v a s t market has c e r t -
a inly become a source of a t t r a c t i o n t o Japan. Thus, 
Japanese l eadersh ip i s making s incere e f f o r t s t o enhance 
i t s economic a c t i v i t i e s i n the South Asian region par-
t i c ularly^_^JLt.h India. As the • Japanese Prime Minister 
Mr. Toshiki Kaifu s t a t e d , "One of the keys t o v igorous 
economic development of South Asia w i l l be the minimisation 
of government regu la t ion^ ,pr ivat i sa t ion of state_owned 
corporation/ as wel l as improved i n d u s t r i a l in fras truc tuce ^nd 
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stimulation ©f investment from inside and outside the country.As 
Japan is a major trade and investment partner of this 
of 
region, the Government/Jap an sha l l continue t o improve 
and u t i l i z e i n d u s t r i a l f ram^^orks to r e a l i z e a s t r en -
gthened economic r e l a t i o n s h i p in cooperat ion with govern-
ments of south Asia ," ' ' 
No doubt/ improvement of Indo-Japanese 
r e l a t i o n s have assumed c r u c i a l importance in the promo-
t ion of peace and s t a b i l i t y in the Asian region. That 
i s the reason t h a t both India and Japan get themselves 
a t loggerheads on the NPT i s sue , even there i s strong 
wi l l from both s ides t o widen the gamut of t h e i r r e l a -
t ion^ . This was c l e a r l y indica ted by Japanese Premier, 
Mr. Kiichi Hlyazawa t o h i s Indian counterpar t Mr.Nansimha 
Rao, when he paid a v i s i t to Tokyo in June 1992 tha t ^ 
Japan i s not at a l l wi l l ing t o l ink i t s economic aid 
( to India) with NPT, Cordial t i e s between India and 
the land of r i s i n g sun are perhaps the key to the economic 
3, Policy speech de l ivered by the Japanese 
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in the Parliament 
Hous, Mew Delhi , April 30,1990, 
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future of India. Already, recent t rends serve to high-
l i g h t the c r u c i a l ro l e of Japan in the development of 
the developing economies. Therefore, Japanese assurances 
are p a r t i c u l a r l y valuable to India t h a t Japan wi l l 
continue to enhance i t s overa l l t i e s , despi te the d i f f e -
rences on NPT, 
At the hear t of these assurances i s the 
Japanese asse r t ion of i t s i d e n t i t y as an Asian country 
f 
charged with the Primary r e spons ib i l i t y to maintain the 
peace and s t a b i l i t y of the Asian con t inen t . Japanese 
Vice-Minister for In t e rna t iona l Financial Affairs Mr, 
Tadao Chino said, Bhe proclaimed a s t ra tegy of Japan 
using i t s pos i t ion in the ranks of the G-7 nat ions to 
"draw the world 's a t t en t ion to Asia, .Asia has more 
p o t e n t i a l power than other a reas" . -
Declaring himself "pro/Asia", Chino said 
tha t " i t i s Japan ' s ro l e to r a i s e Asian economic power, 
and the improvement of the Asian area i s Important for 
4 Japan and the world". Another open attempt to p ro jec t 
4. •Brown (Eugene)^ "The Debate over j a p a n ' s strfete^ic 
Future7~S51an Survey, Vol,XXXlII, No. 6, June 1993; 
p.548 . 
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j ^ a n e s e identi ty as Asian one, was made through edi tor ia l 
writing in 1991, the dai ly , "Nihon Keizai" said that, 
"Japan wi l l push policy coordination between Asia and the 
U. S . - th i s i s Jaypan's task in the Asia Pacif ic region". 
More recently, the then Prime Minister of Japan Mr.Kiichi 
Miyazawa showed keen interes t in taking part in any multi-
lateral security forum for Asia. "Miayazawa's announced 
wil l ingness to participate in a multi lateral security forum 
for Asia modelled on the Conference on Security and coop-
eration in Europe i s a sharp departure from Japan's declara-
tory pol icy . Prior to 1992, Japan's leaders had maintained 
that the geographical divers i ty of the Asia-Pacific region 
mil i tated against the creation of a mult i - lateral security 
architecture fdr the region". In e f f ec t , Japan i s increas-
ingly changing her perception of the way the Asian people 
regard themselves and their pace in the world. 
Undoubtedly, India on the other hand has 
been pursuing a policy of non-alignment since her indep-
endence, which i s nothing but a policy that has been 
crying for the deve2)Oproent and progress of Third world 
countries, 
5. Ibid. . p. 548. 
6. Ib id . , p. 551. 
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India has been expressing since her in -
dependence that India's foreign policy wi l l gave priori ty 
to the nations of Asia, The architect of India's foreign 
pol icy . Pandit Jawahar^al Nehru, off repeatedly stated 
that India gives utmost priority and emphasis to improve 
i t s t i e s with a l l the nations of Asia and India's e f for t s 
wi l l be continued to es tabl i sh peace and s t a b i l i t y in 
th i s region, since then, no change has been observed in 
India's foreign policy and s t i l l Indian government keeps 
Asia's peace and s tab i l i t y at the top in India's foreign 
policy* I t may also be because of India's in teres t l i e s 
in the maintenance of peace and s t a b i l i t y in t h i s region 
after achieving considerable improvement in the f i e ld 
of agriculture, industry, science and technology. Thus 
India, on her part i s bound to welcome any move which i s 
directed towards the maintenance of peace and s tab i l i t y 
in the Asian region. 
One does not have to be a genius to under-
stand that a common interest i s deeply involved for both 
the countries India and Japan in maintaining peace and 
s tab i l i t y in the Asian continent. 
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Both the coun t r i e s are ready t o play a cons t ruc t ive 
ro le in c rea t ing an environment conducive for mutual 
cooperation and coordinat ion e f f o r t s r a the r than 
ge t t i ng i n t o unnecessary and sense less confronta t ions 
and c o n f l i c t s among the Asian nations* The Governments 
and the people are eager t o extend t h e i r whole hearted 
cooperat ion and extend t h e i r helping hands t o achieve 
t h e i r common goal of achieving peace and s t a b i l i t y in the 
Bcgion and co seem to be s t r i v i n g in the r i g h t d i r ec t ion 
to fur ther s t rengthen and cement f r iendly r e l a t i o n s t h a t 
aiready e x i s t between Japan and India . Since some of the 
count r ies of the Asian region doubt the good i n t en t i ons 
and the i n t e g r i t y of Japan because of her pa s t expans ionis t 
and hegi^-monial p o l i c i e s during the second world war, Japan 
seems to have brought revolu t ionary changes in her thinking 
and percept ions and deal ings which Japan has managed 
to prove with her deeds and the changing behaviour of i t s 
l eade r sh ip . As Prime Minis ter Toshiki Kaifu sa id , "peace 
and s t a b i l i t y in Asia i s a matter of grea t concern to 
Japan, Developments in pu r su i t of a new world order 
beyond East-West confrontat ion and the cold war mental i ty 
through dialogue and cooperat ion, must spread beyond 
Europe t o t h i s p a r t of the world. The s t r a t e g i c environ-
ment and h i s t o r i c a l : a n d c u l t u r a l background of Asia d i f f e r 
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significantly from those of Europe. To improve mutual 
trust among nations in this region, ensure security 
for individual countries at a lovier level of armament 
and international relations based on dialogue and coo-
peration, »e must be engaged in multifaceted efforts 
that suit the realities of the region, while taking 
7 
account of its characteristics," Having itself experi-
enced the pains of modernization in the not so distant 
past, Japan fully appreciates how great the implications 
of the development issue would be, not only in the economic, 
but also in the social and even political aspects that 
is why India reposes its faith in Japan as a partner in 
its progress. The Japanese government appears to be firmly 
determined to respond seriously to India's expectations. 
So Japan has increased its development cooperation and 
has emerged as a major trade and investment partner of 
India, 
Thus, we find that there are good prospe-
cts of cooperation and fresh thinking on relations between 
7, Policy speech delivered by the Japanese prime Minister 
Toshiki Kaifu, op,cit. 
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India and Japan. E a r l i e r , Japaoi and India might have 
a t tached low p r i o r i t y t o each other for t h e i r own 
reasons or they couldjQOt mature enough in t h e i r t i e s 
beyond economic and commercial ones but the recent 
incred ib le changes in the l a s t few years at the global 
level have compelled both the coun t r i e s to adopt 
var ious s trong measures to come c loser for /a c lose r 
cooperation and stronger t i e s between the two na t ions 
for t h e i r mutual bene f i t . To make the going e a s i e r and 
smoother for b e t t e r understanding and more cooperat ion 
the v i s i t of Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to 
New Delhi 1990 and the recent v i s i t of the Indian Prime 
Minister Nacsimba Rao to Tokyo in June 1992 proved t o 
be a landmark in the h i s t o r y of Indo-Japanese r e l a t i o n s . 
The v i s i t s gave an opportuni ty to impress upon each 
other t h a t both the na t ions are upholding the pol icy 
of peace and s t a b i l i t y in the Asian region and are too 
wi l l ing t o improve t h e i r b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s in each and 
every f i e ld for t h e i r mutual bene f i t . In fact* Japan 
has already r e a l i s e d the importance of India in achieving 
her longfe l t purpose and i s constant ly making s incere 
e f f o r t s t o provide economic and technological ass i s tance 
which i s badly needed by Indian^Japoimost c e r t a i n l y does 
seem to be eager and keen to enlarge and widen the gamut 
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Of her re la t ions with India, India and Japan both, are, 
therefore, too eager to see that the b i l a t e ra l t i e s 
are not confined to economic spheres only. As Toshlku 
Kalfu said In Delhi, "I shall posi t ively Implement the 
following concrete measures In order to give further 
depth and breadth of Japan's re la t ions with South Asian 
countries. These are namely the promotion of po l i t i ca l 
and economic dialogue, the expansion of development 
assistance and the promotion of cul tural exchange and 
cooperation, " 
No doubt, both India and Japan are inclined 
to have bet ter economic and po l i t i c a l re la t ions because 
of the prevailing trends in international re la t ions . 
Therefore, India needs to u t i l i z e a l l possible opportu-
n i t i e s to take advantage of the s i tua t ion. As far as the 
trade re la t ions are concerned India has yet to ra t ional ize 
i t s imports and to make i t s presence fe l t in the Japanese 
market. The imports from Japan will accelerate the economic 
growth and will enhance India ' s capabili ty to conplete 
in the world market, and Indian exporters can widen the i r 
exports base in Japanese market, which i s the need of 
8. Ibid. 
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the hour. Although the government has already taken several 
measures t o a t t r a c t Japanese Inves to r s for Indian market 
through l i b e r a l i s a t i o n of economic p o l i c i e s and providing 
a,favourable atmosphere for them but they don ' t seem t o 
be good enough t o i n s t i l l confidence in the hea r t s of the 
Japanese business community. More confidence-building 
measures are urgent ly needed to assure the Japanese gover-
nment in general and the p o t e n t i a l i nves to r s the business 
community in p a r t i c u l a r t h a t Narsimha Rao government has 
good and e f fec t ive cont ro l over here in India and the 
environment in the country i s peaceful and worth inves t ing 
with no i n s t a b i l i t y a t a l l and t h a t they need not doubt 
the good i n t e n t i o n s of the government of India . I t can very 
well be seen t h a t Narsimba Rao government has managed t o 
r e s to r e complete law and order in the country a f t e r the 
incred ib le wide-spread violence and communal f la re -ups 
which had engulfed the whole na t ion a f t e r the h i s t o r i c 
Babri i ias j id was demolished on 6th December 1992 by the 
F a s c i s t f ana t i c s « a f t e r which the whole country was in 
flames. The world has amply seen the • c ^ a b i l i t y 
of the oovertiment of India to deal with any s i t u a t i o n with 
a firm hand. And the e f f o r t s made by India to promote 
peace, t r a n q u i l i t y and universa l brotherhood (ydar Charitanam 
Tuvasudhaiva Kutunil^akam} hh^e been widely appreciated 
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at a l l leve ls . The Japanese leadership did give a clear 
indication about th i s when Narsimha Rao v is i ted Je^an 
in June 1992. Thus the t i e s between the two countries 
are consolidating day by day as they are fast coming 
closer, closer more than ever before. 
The above analysis leads to an optimistic 
assessment of the pos s ib i l i t i e s of improving the mutual 
cooperation between India and Japan, Our observation of 
the si tuation goes to show that the mutual cooperation 
i s the basic necessity of both India and Japan, some 
pleasant and fruitful r e su l t s are already vis ible and i t 
seems the r ight efforts are being made in the r ight d i re -
ction by both the countries. 
F i r s t t J e a n ' s ambition to re-emerge as an in te -
rnational actor which has repeatedly been 
aired by Nakasone and other Prime Minis-
t e r s of Japan that Internationalizat ion of 
Japan i s the need of the hour. I t goes 
to show that the Japanese leadership has 
the ambition of emerging as an interna-
t ional actor to play a larger role in 
the world affa i rs , Takashita, the then 
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Prime Minister of Japan, who had repeatedly 
r e i t e r a t e d and emphasised t h a t Japan must 
revive and widen i t s t rad ing t i e s with 
other na t ions r a t h e r than remain confined 
t o western world and the U.S.A. His. 
dec la ra t ion on 5th May, 1988 during h i s 
tour of Europe t h a t Japan wished to adopt 
a high global p r o f i l e in order t o 
maintain peace in the world and to secure 
the p rosper i ty of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l community. 
The recent u t t e rances of Kaifu and Miyazawa 
are not d i f f e ren t from t h e i r predecessors 
and seem t o be only the extension of the 
same. 
Second: j a p a n ' s growing f r i c t i o n with the U.S.A. 
and the European community on mat te rs of 
t r ade , t a r r l f s and investments pose a 
ser ious t h r e a t to J apan ' s economic s t a t u s . 
In t h i s strange s i t u a t i o n Japan would have 
to n a t u r a l l y and obviously, look for and 
explore new markets for i t s goods and 
investments. For t h i s obvious reason the 
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the s ize and potential of India's market 
i s l ike ly to be most attract ive to Japan, 
Third: After achieving certain level of progress 
in the fields of agriculture, industry 
and technology India has been making all 
out efforts to derive the utmost benefit 
out of the Japanese economic and technolo -
gical assistance^ so the expansion of colla-
boration with Japan is an step in the right 
direction. 
Finally; Both India and Japan have very well realized 
the imperatives of their economic inter-
dependence. Both of them have also felt 
the urgency of making whole hearted 
efforts to further strengthen the bilateral 
ties. The rapidly changing global scenario 
is proving to be helpful to them in 
coming closer, so the fatxuse. appears to 
hold bright prospects for better and closer 
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Indo-Japanese re la t ions . Part icularly in the economic 
field and more par t icular ly in reaching some sort 
of po l i t i ca l understanding eventually on major po l i t i co -
s t ra tegic issues facing the Asia-Pacific region. 
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8 Share of DAC Countries In Total Bilateral ODA received by Vietnam (i ($ miU orti 
Sweden 
$38 37 
58 3% 
Finland 
$11 92 
18 1% 
France 
$5 94 
9 0% 
Otheis 1 
$9 55 1 
14 5% 1 
Tolal Bilateral ODA Received 
Total Multilateral OOA Received 
65 78 
50 85 
Southwest Asia 
BANGLADESH (Hundred Million Yen) 
Fiscal Year Loan Aid Grant Aid Technical Cooperation 
1984 
1985 
• Power Plant Berge (60 65) 
(Tolal 60 65) 
• Food Aid (34 71) 
• Aid lor Increased Food 
Production (33 50) 
• Proiect lor the Construction 
ol the General Hospital In 
Narayangan) (16 80) 
• Project for the Improvement 
o( Medical Equipment lor 
the Upazila Health Complex 
and the District 
Hospital (8 32) 
• Proiect for the Improvement 
ot Water Supply System 
in New District 
Towns (7 63) 
• Rehabilitation Project in 
the Area Affected by the 
Flood and Cyclone (6 00) 
• Debt Relief (23 72) 
• Three other proieclj (7 24) 
(Tolal 137 93) 
Commodity Loan (160 70) 
Qaa Turbine Pow«r Plant 
Construction Proiect (75 10) 
Telecommunication Network 
Expansion Project (34 20) 
Commodity Loan (163 90) 
Greater Dhaka Telecom-
munications Network Improve 
ment Pro|ect (63 20) 
Chlttagong Steel Mill 
Rehabilitation Proiect (47 90) 
(Tolal 545 00) 
Emergency Aid (2 84) 
Proiect lor the Construction 
of the General Hospital m 
Narayangan) (6 10) 
Proiect for the Improvement 
of Water Supply System 
in New District 
Towns (14 53) 
Proiect lor the Construction 
ol Upazila Connecting 
Roads (11 00) 
Food Aid (31 05) 
Protect for the Construction 
of the Foodgrain 
Storages (5 36) 
Debt Relief (28 10) 
Four other proiecis (48 90) 
(Total 147 88) 
(Tolal 10 7J) 
(Total 9 67) 
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1986 Chlttagong Urea Fertilizer 
Project (35 51) 
(Total 35 51) 
Project tor the Improvement 
of Water Supply System 
(15 80) 
Project lor the Replacement 
ol Weather Surveillance 
Radars (6 36) 
Debt Relief (33 85) 
Project lor the Replacement 
o( Medium-Wave Transmitter 
(3 73) 
Power Distribution Project 
(3(X)) 
Project lor the Improvement 
of Fire Fighting and Rescue 
Equipment (2 50) 
Audio-Visual Equipment to 
the Bangladesh Institute of 
Distance Education (0 39) 
Aid tor Increased Food 
Production (12 00) 
Improvement of Medical 
Equipment for the Institute 
of Cardlo-Vascular 
Disease (3 03) 
' Project for the Construction of 
Food Grain Storages (11 04) 
Project lor the Construction 
of the Meghna Bridge 
(11 95) 
RehatJilltation Project in the 
Flood & Cyclone Affected 
Area (7 00) 
' Food Aid (20 00) 
(Total 130 65) (Total 1164) 
1987 Sylhet Combined Cycle 
Power Plant Construction 
Project (81 7) 
Commodity Loan (156.3) 
(Total 24000) 
Project for the Construction 
of Meghna Bridge (19 86) 
Project for the Improvement 
of Water Supply System 
(12 42) 
Food Aid (25 00) 
Project for the Construction 
and Rehabilitation of the 
Sewerage System (1 82) 
Project for the Improvement 
of Safety Services and Motor 
Transport Vehicles (3 95) 
Rehabilitation Project In 
the Flood i Cyclone Affected 
Area (8 50) 
Rehabilitation Project for 
the Terminal Irrigation 
Facilities in Narayanganj 
Narshingdl Area (1 OS) 
Television Broad Casting 
to Bangladesh Television 
(0.48) 
Debt Relief (42 18) 
Aid (or Increased Food (5 6) 
Project for the Improvement 
of the Mail Vans and 
Motor Vehicles (1 19) 
Project for the Improvement 
ol Medical Equipment (6 81) 
(Total 128 86) (Total 13 33) 
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1986 CommoOlty Loan (133 00) 
Madhapara Hard RocK Mining 
Pfoiect (4 41) 
Jamura Fertilizer Project 
(138 53) 
Chlttagong Caustic Soda Plant 
Rehabillitation Project (20 76) 
Ghorasal Urea Fertilizer Fac 
tory Renovation Project (103 43j 
Emergency Commodity Loan 
(75 00) 
Jamvra FertiJuer Project III) 
(185 00) 
(Total 475 13) 
• Ttie Project (or the Construe 
tlon of the Meghna Bridge 
(19 99) 
• The Project for the Improve 
ment of Water Supply System 
In NevK District Towns (9 62) 
• The Whole Rehabilitation Pro 
ject the Terminal Irrigation 
Facilities in Narayaganj — 
Narshingdi Area (5 36) 
• The Project lor the Construe 
lion anO RehabiMaUon ol the 
Sewerage System (16 30) 
• Food Aid (19 00) 
• Grand Aid for Disaster Relief 
(0 289) 
• • (0 675) 
• • (10 00) 
• " (0 186) 
• The Project for the Improve 
ment of Ice Plants Processing 
Units and Related Facilities of 
Bangladesh Fisheries Develop 
ment Corporation (1 54) 
• The Project lor the Construe 
tlon of Narayanganj — Nar 
shingdi Irrigation 
Facilities (0 76) 
• Debt Relief (52 32) 
• Equipment of Preservation and 
Conservation of Paharpur 
Buddhisl Monastery (0 38) 
(Total 136 42) (Total 12 37) 
A Japan s OOA Disbursements to Bangladesh 
($ million) 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Grant Aid 
42 95 
55 86 
49 35 
124 61 
118 71 
Grants 
Technical Cooperation 
5 24 
6 29 
9 30 
11 25 
15 01 
Total 
48 19 
62 15 
58 66 
135 86 
133 72 
Loan Aid 
75 10 
59 33 
189 82 
198 34 
208 24 
Total 
(V.) 
123 28(61) 
121 48(4 8) 
248 47(6 5) 
334 20(6 4) 
341 96<5 3) 
• 
(Note) Figures In parentheses Indicate the percentage within Japan s total bilateral OOA 
B Share of OAC Countries m Total Bilateral OOA received by Bangladesh (1987) 
Total Bilateral OOA Received 
Total Multilateral OOA Received 
926 51 
684 52 
($ million) 
1 Japan 
$334 20 
1 36 1 % 
U S A 
$146 00 
15 8% 
Canada 
$10195 
110% 
Neth 
$66 97 
7 2% 
F R G 
$66 13 
7 1% 
Others 
$211 26 
22 8% 
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o n u i M n 
Fiscal Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Loan Aid 
— 
— 
Grant Aid 
• Aid tor Increased Food 
Production (4 00) 
(Total 4.00) 
• Project for the Construction of 
the Micro Hydro Power 
Facilities (6.24) 
• Aid lor Increased Food 
Production (1 00) 
(Total 7 24) 
• Aid for Increased Food Pro-
duction (2.00) 
• Pro|ecl for Agriculture 
Oevelopnient (6 66) 
(Total 8 66) 
• Aid for Increased Food Produc-
tion (2.00) 
• Agriculture Development Proj-
ect (2.13) 
• Project for Construction and 
Maintenance of Roads (4.12) 
(Total 8.25) 
• Aid for Increased Food Produc-
tion (2 50) 
(Total 2 50) 
(Hundred Million Yen) 
Technical Cooperation 
(Tolal 0 39) 
(Total 0 51) 
(Total 0 74) 
(Tolal 1 19) 
(Total 2 04) 
A Japan's OOA Olsbursements to Bhutan 
($ million) 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Grant Aid 
1.69 
1.38 
4.82 
3.74 
5.24 
Grants 
Technical Cooperation 
0.21 
0.21 
0.49 
0 49 
1.52 
Total 
190 
1 59 
5 32 
4 23 
6.77 
Loan Aid 
— 
— 
— 
— 
— 
Tolal 
(V.) 
1 90(0 1) 
1 59(0 1) 
5 32(0 1) 
4 23(0 1) 
6 77(0 1) 
(Note) Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage within Japan's total bilateral OOA 
B Share of DAC Countries In Total Bilateral OOA received by Bhutan (1987) 
Total Bilateral ODA Received: 
Total Multilateral ODA Received: 
11.46 
23.50 
(J million) 
Japan 
$4.23 
36.9% 
Norway 
$3 06 
26.7% 
SWISS 
J2.37 
20 7% 
Others 
J180 
15 7% 
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INDIA (Hundred Million Yen) 
Fiscal Year Loan Aid Grant Aid Technical Cooperation 
1984 • Bljalpur Fertilizer Plant Project 
(150 00) 
• Telecommunication Expansion 
Protect (54.30) 
• Ammonium Sulphate Caprolac-
turn Plant Project (102 00) 
• Nitrophosphate Fertilizer Plant 
Project (41.00) 
• Aonia Fenillzer Plant Protect 
(81 95) 
• Gas Pipeline Project (200.00) 
• Telecommunication Network 
Expansion Project (75.35) 
• Eastern Gandalt Canal 
Hydroelectric Project (16 30) 
(Total 720.90) 
• Project (or the Improvement ol 
Educational and Research 
Equipment of the University ol 
Delhi (5 00) 
• Project for the Improvement ol 
Medical Equipment at Regional 
Cancer Centers (5 00) 
• Research, Preservation Equip 
ment (0.50) 
• Microfilm, Audiovisual Equip-
ment (0 20) 
• Debt Relief (17 74) 
(Total 28 44) (Total 2 87) 
1985 • Gas Pipeline Project (158.00) 
• AonIa Fertilizer Plant Protect 
(95 00) 
• Sardar Sarovar Hydro Electric 
Protect (28.50) 
• UJtani Hydro Electric Protect 
(1500) 
• Telecommunication Network 
Expansion Project (95 81) 
• Assam State Gas Turbine 
Power Station and Transmis-
sion Line Construction Protect 
(300 00) 
aotal 692 31) 
• Aid (or Increased Food Produc 
Hon (12 00) 
• Debt Relief (IS 85) 
• Equipment lor Studies of the 
Fine Arts and Agncultural 
Education (0 43) 
(Total 28 28) (Total 1 96) 
1986 • Gas Pipeline Protect (III) 
(169 04) 
• AonIa Fertilizer Plant Project 
(III) (58 39) 
• Telecommunications Projec 
(IX) (118 84) 
• Teesta Canal Hydroelectric 
Project (80.25) 
• Haldia Port Modernization 
Project (37.91) 
(Total 484.43) 
• Protect tor the Improvement ot 
Medical Equipment of Santai 
Gandhi Post Graduate Institute 
(19.73) 
• Debt Relief (14 12) 
• Aid lor Increased Food Produc-
tion (6 00) 
• Sports Equipment to the Na-
tional Institute ol Sports (0 38) 
(Total 40 23) (Total 4 80) 
1987 • Srisaitam Left Banl( Hydro 
Power Station Protect (261.01) 
• Purulia Pumped Storage Pro-
tect (E/S) (6 28) 
• Anpara 'B' Thermal Power Sta-
tion Construction Project (II) 
(142 95) 
• Assam Gas Power Station and 
Transmission Line Ck>nstruc-
tion Project (II) (135 52) 
• Tamil Nadu Small-Scale Enter-
prises Development Project 
(31 98) 
• MalanjKhand Copper Project 
(E/S) (27.31) 
• Telecommunication Network 
Expansion Project (X) (33.37) 
• Corakhpur Fertilizer Plant 
Revamplng/Rehabilllallon 
Project (26 35) 
• Project (or the Improvement ol 
Medical Equipment for Sanjay 
Gandhi Postgraduate Institute 
(13.46) 
• Project for the Improvement of 
Testing and Training 
Equipments for Agricultural 
Machinery (3 71) 
• Project (or the Improvement o( 
Medical Equipment for 
Regional Cancer Centers (S 08) 
• Debt Relief (12 55) 
• Fishery Survey Vessel Building 
Project (9 11) 
• Aid (or Increased Food Produc-
tion (6 00) 
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• F A C T Cochin Division Cap-
tive Power Plant Project |20 00) 
• Commodity Loan (295 00) 
(Total 979 77) (Total <9 91) (Total 6 56) 
198a Ralchur Thermal Power Station 
Expansion Pro|ect (231 42) 
Ghatghar Pumped Storage Pro-
ject (114 14) 
Tourism Development Project 
(92 44) 
Small Scale Industries Develop 
meni Project (195 00) 
Upper Kolab Irrigation Project 
(37 69) 
Upper Indravati Irrigation Pro 
ject (37 44) 
Ramgundam Fertilizer Plant 
Rehabilitation Project (111 32) 
Mysore Power Mills Moderniza-
tion Project (23 81) 
Modernization of the Hooghly 
Dock and Port Engineers Pro-
ject (35 08) 
> Modernization Project ol Burn-
pur Steel Works (55 46) 
(Total 933 80) 
Project for the improvement o( 
Educational Technology Equip-
ment ol the Indira Gandhi Na-
tional Open University (6 11) 
Project for the Improvement of 
Medical Equipment of Regional 
Cancer Center {II) (6 41) 
Debt Relief (1109) 
Aid for Increased Food Produc 
tlon (6 00) 
Audio-Visual Equipment to the 
Indira Gandhi National Art 
Center (0 41) 
(Total 30 02) (Total 5 03) 
A Japan's OOA Disbursements to India 
($ million) 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Grant Aid 
14 45 
965 
22 53 
23 05 
35 28 
Grants 
Technical Cooperation 
3.15 
4 49 
694 
1012 
10 31 
Total 
17 60 
14 14 
29 47 
33 16 
45 59 
Loan Aid 
4 01 
7 77 
197 23 
270 78 
133 87 
Total 
(%) 
2160(0 9) 
21 91(0 9) 
226 71(5 9) 
303 94(5 8) 
179 46(2 8) 
(Note) Figures In parentheses Indicate the percentage within Japan's total bilateral ODA 
B Share of DAC Countries in Total Bilateral ODA received by India (1987) 
Total Bilateral OOA Received 
Total Multilateral OOA Received 
956 81 
914 29 
(S million) 
Japan 
$303 93 
318% 
F R O 
S136.60 
14 3% 
Neth 
S104 00 
10.9% 
UK 
$76 57 
80% 
France 
$69 42 
7 3% 
Others 
$266 29 
27 8% 
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MALDIVES 
Fiscal Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
19S8 
Loan Aid 
^ 
w 
Grant Aid 
• Construction ol Primary 
Schools (3.80) 
• Food Aid (1 05) 
(Total 4.85) 
t Talecommunication Develop-
ment Proiect (6 39) 
• Food Aid (1 00) 
(Total 7.39) 
• Food Aid (0.85) 
• Equipment for Producing TV 
Programs to TV Maldives (0.43) 
• Telecommunications Develop-
ment Project (9.65) 
(Total 10.93) 
• Telecommunications Develop-
ment Project (3.40) 
• Project for the Construction o( 
the Primary School In Male 
(6.72) 
• Project for the Construction of 
the Breakwaters on the 
Southern Coast of Male (4 97) 
• Food Aid (0.85) 
(Total 15.94) 
• Telecommunications Develop-
ment Project (4 99) 
• Project for the Construction ol 
the Breakwaters on the 
Southern Coast ol Male (6 82) 
• Food Aid (0.75) 
1 (Total 12.56) 
(Hundred Million Yen) 
Technical Cooperation 
(Total 0.89) 
(Total 0.97) 
(Total 0.99) 
(Total 1 87) 
(Total 1.45) 
A Japan's ODA Disbursements to Maldives 
({million) 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Grant Aid 
2.06 
1.89 
4.34 
4.52 
15.14 
Qranta 
Technical Cooptratlon 
0.27 
0.49 
0.56 
1.37 
1.47 
Total 
2.33 
2.38 
4.90 
5.88 
16.61 
Loan Aid 
A0 31 
A0.30 
A0 56 
— 
— 
Total 
(%) 
2 02(0.1) 
2.08(0 1) 
4 34(0 1) 
5 88(0 1) 
16.61(0 3) 
(Note) Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage within Japan's total bilateral ODA 
8. Share of DAC Countries in Total Bilateral ODA received by Maldives (1987) 
Total Bilateral ODA Received: 
Total Multilateral ODA Received: 
12.31 
8.74 
(S million) 
Japan 
SS.88 
47.8% 
Norway 
$2.12 
17.2% 
FR.G. 
$152 
12 3% 
U.K. 
J1.15 
9 3% 
Others 
J1.64 
13.3% 
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NEPAL (Hundred Million Yen) 
Fiscal Year Loan Aid Giani Aid Technical Coopetalion 
1984 Aid (or Increased Food 
Production (26 00) 
Project lor the Construction ol 
Nursing School (11 60) 
Pro)ect tor the Irrigalion 
Facilities Construction (6 00) 
Pro)ecl lor the Improvement o( 
the Transportation Capacity 
(5 00) 
The Rural Electrification 
Pro|6ct (3 00) 
' The Children's Hospital 
Medical Equipment Upgrading 
Project (2 80) 
I Rural Telecommunication 
Network Improvement 
Project (1 54) 
I Project for Rehabilitation of 
School Facilities (1 50) 
< Debt Relief (1 41) 
(Total 58 85) (Total 12 14) 
1985 Project lor the Expansior' of 
Honiculture Development 
Center (8 47) 
Project for the Improvement ol 
the Load Dispatching Network 
(5 89) 
Project for the Reinlorcement 
of Power Distribution Network 
in Kathmandu (5 03) 
Project for the Construction of 
the Food Storage (3 36) 
Rural Telecommunication 
Network Improvement Pro)eot 
(12 26) 
An Display Equipment lo the 
Royal Nepal Academy (0 29) 
Aid for Increased Food 
Production (20 00) 
Debt Relief (0 82) 
Three other projects (6 00) 
(Total 62 12) (Total 9 27) 
1986 Construction of Food 
Storage (11 20) 
Equipment for Paleomagnetic 
Studies 10 Tribhuvan University 
(0 29) 
Rural Telecommunication 
Network Improvement Project 
(22 45) 
Debt Relief (2 28) 
Aid lor Increased Food Produc 
tion (21 00) 
Food Aid (3 00) 
Project for the Remtoicement 
of Power Distribution Network 
in Kathmandu Valley (4 90) 
(Total 65 12) (Total 16 10) « 
1987 • Udalpur Cement Plant Protect 
(187 70) 
• Rural Telecommunication Net-
work Improvement (9 05) 
• Construction of the National 
Tuberculasis Center (14 31) 
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(Total 187.70) 
Rehabilitation of School 
Facilities (20.00) 
River Training (11.79) 
Improvement ol Transportation 
Capacity (11.96) 
Increased Food Production Aid 
(20.0) 
Grant Aid for Debt Relief (2.24) 
Display Equipment tor the 
CulturaJ Assets to the National 
Museum of Nepal (0 49) 
(Total 71.84) (Total 1S.8S) 
1988 Aid tor Increased Food Produc-
tion (7.00) 
Project for Rehabilitation of 
School Facilities (2.00) 
River Training Project (8 45) 
Project for the Improvement of 
the Transportation Capacity 
(8.25) 
Emergency Relief (0 405) 
Project for Expansion and 
Development of the Medium 
Wave Radio Broadcasting Net-
worlt (14.60) 
Project for the Water Supplies 
to Urban and Semi-Urban 
Centers (4 05) 
Debt Relief (2.20) 
Aid for Increased Food Produc 
tion (8 SO) 
(Total 55 46) (Total 19 28) 
A Japan's ODA Disbursements to Nepal 
({million) 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Grant Aid 
15.15 
36.31 
44 66 
49 96 
4137 
Grants 
Technical Cooperation 
6.40 
4.82 
9.05 
14.74 
14.56 
Total 
2155 
41 13 
53 71 
64 72 
55 93 
Loan Aid 
6 97 
961 
14 35 
62 05 
6 43 
Total 
(%) 
28 52(1 2) 
50 74(2 0) 
68 07(1 8) 
76 78(1 5) 
62 36(1 0) 
(Note) Figures In parentheses Indicate the percentage within Japan's total bilateral OOA 
B Share of OAC Countries in Total Bilateral OOA received by Nepal (1987) 
Total Bilateral OOA Received: 
Total Multilateral OOA Received. 
189.21 
151.75 
($ million) 
Japan 
$76.77 
40.6 V. 
F.R.G. 
{26.74 
14.1% 
U.SA. 
{20 00 
10 6% 
UK 
{16 26 
8 6% 
Others 
{49 44 
26 1 % 
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PAKISTAN (Hundred Mllilon Yen) 
Fiscal Year Loan Aid Grant Aid Tecnnlcal Cooperallon 
1984 Project lor tite Construction ol 
Machinery Training 
Centre (29 70) 
Aid lor Increased Food 
Production (29 00) 
Project for the Establishment 
of the College of Nursing and 
Paramedical Institute (15 90) 
Project tor the Exploitation of 
Ground Water (13.30) 
Equipment for the Preservation 
and Exhibition of Cultural 
Properties (0 50) 
Equipment for the Restoration 
and Preservation of Mohenjo 
Daro (0 50) 
Debt Relief (5 14) 
(Total 94 04) (Total 6 60) 
1985 Commodity Loan (85.00) 
Jamshoro Thermal Power 
Station Project (89.77) 
Railway Transportation 
Reinforcement Project 
(148 00) 
(Total 322.77) 
Project lor the Improvement ol 
Equipment tor Punjab Medical 
College (16 70) 
Project for the Establishment 
of the College of Nursing and 
Paramedical Institute (9 20) 
Project for the Exploitation of 
the Ground Water (9 37) 
Aid for Increased Food 
Production (29 00) 
Debt Relief (4 64) 
Project for the Modernization 
of Science Laboratories In the 
Quaid-Azam University (13 40) 
Project for the Improvement of 
Equipment lor National in-
stitute of Cardiovascular 
Diseases (7 80) 
Cultural Grant Aid (0 41) 
(Total 90 52) (Total 8 02) 
1986 Improvement Project of the 
Educational Equipment of the 
Mehran University of Engineer-
ing and Technology (12 82) 
Improvement Project of the 
Research Equipment of H E J 
Research Institute ot 
Chemistry, University ol 
Karachi (12 38) 
Project tor the Establishment 
of High Voltage and Short Cir-
cuit Testing Laboratory (1 06) 
Project for the Improvement ol 
Medical Services lor Sind Arid 
Zone (8 42) 
Upgrading Project for Pakistan 
Marine Academy (5 10) 
Debt Relief (4 32) 
Project (or the Improvement ol 
Roads in Frontier Area (13 46) 
Aid (or increased Food ProduC' 
tion (27 00) 
(Total 84 56) (Total 9 76) 
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1987 
1988 
• Bin Qasim Thermal Powar Sta-
tion Expansion Project (153.00) 
• Telex Network Expansion Proj-
ect (19.00) 
• Dredger Procurement Project 
(43.33) 
• Pat Feeder Canal Rehabilita-
tion and Improvement Project 
(15.51) 
aotal 340.84) 
• Commodity Loan (90.0) 
• Rural Electrification Project 
(207.38) 
• Diesel Power Station Project 
(65.65) 
a SOOkV Multan and Quddu 
Substation Extension Project 
(33.03) 
• Commodity Loan (105.0) 
• Metropolitan Water Supply Pro-
ject (Khanpur 1) (125.16) 
• Metropolitan Water Supply Pro-
ject (SImly) (57.5) 
• Second 220kV Gudd-Slbbi-
Quatta Transmission Line Pro-
ject (49.15) 
• Indus Highway Project (85.16) 
• Oaudkhei Fertilizer Plant 
Modernization Project (185.96) 
(Total 1,004.23) 
• Upgrading Project for Pakistan 
Marine Academy (11.20) 
• Project lor the Construction of 
the High-Voltage and Short-
Circuit Testing Laboratory 
(9.72) 
e Project lor the Improvement of 
Educational Equipment ol 
Mehran University ol Engineer-
ing and Technology (8.81) 
• Project lor the Improvement ol 
Educational Equipment of 
Baluchistan Engineering Col-
lege Khuzdar (6.49) 
e Agriculture Development Proj-
ect in Nashlrabad (3.96) 
e Project lor the Exploitation ol 
Ground Water (22.73) 
• Grant for Debt Relief (4.08) 
• Grant for the Increase of Food 
Production (25.00) 
(Total 91.99) 
• Project lor the Construction ol 
the High-Voltage and Short Cir-
cuit Tes'.Ing Laboratory (ii) 
(22.09) 
• Project for the Improvement o( 
Educational Equipment ol 
Baluchistan Engineering Col-
lege Khuzdar (3.57) 
• Agriculture Development Pro-
ject in Nashirobad (16.68) 
• Aid (or increased Food Produc-
tion (18.5) 
• Emergency Reliel (10.0) 
• Emergency Reliel (2.38) 
• Food Aid \K.O) 
• Debt Relief (3.83) 
• Sports Equipment lor the 
Sports Board (0.47) 
• Project for the Improvement of 
Construction Machinery of 
Fronteer Works Organization 
(15.21) 
• Project for Rehabilitation ol the 
Area Suffering from the Flood 
(6.00) 
(Total 108.73) 
(Total 16 18) 
(Total 14.16) 
A. Japan's OOA Disbursements to Pakistan 
($ million) 
Year 
1984 
19SS 
1986 
1M7 
1988 
Grants 
Grant Aid 
42.72 
36.52 
31.90 
ei.78 
M.4« 
Technical Cooperation 
,>.01 
4.74 
6.94 
11.01 
13.75 
Total 
45.72 
43.26 
38.84 
72.80 
103.21 
Loan Aid 
21.31 
50.05 
112.72 
53.89 
198.97 
Total 
(V.) 
67.03(2.6) 
93.31(3.6) 
151.56(3.9) 
126.69(2.4) 
302.17(4.7) 
(Note) Figures In parentheses Indicate the percentage within Japan's total bilateral ODA. 
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B Share of OAC Countries In Tot«i Bilateral ODA received by Pakistan (1987) 
Japan 
28.8% 
U.S.A. 
(90.00 
20.4% 
F R G 
(SO SO 
11 5% 
Canada 
VJ7 99 
8 6% 
France 
«A.06 
7 7% 
($ million) 
Others 
J-iOl 22 
23 0% 
Total Bilateral OOA Received: 
Total Multilateral ODA Received' 
440.46 
471.85 
SRI LANKA (Hundred Million Yen) 
Fiscal Year Loan Aid Grant Aid Technical Cooperation 
1984 Greater Coloml>o 
Telecommunication Network 
Improvement Project (103.59) 
Port of Colombo Expansion 
Project (Supply of Equip-
ment; Phase II) (25.79) 
Commodity Loan (24.32) 
(Total 153.70) 
Aid for Increased Food 
Production (26 00) 
Proiect for the Rehabili-
tation of Water Treatment 
Plants in Colombo 
(14 90) 
Project for the Expansion of 
Television Broadcasting 
(14 30) 
Project for the Establishment 
of the Matara College of 
Education (13 40) 
Project lor the improvement 
of Educational Equipment of 
the University of Ruhuna 
(6.20) 
Project for the Improvement 
of Equipment lor the 
Telecommunication Training 
Centres (5 70) 
Three other projects (7 40) 
(Total 87 90) (Total 1101) 
1985 Project for the Establishment 
of the Matara College of 
Education (20 OOj 
Aid for Increased Food 
Production (26 00) 
Project for the Establishment 
of the National Youth 
Center (10 30) 
Project for the Establishment 
of the Pharmaceutical 
Formulation Center of 
Essencial Drugs (16 60) 
Debt Relief (2 45) 
Emergency Aid (0 20) 
Other three projects (12.72) 
(Total 89 82) (Total 15 45) 
1986 • Samanalawewa Hydro-
electric Power Project 
(146.00) 
• Commodity Loan X (25.00) 
• Project for the Improvement 
of the institute of Funda-
mental Studies (6 77) 
• Debt Relief (2 21) 
• Project for the Improvement 
of Drlnl(ing Water Supply 
(6.70) 
• Project for the Establishment 
of Plant Genetic 
Resources Center (9 73) 
• Project lor the Establishment 
of National Youth 
Center (18 06) 
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1987 
(Total 170.00) 
0 Emergency Aid (0.21) 
0 Project lor the EstabllshmerM 
ol Pharmaceutical Formula-
tion Center (7.04) 
« The Central Store for 
Medical Supplies & Equip-
ment (13.43) 
# Aid lor Increased Food 
Production (28.00) 
(Total 94.15) 
Samanalawewa Hydroelectric 
PoMiw Pro\«ct ^\M.2\ 
Port ol Colombo Expansion 
Project (19.55) 
Commodity Loan (35.00) 
Mahawell Development Project 
(System C) (29.50) 
Mahawell Development Project 
(System B Right Bank) (83.92) 
' MInipe and Nagadeepa Irriga-
tion Rehabilitation Project 
(18.50) 
' Roads Reconstruction Program 
(123.14) 
\SM 
(Total 448.81) 
• Project tor the Establishment 
Center (10.15) 
• Musical Instruments to the 
Ministry of Education (0.46) 
• Emergency Aid (0.24) 
• The Fishing Ports Maintenance 
Project (5.62) 
• Project lor the improvement ol 
the Medical Research institute 
(10.38) 
• Project for the Establishment 
of the National Training Center 
for Automobile Engineering 
(13.58) 
• Aid for Increased Food (28.00) 
• Project tor the Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction (11.20) 
• Debt Relief (2.00) 
• Project for the Improvement of 
the Equipment lor the Anti-
Malaria Campaign (4.55) 
Project lor the improvement of 
the Educational Equipment for 
the University ol Moratuwa 
(9.09) 
(Total 95.27) 
(Total 14.36) 
« Comnvo^VVj Loan \,30.00\ 
• Transmission System Augmen 
tation & Development Project 
(•3.80) 
• Commuter Train Improvement 
Project (67.42) 
(Total 141.02) 
» T^« PTO\«C^ <i< <w ^h« Vw r^a"**-
ment ol the Medical Research 
Institute (18.42) 
• The Project lor the Establish-
ment ol the National Training 
Centre lor Automobile 
Engineering (7.86) 
> The Project lor the imponre-
ment ol the Equipment for the 
Emergency Medical Services 
(2.36) 
e The Project for the Improve-
ment of the Equipment for the 
Model Villages (14.55) 
• The Project lor the improve-
ment of the Short Wave Radio 
Broadcasting (12.73) 
• The Project for the ReconstruC' 
tion of the Victoria Bridge 
(0.53) 
• Debt Relief (1.79) 
• Aid lor increased Food Produc-
tion (26.00) 
• The Project tor the Develop-
ment ol the Rehabilitation for 
Minipe-Nagadeepa (4.49) 
(Total 88.73) 
(Total 18.57) 
I (Total 21.45) 
A. Japan's ODA Olsbursamants to Sri Lanka 
(S million) 
Yaar 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Grants 
Grant Aid 
29.42 
33 35 
56.61 
54.16 
65 68 
Technical Cooperation 
5.82 
7.71 
11.09 
12.47 
21.18 
Total 
35 24 
4106 
67 70 
66 63 
66 86 
Loan Aid 
28 53 
42 68 
59 20 
51.63 
112.97 
(V.) 
63 77(2 6) 
83 74(3 3) 
126 91(3 3) 
118 26(2 3) 
199 83(3 1) 
(Note) Figures In parentheses indicate the percentage within Japan's total bilateral OOA 
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B Share of DAC Countries In Total Bilateral ODA received by Sri Lanka (1987) 
Japan 
S118.25 
36.3% 
F.R.Q. 
$30.87 
12.2K 
U.S.A. 
$35.00 
10.7% 
Neth. 
$23.52 
7.2% 
Others 
$109 63 
33 6% 
(S million) 
Total Bilateral OOA Received: 
Total Multilateral OOA Received: 
326.07 
173.35 
Middle East 
AFGHANISTAN 
Fiscal Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1968 
Loan Aid 
-
-
-
— 
-
Grant Aid 
-
-
-
-
-
(Hundred Million Van) 
Technical Cooperation 
— 
-
— 
— 
-
A. Japan's OOA Disbursements to Afghanistan 
({million) 
Year 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1088 
Grants 
Grant Aid 
— 
Technical Cooperation 
0.00 
Total 
0.00 
Loan Aid 
i:^0.30 
A0 04 
Total 
(%) 
£>0 30 ( - ) 
0 00(0.0) 
A0 04(—) (r 
(Note) Figures In parentheses Indicate the percentage within Japan's total bilateral ODA 
APPEt^DlX B* 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAfAN 
AND SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES 1970-1988 , 
•Source t Economic R e l a t i o n s between 
Japan and the SAARC c o u n t r i e s 
(TokyoXMinistry of F o r e i g n 
A f f a i r s , 1 9 9 0 ) . 
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in.Japan's Economic Cooperation with the SAARC Countries 
1.Total Flow of Financial Resources frou Japan to the SAARC Countries (encluding Grants by Private Voluntary Agencies) 
(net disbursement basis) 
unitlmlllion |(the figures are rounded to the first decimal) 
B a n g l a d e s h 
B h u t a n 
I n d i a 
H a l d i v e s 
N e p a l 
P a k i s t a n 
S r i L a n k a 
t o t a l 
SAARC s share of 
Japan' s total flow of 
Financial Resources 
to a l l Developing 
Countries 
1 9 8 3 
1 0 4 . 3 
0 . 4 
1 9 9 . 2 
1 . 2 
2 5 . 4 
6 3 . 4 
8 4 . 0 
4 7 7 . 9 
6 . 1% 
1 9 8 4 
1 2 2 , 7 
1 . 9 
1 2 3 . 9 
1 . 6 
2 8 . 7 
5 7 . 7 
1 3 7 . 0 
4 7 3 . 5 
4 . 0% 
1 9 8 5 
1 2 3 . 6 
1 . 6 
6 7 . 6 
1 . 9 
5 1 . 5 
9 2 . 8 
1 2 3 . 4 
4 6 2 . 4 
4 . 0% 
1 9 8 6 
2 5 7 . 7 
5 . 3 
4 5 7 . 3 
3 . 1 
7 6 . 4 
1 6 6 . 8 
1 3 9 . 4 
1 , 1 0 6 . 0 
7 . 6% 
1 9 8 7 . 
3 2 8 . 4 
4 . 2 
6 4 9 . 6 
6 . 1 
7 1 . 5 
1 4 5 . 9 
1 3 5 . 1 
1 , 3 4 0 . 8 
6 . 6% 
Source; OECD:Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries,and others 
(note) Total Flow of Financial Resources consists of ODA(Official Development Assistance), 
OOF(Other Official Flow), PF(Private Flow),and Grants by Private Voluntary Agencies. 
2 . Distribution of Japan's ODA anong the SAARC Countries 
(net disbursenent basis) 
unit:idllion t, % (the figures are rounded to the first decinal) 
W o r l d 
A s i a 
S A A R C 
Bangladesh 
B' h u a n 
I n d i a 
M a l d i v e s 
N e p a l 
P a k i s t a n 
S r i Lanka 
1 9 8 1 
2,260.4 
(100.0) 
1,604.5 
(71.0) 
350.3 
(15.5) 
145.0( 6.4) 
0.4( 0.0) 
4.0( 0.2) 
1.0( 0.0) 
33.l( 1.5) 
1U.7( 1.8) 
49.1( 2.2) 
1 9 8 2 
2,367.3 
(100.0) 
1,624.3 
(68.6) 
449.7 
(19.0) 
215.8( 9.1) 
1.6( 0.0) 
41.0( 1.7) 
-0.9( -) 
35,2( 1.5) 
9S.3( 4.0) 
61.6( 2.6) 
1 9 8 3 
2,425.3 
(100.0) 
1,613.8 
(66.5) 
410.0 
(16.9) 
104.2( 4.3) 
0.4( 0.0) 
129.5( 5.3) 
1.5( 0.1) 
28.3( 1.2) 
72.8( 3.0) 
73.1( 3.0) 
1 9 8 4 
2,427.4 
(100) 
1,594.2 
(65.7) 
308.3 
(12.7) 
123.3( S.l) 
1.9(0.1) 
21.6( 0.9) 
2.0( 0.1) 
28.5( 1.2) 
67.0( 2.8) 
63.8( 2.7) 
1 9 8 5 
2,556.9 
(100.0) 
1,731.8 
(67.7) 
375.0 
(14.7) 
121.5( 4.8) 
1.6( 0.0) 
21.9( 0.9) 
2.1( 0.1) 
50.7( 2.0) 
93.3( 3.6) 
83.7( 3.3) 
1 9 8 6 
3,846.2 
(100.0) 
2,493.5 
(64.8) 
831.0 
(21.6) 
248.5( 6.5) 
5.3( 0.0) 
226.7( 5.9) 
4.3( 0.1) 
68.1( 1.8) 
151.6( 3.9) 
126.9( 3,3) 
1 9 8 7 
. 5,247,6 
(100,0) 
3,415.9 
(65.1) 
970,2 
(18,5) 
334.2( 6.4) 
4.2( 0.1) 
303.9( 5.8) 
5.9( 0,1) 
76.8( 1.5) 
126.7( 2.4) 
118.3( 2.3) 
1 9 8 8 
6,421.9 
(100.0) 
4,038.6 
(62.9) 
1,109.2 
(17.3) 
342.0( 5.3) 
6.8( 0.1) 
179.5( 2.8) 
16.6( 0.3) 
62.^( 1.0) 
302.2( 4.7) 
199.8( 3.1) 
Source : Outlook of Japan' s Economic Cooperation 
(Economic Cooperation Beureau) 
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